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ABSTRACT 
Asim Yuzbasioglu 
An Empirical Analysis of Takeover Predictions in the UK: Application of Artificial 
Neural Networks and Logistic Regression 
This study undertakes an empirical analysis of takeover predictions in the UK. The 
objectives of this research are twofold. First, whether it is possible to predict or identity 
takeover targets before they receive any takeover bid. Second, to test whether it is 
possible to improve prediction outcome by extending firm specific characteristics such 
as corporate governance variables as well as employing a different technique that has 
started becoming an established analytical tool by its extensive application in corporate 
finance field. 
In order to test the first objective, Logistic Regression (LR) and Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANNs) have been applied as modelling techniques for predicting target 
companies in the UK. Hence by applying ANNs in takeover predictions, their prediction 
ability in target classification is tested and results are compared to the LR results. For 
the second objective, in addition to the company financial variables, non-financial 
characteristics, corporate governance characteristics, of companies are employed. For 
the fist time, ANNs are applied to corporate governance variables in takeover prediction 
purposes. In the final section, two groups of variables are combined to test whether the 
previous outcomes of financial and non-financial variables could be improved. 
However the results suggest that predicting takeovers, by employing publicly available 
information that is already reflected in the share price of the companies, is not likely at 
least by employing current techniques of LR and ANNs. These results are consistent 
with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Mergers and takeovers are used as a strategy for corporate control and expansiOn, 
market stability, and in certain cases to provide excess gains to the shareholders of 
acquired firms (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). The rationale behind mergers and 
takeovers can be related to a wide range of factors. These include capital market 
liquidity, strategic reasons, business cycles, the economic and political environment, 
integration of the European Union, management motives, diversification, defence 
against acquisitions, and taxation. (Post, 1994; Brealey and Myers, 1991; Sudarsanam, 
1995; Mueller, 1989). 
In general, the explanation of why firms become takeover targets was first given by 
Manne ( 1965, p.ll2) as poor management; 
"As an existing company is poorly managed-in the sense of not making as great re tu m 
for the shareholders as could be accomplished under the other feasible managements-
the market price of the shares declines relative to the shares of other companies in the 
same industry or relative to the market as a whole'. 
Clearly, as a result of this logic, one can postulate that managers of other firms would 
take the low price signalling of stock market as evidence of poor performance on behalf 
of incumbent management and act accordingly by bidding for these low priced firms on 
the market. 
However, the assumption of low pricing/valuation of inefficient management by the 
stock market relies on explicit presumption of efficient markets, which means that 
market prices of securities will always equal the fair or fundamental values of those 
securities. On the other hand, if one observes that stock prices move randomly 
approximating a random walk, the stock market will, randomly, under price some of the 
securities. This may not necessarily be as a result of its managers or mismanagement, 
but leaves them vulnerable to any takeover bid from a competitor or any fim1 that is 
randomly enjoying a period of high share price performance. High share price will also 
enable fim1s to raise necessary tinance for the cost of the takeovers (Scherer, 1988). 
Empirical studies have been carried out to predict acquisition targets or profile target 
companies' characteristics- before a takeover bid - mainly used publicly available 
financial information as financial ratios. These studies include work by Simkowitz and 
Monroe, 1971; Stevens, 1973; Singh, 1975; Belkaoui, 1978; Wansley and Lane, 1983; 
Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Rege, 1984; Walkling, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Bames, 1990; 
Sen et al. 1995; Powell, 1997; and Barnes. Most of these studies have reported 
successful prediction models for takeovers. 
However, as indicated by Palepu ( 1986), contrary to the reports of successful prediction 
modelling, the stock market, through share prices, is unable to predict target firms in 
reality even within a very short time window. Dodd and Ruback (1977), and Asquith 
(1983) found that the market only receives the takeover news shortly before the 
announcement dates. As the most frequently cited line in takeover studies says 'it is 
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difficult, if not impossible, for the market to predict future targets' Jensen and Ruback 
(1983, p.29). 
In these studies statistical classification techniques of Dichotomous Classification test 
(DC), Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Logistic Regression (LR) are used as 
predictive tools in corporate takeover prediction. Although almost all of them claimed a 
high degree of prediction (from 60% to 90%) in their classification of companies as 
targets and non-targets, Palepu ( 1986) shows that most of these studies suffer from 
sampling biases. This bias occurs when the hold-out sample is selected to test the 
predictive ability of the model, in that the non-targets are underrepresented in the 
sample. Due to this they have been able to claim a high degree of success in their 
model's. classification or prediction of corporate takeovers. Palepu (1986), by correcting 
this sampling bias, estimated that logistic regression is capable of predicting only 45% 
of the targets and non-targets in a hold-out sample. Thus, any abnormal returns for 
investors, by simply predicting takeovers or using these techniques, seem unlikely. 
Prediction studies in corporate takeovers are founded/modelled on corporate failure 
prediction. Since Beaver's work in 1966, different prediction techniques with different 
variables, but mainly financial ratios, are applied both in takeover and failure 
predictions. As in the case of any other event in finance, information is power and 
enables its holders to manipulate the rmrket and benefit from it. Thus, being in 
possession of early information about a takeover event is a major advantage to the 
holder. 
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As earlier event studies show, takeovers create abnormal returns to the target firm 
shareholders (Mandelker, 1974; Dodd, 1980; Conn, 1985; Holland and Hodgkinson, 
1994 ). As studies analysed share price performance of companies around the 
announcement of bids, results were implicit that target firms' shareholders experienced 
abnormal ren1rns (cumulative average residual) on their share prices after it was 
adjusted for overall market effect. However, the results were not so conclusive for 
bidding firms' share price performance. Results vary from positive returns to zero 
returns. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) examined 40 previous merger studies and concluded that 
corporate takeovers generate positive gains to target firm's shareholders, and bidding 
firm's shareholders do not lose. These results are, however, contradicted by some other 
researchers in that, although target firm's shareholders benefit in the form of premiums 
paid, acquiring firm's shareholders do not gain from the takeover activities. Roll (1994), 
by simply examining the same studies as Jensen and Ruback (1983), argued that the 
gains from takeovers are overestimated and reached a different conclusion, stating that 
the combined value of target and bidding firms has increased in some studies and 
decreased in others and none of these are statistically significant. Roll (1994) further 
argued that gains observed by the acquired firms represent a transfer from the bidding 
firms in the form of takeover premiums paid. Roll (1994) argues that corporate 
takeovers are an area that does not reflect the aggregate rational behaviour of markets 
but irrational decision making of individuals under uncertainty. As a result he explains 
that takeovers occur as a result of valuation error of individuals and/or hubris. 
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Some of the other studies reported that, on average, acquiring firms suffered falls in 
their share prices on the announcement of the takeover (Firth, 1980) while some 
indicated slight increases or no change in the acquiring firms' share prices. Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins {1983) stated the importance of size effects and merger programs. 
They drew some attention to merger programs contending that earlier bids should 
contain more information about the profitability of the program than later bids. Their 
conclusion for the programs was that bidding firms gain significantly in their first four 
merger bids. Also, it is difficult to measure abnormal returns if the relative size of two 
merging firms is different. Nevertheless the overall conclusion of these studies is that 
takeovers are generally value enhancing. 
Since it is generally supported empirically that target firm's shareholders benefit from a 
takeover it is especially important for market players to attempt to predict, if possible, or 
identify likely takeover targets in advance with certain degree of accuracy to acquire 
some abnormal returns. 
1.2 The Purpose of the Study 
This study undertakes an empirical analysis of takeover prediction in the UK. The main 
objective of the research is to examine whether it is possible to predict takeovers, or 
identify possible target candidates, before the actual announcement of takeover bid. As 
the question rightly put forward by Singh A. (1971), "for firms quoted 011 the stock 
market, is it possible to ge11eralise and suggest that the possessio11 of certai11 defillile 
eco11omic and fina/lcial characteristics may make a firm more likely to be take11 over?" 
Second, if such a prediction is likely then more importantly to improve the prediction 
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success of earlier studies by improving finn specific variables and employing a different 
technique that has started becoming an established analytical tool by it is extensive 
application in corporate finance. However it should be noted that it is not in the scope of 
this research to explain why takeovers occur, or to explain extensively the factors 
contributing to takeovers. As explained, the limit will be to examine whetter company 
takeovers can be predicted by using some their publicly available information. 
As mentioned, identifying target companies accurately prior to their bid announcement 
can create abnonnal returns to the market players. Generation of abnonnal returns to the 
target companies through corporate takeovers has already been well documented in the 
literature. However, contrary to markets' inability to make such predictions through 
valuation, Dodd and Ruback (1977), Asquith (1983), those studies mentioned above 
have already reported some impressive results by applying conventional statistical 
techniques of Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Logistic Regression (LR). 
Since the mam mm of the study is prediction, a new technique, Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANNs), which has been tested and applied in other fields of finance and 
accounting, is put to use. The close parallel to the employment of ANNs to corporate 
takeover prediction studies in the field of corporate finance is corporate failure 
predictions. Several studies successfully use this technique in corporate failure 
prediction along with the classical counterparts of MDA and LR and reported that 
application of ANNs provided better classification rates than the fonner techniques 
(Aiici, 1996). 
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Therefore this research will be carried out to test the following objectives: 
I . Modelling takeover likelihood and testing it on the possibility of predicting 
target companies in the UK by ANNs and LR. 
2. Applying ANNs in takeover prediction and testing ANNs' classification 
ability for target prediction in comparison with LR 
1.3 Classification Techniques in Corporate Takeovers 
It is worth noting that although, in this study, LR and ANNs are selected for 
classification techniques, classification techniques are by no means limited to these 
methods. Other techniques such as classification trees, multiple regression, probit 
analysis, machine learning techniques and expert systems can also be applied to the 
classification tasks (Weiss and Kulikowski, 1991). On theother hand, the reason for the 
preference given to LR, as a benchmark to ANNs, is its theoretical advantage 
concerning that it is free of multivariate normality assumption as well as its popularity 
in the literature. Also using the same type of technique \\ill make the results of this 
study comparable to previous classification and prediction studies. 
ANNs, as compared to the other statistical techniques, is relatively a new technique and 
making its way into financial applications. They are being applied to all areas of finance 
and accounting. Their rising popularity comes from the fact that ANNs try to mimic the 
human brain in their working. Thus, the approach of neural computing is to capture the 
governing principles of the human brain and its solutions and apply these 
methodologies to the given tasks. 
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Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) have been used as a tool to classify companies or 
financial organisations (Martin-del-Brio and Serrano-Cinca, 1995) and much work has 
been conducted on bankruptcy predictions with the comparison of MDA and LR which 
are linear or curvi-linear classification techniques. 
Alici (1996) has applied ANNs to company failure prediction and suggested that ANNs 
can perform better than their classical counterparts, DA and LR, where a noisy and 
random environment exists. 
Several advantages of ANNs have been mentioned over statistical models. For example, 
this approach is free of multivariate normality assumption. In as much as the 
multivariate normality of financial ratios is questionable, the reliability of the models 
that use financial ratios and depend on this assumption of normality will be questionable 
too (Watson, 1990). The existence of outliers in financial ratios is widespread. Although 
remedial measures, such as winsoration, the replacement of outliers with the nearest 
observation, trimming, removal of unusual observations from the data, are applied to 
financial ratios, the distribution of many financial ratios is not only nom1al but their 
distribution properties change in time. However, it is claimed that ANNs are capable of 
fitting complex non-linear models to the data. 
Recently, Sen et al. ( 1995) have applied ANNs and Logistic Regression to corporate 
merger prediction. Their work suggests that ANNs provide a good mathematical fit to 
the data. However in predicting mergers neither of the teclmiques performed better on a 
hold-out sample. 
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One of the main disadvantages of ANNs lies in their inability to explain the relative 
importance of the inputs. Therefore they have a limited use compared with statistical 
models in empirical research in finance and accounting. In order to eliminate this 
disadvantage, Sen et al.(l995) used simple techniques, such as sensitivity analysis and 
graphical plots. Also, Alici(l996) used a skeletonisation algorithm that aims to 
determine the relevance of individual nodes and connections by leaving only those 
important inputs and connections in order to eliminate this disadvantage to a certain 
degree. 
Some of the applications of ANNs in finance and accounting are; 
1. Bond rating: Dutta and Shekar (1988), Singleton (1990), Dutta and Wong (1994). 
11. Bank failure prediction: Bell et al., (1990), Tarn (1991), Tarn and Kiang (1992). 
iii. Stock price performance modelling: Kimoto et al., ( 1990), Ahmadi (1990), Yoon 
and Swales (1991 ), Refenes et al., ( 1994). 
IV. Risk assessment of mortgage applications: Colins et al., (1988), Reilly et al., 
(1991). 
v. Currency exchange rate forecasting: Refenes (1993). 
v1. Time series prediction of Financial Markets: Sharda and Patil (1993), Azoff 
(1994), Beastaens et al., (1994), Bosarge (1991), Beastaens et al., (1994), Refenes 
(1995). 
vn. Commodity trading: Bergerson and Wunsch (1991), Collard (1993). 
VIII. Accounting and financial ratio applications: Liang et al.. ( 1992), Coakley and 
Brown (1993), Berry and Triquerios (1993), Barker (1993), Kryzanowski et al., 
(1995). 
ix. Corporate failure prediction: Odom and Sharda (1990), Tarn (1991), Udo (1993), 
Altrnan et al., (1994), Wilson and Sharda (1994), Alici (1996). 
x. Corporate takeover prediction: Sen et al., ( 1995). 
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1.4 Data Set 
The trend of mergers and acquisitions during the time period where the data set has 
been extracted can be seen below. This trend shows that the takeover activity reached a 
high point during the mid to late 1980s in the UK. It reached its peak pcint in 1987 in 
terms of numbers then in value tem1s in 1989. However, the trend has since been a 
decline. Even though it seems that it started to be on the increase in money tetms, 
reaching a value of £36 billion in 1995, it declined to £23 billion in 1996. In the period 
of this study, from 1990 to 1994, the general trend is downwards both in value and 
number terms. This trend, especially in the drop in number of acquisitions, is obviously 
reflected in the data set of this study as well. 
M&ATrend 
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100 
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Figure 1.1. Number and Value ofUK public company acquisitions. 
The target companies have been extracted from the Acquisition Monthly from a period 
of January 1990 to December 1996 in the UK. The target group also includes fai led 
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bids. The assumption here is that if a company receives a bid, it contains the 
characteristics of target companies. The compames in the sample were drawn from 
manufacturing industry to establish more stable models by excluding oil and gas, 
utilities and construction industries. The target group includes I 03 companies. The data 
set has been divided into two to form a derivation sample to form the models and a 
hold-out sample to test the effectiveness of these models. 
In this study no further attempt has been made to split the target sample into hostile and 
non-hostile acquisitions. The fundamental reason for this is that the hostile acquisitions 
fom1 a small proportion of overall takeover market in the UK. Weir (1997), for 
example, reported that out of 71 targets for the period 1990-93, only 23 were hostile 
acquisitions. This makes a proportion of 24% and is consistent with the figure for the 
1980s (Sudarsanam, 1991; Powell, 1997). Small number of hostile targets would result 
models with unreliable estimates. Especially considering that the data is further divided 
into estimation and hold-out samples. If the same proportionality were applied to the 
target data in this study, it would have produced a sample of 24 hostile acquisitions. 
These 24 hostile companies would have additionally had to be partitioned into 
estimation and hold-out samples. Hence such a sample would have neither produced 
liable models nor prediction results would have been reliable. Therefore it is decided to 
concentrate solely on the whole acquisitions without splitting the targets into any sub-
groups. 
Two different sets of data are constructed in order to form the models. First the target 
group is divided into two random groups for each year in order to form the first model. 
52 target companies are matched with non-target companies and used in the estimation 
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sample. The rest of the target group is used in the hold-out sample. This data is called 
' Mixed Data ' (MD). Second, the target companies that received takeover bids from 
January 1990 to December 1994 are matched with non-target companies and used in the 
estimation sample. The target companies of 1995 and 1996 on the other hand are 
included in the hold-out sample. Tlus data is ca11ed 'Time Data' (TD). 
The reason for formi ng MD modelling is twofold. First it is used as an estimation of 
acquisition probability in the previous literatme (Dietr ich and Sorensen, 1984). Second 
to use it as a benchmark to TD. As can be seen the TD is a more realistic approach in 
takeover modelling. As it would be unrealistic to predict companies acquired in 1990 
with companies takenover in 1996 and claim predictive success as a result in the case of 
MD. 
The distribution of target companies in years for MD and TD are presented below in 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
Table 1.1 -Target composition in MD 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
No ofComp. 16 18 15 13 16 15 10 103 
Derivation 9 9 7 6 8 8 5 52 
Hold-Out 7 9 8 7 8 7 5 52 
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Table 1.2-Target composition in TD 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
NoofComp. 16 18 15 13 16 15 10 103 
Derivation 16 18 15 13 16 - - 78 
Hold-Out - - - - - 15 10 25 
1.5 Variable Set 
Two different variable sets are used in this study. In the first part the financial ratios 
were used to model takeover likelihood. Financial ratios of the companies are collected 
from Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) and Datastream databases. Secondly the 
non-financial characteristics, which are the corporate governance structure, of 
companies are used in the modelling process. The corporate governance variables are 
collected from Price Waterhouse Corporate Register and annual reports of the related 
companies. In the final analysis the financial and non-financial variables are combined 
to form the models. The schematic description of this methodology is shown below. 
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VARIABLES 
FINANCIAL RATIOS 1------.------l NON-F I NANC I AL 
Diagram 1.1 Schematic description of the steps involved in the methodology. 
1.6 The Layout of the Study 
In chapter 2, some theoretical discussion of mergers and acquisitions will be provided. 
In this chapter, the discussion on takeovers wi ll be examined firstly from the two 
opposing views as neo-classical and managerial and in second from the agency theory 
perspective. The general purpose of this chapter is just to highlight the ongoing 
discussion on takeovers and takeover framework and provide an introduction to the 
concepts and terminology that are used in chapters four and five. 
In chapter 3, the teclmiques that are used in this study will be covered. LR and 
especially ANNs will be described in more detail. Since one of the research objectives 
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of this study is to measure the application of ANNs in takeover predictions, and due to 
ANNs' relatively recent introduction to finance, a relatively detailed introduction to 
neural computing technology will be given. Supervised learning process and training 
algorithms of Standard Backpropagation and Generalised Delta Rule along with 
unsupervised learning process are described. 
In chapter 4, the financial ratio modelling results will be presented. The aim of this 
chapter is to model financial ratios of the companies in the sample and apply these 
models to hold-out samples in order to assess the prediction success. In the first section 
the methodology, data and derivation of the variables from the relevant hypothesis 
postulated in the literature as the causes of takeovers will be explained along with the 
methodological issues and shortcomings of prediction studies as explained by 
Zmijewski (1984) and Palepu ( 1986). In the second part the estimated models of LR and 
ANNs will be presented. Since there is no attempt will be made to exphin the relative 
importance of input variables in the constructed ANN structures, the classification 
tables of the networks' on the estimation sample will be given as an indication of the 
networks' mathematical fit to the data. In any case, the determination of the network 
weights is beyond the capability of the neural network software (NEUframe 
Professional v.3) that is used in this study. The final section of this chapter will provide 
the prediction results of the models and their significance. 
In chapter 5, the corporate governance data modelling results will be given. Similar to 
chapter four, the first section describes the methodology, data and corporate governance 
variables. In the second part the estimated models of LR and ANNs' classification 
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tables on the estimation data will be displayed. Finally, the prediction results of 
corporate governance models and their significance will be provided. 
In chapter 6, the combined data modelling and results will be presented. As it is 
displayed in Diagram 1.1 that in the final stage of the analysis the financial and non-
financial variables will be combined and modelled for prediction purposes. 
In chapter 7, the main conclusions of the analysis will be discussed along with the 
limitations of the study as well as the general characteristics of takeovers that cause 
impediments to takeover predictions. Also the areas of further research to improve the 
ANNs modelling in takeover prediction studies or in similar empirical studies are 
discussed. 
The reason for modelling financial ratio and corporate governance data separately 
initially before combining them in chapter six is to follow the paths of two distinct line 
of takeover likelihood modelling in the related research literature. Financial ratios used 
to estimate takeover likelihood extensively by the researchers such as Simkowitz and 
Monroe, 1971; Stevens, 1973; Singh, 1975; Belkaoui, 1978; Wansley and Lane, 1983; 
Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Rege, 1984; Walkling, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990; 
Sen et a/, 1995; Powell, 1997; and Bames, 1998. On the other hand some other 
researchers such as Shivdasani (1993), Gammie and Gammie (1996) and Weir (1997) 
applied corporate governance characteristics of companies in their modelling. Therefore 
it is intended in this study to measure the predictive powers of these two separate firm 
characteristics independently without any interaction between them affecting the overall 
results. 
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1.7. Discussions and Summary 
In addition to LR, ANNs will be applied to both financial and non-financial 
characteristics of takenover UK public companies in the hope that their unique profiles 
can be captured or modelled. These models will then be applied for discrimination and 
prediction purposes to test their fitness for such a task. 
As far as the study is concerned, this will be the first study in which ANNs will be 
applied to takeover predictions by employing financial ratios in the UK and first time by 
employing corporate governance variables in takeover predictions. 
It will also be valuable to see in the end how ANNs cope with such a complex task of 
takeover prediction and perform against an established multivariate technique such as 
LR. 
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Chapter 2 - Motives for Takeovers, Agency Theory and Control 
Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief discussion of some of the theories of firm 
and their implications as well as their explanations of mergers and acquisitions process. 
In the first instance, the motives and reasons for mergers will be highlighted from the 
perspective of two opposing theories, classified as neo-classical and managerial 
approaches to firm behaviour. In addition, the results of some of the empirical work 
carried out to see whether acquisitions are undertaken in accordance with neo-classical 
or managerial perspectives will be reviewed. Furthermore, along with the discussion of 
these hypotheses, some of the variables and their relevance to the discussion topic will 
be highlighted. However, a more detailed discussion of the variables, financial and 
corporate governance, and their importance in terms of the takeover prediction 
perspective will be provided later in their respective chapters. 
In the following part of the chapter, agency theory will be reviewed and its relevance to 
takeovers will be stressed. The review of agency theory in this chapter serves simply to 
highlight the agency framework, define the concepts and tenninology that are used in 
the theory as well as in this study. It is not the aim here to provide a comprehensive or 
detailed analysis of agency theory in the sense of designing an agency concept. This 
review, though simple, provides a supplementary introduction and groundwork to the 
hypothesis that is used in the later chapters of the model development. 
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2.2 Motives and Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions decisions are part of business and corporate strategy for 
companies. However, the decision taken by the management to implement these 
strategies has brought forward the two different conflicting views on the motives of the 
takeover decisions. First it is the value maximising approach, where the bidding 
management makes a decision on the basis of the economic return to the investment, 
hence maximising shareholders' value, and the second is the managerial self-interest 
seeking approach. 
In the neo-classical approach to the firm, managerial decisions about takeovers are 
taken to maximise shareholders' wealth. The neo-classical theory interprets the 
companies as single units with a single purpose of profit maximisation. It assumes 
costless information and rational decision-making so it isolates organisations from 
managerial behaviour. Accordingly self-interest seeking purpose has no place. It further 
assumes that power relations are unimportant and the conflict among the individuals is 
meaningless (Moschandreas, 1994). The neo-classical profit maximisation theory 
suggests that competitive market forces drive companies to pursue shareholder wealth 
maximisation. Hence, the theory interprets mergers and acquisitions from a profit 
maximisation perspective and concludes that companies make acquisitions when it 
results in increased shareholder wealth. If, after the takeover, the acquired company's 
profitability increases, then this increase in shareholder wealth will be realised (Firth, 
1980; Manne, 1965). Firth (1980) suggests that the profitability can increase through 
monopoly power, synergy, or replacing target management with a more efficient and 
competent type. 
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Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review of the literature is supportive of the neo-classical 
theory. The results of the reviewed empirical studies showed that shareholders of target 
firms accumulated large positive abnormal returns in completed takeovers while small 
but statistically significant positive abnormal returns are realised by bidders in 
successful tender offers. However the returns to bidding companies' shareholders in the 
case of mergers were zero. Finally, Jensen and Ruback (1983) concluded that even 
though bidding companies' shareholders do not gain but do not lose either, gains 
experienced by the targets indicate that takeovers create value. 
Mandelker (1974) investigates mergers and acquisitions from a competition perspective 
to see whether the information about the mergers is efficiently reflected in the 
company's share price. The study concluded that shareholders of acquiring firn1s earn 
normal returns from acquisitions as they would from other investment activities with the 
same risk level. It also reported that acquired firms earn abnormal returns after the 
merger. The results that acquired firms' shareholders are not losing but gaining positive 
normal returns support the profit maximisation hypothesis. 
Langetieg (1978), examining mergers from the same perspective as Mandelker (1974), 
reached the same conclusions. It is reported that acquiring firms' shareholders obtained 
non-significant but positive returns from mergers and acquired firms had an average 
excess return of approximately 13%. These results are also in support of the profit 
maximisation purpose of mergers. However, the research also concluded that since 
gains to the acquiring firms are too small, it is possible that the profit maximisation was 
not the only reason for mergers. 
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However, the results of various other researches showing that target shareholders are 
benefiting, and acquirer shareholders are either losing or not gaining, implicated and 
challenged the neo-classical perspective of acquisitions. They have concluded that 
managers pursue takeovers in order to promote their own self-interests and some of 
these self-interest-seeking factors are listed as, a reduction in the risk of losing a job 
increased salary levels and power, or diversification and minimisation of bankruptcy 
risk. Mueller (1969), for example, argued that managerial salaries, bonuses, stock 
options, and promotions tend to be related more to changes in the size of a firm than its 
profits. 
The managerial perspective looks at the issue from the separation of management from 
ownership perspective and infers that the managers as individuals act to enhance their 
own interest rather than that of their shareholders. The theory suggests that managers 
are motivated by salaries and other financial rewards, and desire to increase their status 
and power. Berle and Means ( 1932) were the first to highlight the separation of 
ownership and management and its consequence for the profit maximisation purpose. 
They have perceived that management and ownership interest do not naturally align 
when the roles are separated. This however may not necessarily mean that the profit is 
totally sacrificed; it is also suggested in the theory that after a certain satisfactory profit 
level, the management will attempt to maximise their own utility. Otherwise they would 
have been dismissed by the shareholders. 
From a point of view of takeovers, the self-interest seeking behaviour of managers will 
result in unprofitable acquisitions to increase size and have a downward effect on share 
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prices and, as a result, on shareholder wealth unless proper mechanismsare put in place 
to curb and control the self-interest seeking actions of managers. These mechanisms 
will be discussed in further detail in the second part of this chapter. 
Firth's (1980) study of the period 1969-75 concluded that even if the motive of mergers 
were to create profit maximisation and shareholder wealth, the acquiring companies' 
shareholders experienced wealth losses. Firth ( 1980) also measured the relation between 
remuneration levels and increased size after a merger activity and found that while 
takeovers have resulted in losses to shareholders, it benefited the directors in monetary 
terms, hence supporting the self-interest seeking motivation theory of takeovers. Firth 
(1991) moreover found that after the acquisition the managers' pay increases alongside 
the increase of the acquirer's size. This increase is substantial when the share value of 
the bidder increases but also when it decreases. Similar results were also observed by 
Meeks and Whittington ( 1975) on a UK based sample. They found that sales growth is 
positively related to pay increases. 
Jensen and Murphy's (1990) research on perforn1ance pay and topiTianagement 
incentives concludes that the relation between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth has 
been in decline and is small. This finding suggests that the managers do not have 
incentives to act in the best interest of their shareholders. 
Dodd (1980) studied the daily market reaction to announcement and subsequent 
acceptance or rejection of merger proposals. It is reported that for completed merger 
proposals, target firms' shareholders earn positive abnormal returns in contrast to 
cancelled proposals where they earn significant negative abnormal returns. However 
22 
shareholders of bidding firms in either case earn negative abnormal returns from the 
merger proposals. These findings provide support for a managerial perspective of 
acquisitions. 
Strong empirical support for the managerial perspective came from Agrawal er al., 
(1992). In their study, they have looked at long term performance of a:quiring firms 
after mergers and even after adjusting for the size effect and beta risk. They have found 
that shareholders of acquiring firn1s sustain a statistically significant loss over the five-
year term after the merger date. Their results also show that negative returns 
experienced by acquiring firms are not as a result of a slow adjustment of the market to 
the takeover event. 
Most recent UK evidence on the managerial wealth maximisation hypothesis came from 
Gregory (1997). He finds that after controlling for size and book-to-market effects, 
acquiring firms, even though they had a significant out-performance three years 
previous to the merger activity, were significant under-perforn1ers three years after the 
merger date. He also reported that post acquisition losses were more severe in cases 
where the acquisitions were financed by equity rather than by cash. 
One other reason suggested by Sudarsanam ( 1995) for the failure of acquisitions 
creating value for the acquiring shareholders was that mergers and takeovers are subject 
to different intra-organisational conflicts and political decisions, which are likely to 
result in poor acquisition decisions. 
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From an investment point of view, mergers and acquisitions are investment decisions of 
a kind that provide an external growth as opposed to an internal one and are evaluated in 
the same way as any other investment decision. They are preferred to organic growth 
decisions at times when there is a need for rapid market expansion or defending existing 
markets, speedy diversification into new markets to exploit existing or potential profit 
opportunities through target's assets and market share (Hutchinson, 1995; Sudarsanam, 
1995). Copeland and Weston (1988) argue that growth is vital to the well being of 
companies, as it is needed to attract the best managerial talent by offering rapid 
promotions and responsibilities and without a constant flow of skilled managers, the 
companies would decline in value. Mergers also provide a means of rationalising and 
consolidating in declining industries (Chiplin and Wright, 1987). 
As already mentioned, the causes for mergers and acquisitions cover wide, diverse and 
complex reasons. These could be synergy, risk reduction, strategic reasons, business 
cycles, the economic and political environment, integration into European Union, self-
interest seeking management motives, diversification, defence against takeovers, and 
financial motivations such as taxation and increased leverage. 
These wide and diverse reasons for mergers and acquisitions can further be clustered 
into two broad categories for the purpose of this study. These can be grouped broadly as 
industry specific or related factors (including synergy effects and the impact of 
restructuring) and corporate control and agency cost motivations (Dickerson et al., 
1998). 
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Gort (I 969) highlighted the significance of industry specific factors as important 
motives for acquisitions. He observed that merger frequencies vary among the industries 
and distribution of acquired and acquiring companies is not uniform among industries 
but concentrates on certain types of industries. He, following this trend, discarded the 
hypothesis that mergers occur as a result of managers' personal ambitions and increase 
their asset base for security reasons or simply to manage bigger firms or any external 
influences such as tax structures. 
One of the main industry specific factors is synergy. Synergy has been cited as one of 
the main reasons for takeovers and for value creation in most of the merger activities. 
Synergy can be achieved through reductions in production or distribution costs as it 
creates economies of scale in operational. The acclaimed benefit of a merger where 
there is synergy is as commonly stated as '2+2=5'. In an efficient market, the merged 
organisation is valued in such a way that the added value gained through the merger is 
added to the sum of the individual parts. This states that synergy creates a value to the 
combined entity so that the whole is bigger than the sum of separate parts. In other 
words, the value of the merged firm exceeds the value of the individual parts. 
Sudarsanam et al., (1996) reported that synergy creates value for shareholders of targets 
and bidders where there is complementary growth-resource imbalance between bidders 
and targets. Synergy reason or claim is especially obvious when the intended merger or 
takeover is horizontal or vertical. Vertical or horizontal integration, for example, is used 
by companies in order to achieve economies of scale or to reduce competition in a given 
industry, prevent newcomers, or drive benefits from a dominant or monopoly power. 
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A second factor in the industry specific group is the economic shocks (Gort, 1969), 
where through technology or rapid changes in the security prices, that increaoe the 
merger activity by increasing the dispersion in valuations. Following an economic or 
technological shock, for example, mergers and acquisitions could be used as a medium 
to restructure in specific industries. In the event of a technological shock in a given 
industry, capacity reduction might be required and could be achieved through 
acquisitions. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) analysed industry level patterns in takeover 
and restructuring activity in 1980s over 51 industries and reported that those industries 
experienced the greatest amount of takeover activity during the study period are the 
ones that exposed to the greatest fundamental shocks. These fundamental shocks are 
defined as deregulation, changes in input costs, and innovations in financial ta;hnology 
that induce or enable alterations in industry structure. Jensen (1994) also argues that as a 
result of changing technology or market conditions takeovers occur in order to structure 
corporate assets. In order to control such effects researchers used industry dummies, and 
measured size and liquidity effects. Palepu (1986) and Sen et al., ( 1995) applied 
industry dummy variable in their analysis. They assigned a value of one if at least one 
acquisition observed in a firm's four digit SIC industry during the year prior to the year 
of observation. On the other hand Powell ( 1997) did not consider industry dummy in his 
analysis of takeover modelling in the UK. Industry dummies will not be used in this 
study since there is at least one merger activity in aD the four digit industry 
classifications in the time period analysed. 
Sudarsanam et al.,(l996) show for aUK sample of takeovers that synergy- operational, 
managerial and financial -creates value for shareholders of targets, bidders and in some 
cases, where there is complementary liquidity slack and surplus, for both of them. They 
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have also found some evidence that ownership structure of bidders and targets has a 
significant effect on their shareholders' wealth. Conclusions in their study very much 
depended on the synergy effect and, in conditions where highly rated companies 
acquired less highly rated companies, acquiring companies' shareholders incurred 
wealth losses whereas target shareholders experienced wealth gains. 
If the proposed merger is not in a common/same industry then it is a conglomerate 
merger. These types of mergers were quite common during the 60s as part of risk 
reduction strategy by the companies. TI1e diversified entity, through conglomerate 
merger, might lead to a reduced risk for the combined entity and provide easier access 
to financial capital and markets. Mueller (1969) argued that conglomerate mergers 
might be explained by the existence of management synergies. However, his argument 
has been challenged, as in a perfect functioning capital market such risk reduction can 
quite easily be achieved by shareholders on their own by simply holding a portfolio of 
shares. It is also claimed that conglomerate mergers are less likely to be successful as 
the acquiring management is not familiar with the targets' market. Agrawal et al., 
( 1992) found that acquirers of conglomerate mergers had negative performance over the 
five year post merger period. However contrary to expectations, the loss to the non-
conglomerate acquirers was higher. 
In contrast to Gort's (1969) argument of dismissing managerial ambitions to increase 
the size of their companies, the study by Amihud and Lev ( 1981) showed that, in the 
case of conglomerate mergers, managers engage in takeover activities in order to reduce 
their employment risk as they cannot diversity it. However, there are some studies to 
challenge their conclusions otherwise. Matsusaka (1993), by examining the stock 
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market response to the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s, found that acquirer's 
shareholders benefited from these diversification mergers and as a result concluded that 
these merger activities were not driven by managerial motives. 
In contrast to industry specific factors, the market for control hypothesis provides some 
different explanations for the reasons for mergers and acquisitions. The main point of 
the argument of the market for control hypothesis is poor perfonnance. Managers who 
pursue their own interest rather than shareholders' will be replaced by other competing 
management teams. Fama and Jensen (1983) defined corporate control as 'the right to 
determine the management of corporate resources- that is, the right to hire, fire and 
set the compensation of top managers'. A market for corporate control is defined as a 
market where different managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate 
resources (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
In theory the stock market will assign a low share pnce to compames with low 
profitability and low expectations of future performance. This will reduce fue possibility 
of obtaining new financing from the market. The main indicator of such poor 
performance is profitability or how efficiently the assets of a company have been 
utilised to generate high levels of profitability. Manne (1965) argued that the share price 
of a company is the main indicator of a management's performance. In order to measure 
the poor performance of a management or poor profitability, in this study, return on 
shareholders fund (RSHF) will be employed. So it is expected that if the managers are 
pursuing their own benefits instead of that of their shareholders then this will be 
reflected in the profitability and as a result in their share price. Also utilised is marke~ 
to-book value (MBV) and price earning ratio (PIE). As MBV and PIE are estimated by 
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using share pnce information, they can be used to assess, in part, the markets' 
disciplinary involvement in acquisitions. Therefore a market for corporate control will 
discipline the actions of non-value-maximising managers through takeovers. Hence 
lower profitability should increase the probability density of such companies for 
possible takeovers. Dickerson et al., (1998) suggested two other metrics for the 
measurement of how corporate control identifies those non-value optimising managers. 
These are dividend payments and investments. 
Dividend payments and investment policy metrics are the natural extension to the free 
cash flow hypothesis postulated by Jensen (1986). Free cash flow is the cash available 
to a company after it carries out, after meeting its tax commitments, all available 
positive net present value (NPV) investments. Jensen (1986) explains that 'free cash 
flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital'. The hypothesis implies 
that the companies that lack any profitable investment opportunities should distribute 
their free cash to their shareholders as dividends or use it to purchase their own shares. 
Hence the free cash flow will not be used for value reducing investment schemes. 
However, those who use it for further investment will be disciplined by the market, as 
their likelihood for takeovers will increase. However the results from the Dickerson et 
al.,( 1998) study found no evidence that firms without profitable investment 
opportunities are more likely to be taken over in the event that they increase investment 
or reduce dividends. 
29 
2.3 Agency Theory 
In modem corporations, the separation of management from ownership has highlighted 
the conflict between agents and principals. Agency theory argues that under conditions 
of incomplete information and uncertainty, which are the main characteristics of the 
business environment, two agency problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain ex ante if 
the agent accurately represents his ability to do the work for which he is being paid. 
Moral hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has 
put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). The conflict of interests between 
management and shareholders and description of this relationship through contractual 
agreements between the two parties are at the centre of agency theory. Simply, agency 
theory is concerned with the principal-agent problem in the separation of ownership and 
control of a firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hill and Jones, 1992), and in particular 
the problem rooted of aligning the interests of two groups through contractual 
agreements in order to maximise the firm performance. 
In principle, the agents ought to act in the best interest of their shareholders and try to 
maximise their returns. In reality, though managers do not have the same opportunity to 
diversify their financial wealth in the same way as their shareholders do, they have 
invested their human and financial capital in one company that their career reputations 
depend on its performance. As a result they might end up acting not necessarily in the 
best interest of their shareholders but their own. 
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Overall, the agency theory attempts to resolve different objectives and risk preferences 
of principals and agents, within an agency relationship. In the first instant the problem is 
not only the different objectives and goals of principals and agents but also the difficulty 
of verifYing the actual aims of agents by principals (asymmetric information). A second 
problem arises due to the different risk preferences of the two parties (Eisenhardt, 
1989). As put forward by Gerald and Stout, ( 1992), the nexus of contracts is the centre 
of agency theory and it focuses on the inherent conflict between the interest of 
shareholders and the interest of those who run and work for the firm. 
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling ( 1976) as 'a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent'. In general, as explained above, agency theory defines a 
relationship between two groups who have different goals and attitudes toward risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
These interests of managers as managerial motives are almost equally and similarly 
recognised by different theories of the firm as financial rewards, status, prestige, power, 
and security (Williamson, 1964). This is consistent with self-interest seeking motivation 
and the existence of asymmetric information that complicates monitoring by 
shareholders. The occurrence of this conflict of interest between principal and agent was 
raised by Adam Smith as early as 1776: 
"The directors of such companies ... being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that/hey should watch over 
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it with the same vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not of their master's honour, and very 
easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company. " 
The process of diversification of shareholding and diffusion of management ownership 
in modem corporations has created wide share dispersion so that no one individual or 
small group of shareholders holds a sufficiently substantial amount to exert significant 
influence on the day to day running of the businesses. This has left managements wih 
insignificant shareholdings in the businesses that they run. Berle and Means (1932) 
concluded as early as 1932 that after examining 200 large US corporations, wide share 
dispersion might divert the interest of owners and managers from each other. Accordilg 
to their research result no shareholder had as much as I per cent of total shares and that 
the twenty largest shareholders had no more than 5.1 per cent of total shares. On the 
other hand, the shareholdings of institutional investors has been on the rile over the 
years. This trend of share dispersion and increasing shareholdings of insurance 
companies can also be observed in the UK (see Table 2.1 ). 
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Table 2.1-0wnership of UK equities as percentage, 1969-95 
Sector of Beneficial owner 1969 1975 1981 1991 1992 1994 
Individuals 47.4 37.5 28.2 19.9 20.4 20.3 
Other personal sector 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.3 
(mainly charities) 
Public sector 2.6 3.6 3.0 1.3 1.8 0.8 
lnd. & commercial companies 5.4 3.0 5.1 3.3 1.8 1.1 
Oversees 6.6 5.6 3.6 12.8 13.1 16.3 
Banks 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 
Insurance comp. 12.2 15.9 20.5 20.8 19.5 21.9 
Pension funds 9.0 16.8 26.7 31.3 32.4 27.8 
Unit trusts 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.7 6.2 6.8 
Other financial institutions 
(mainly investment trusts) 10.1 10.5 6.8 2.3 2.5 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Share Ow11ership (1995) 8. 
It is also argued that due to this wide diversion of shareholding, a small percentage of 
shareholders may effectively influence or control the affairs of a company through 
voting power. If these small but influential groups of shares are held by the managers 
then they can effectively pursue their own interest rather than that of the shareholders. 
However, recent growth and dominance of institutional investors and their active 
involvement in fim1-level monitoring through routine dialogue can be an active device 
to affect corporate behaviour and can also act as an incentive for managers to pursue the 
interest of shareholders (Moschandreas, 1994, Stapledon, 1996). This assumption, of 
course, holds true to the extent that institutional investors are willing to participate in 
the corporate affairs of their equity investments. They may see their participation as an 
extra burden on themselves and employ the easy option of selling their shares on the 
market in cases where they are not satisfied with the incumbent management rather than 
participating in the decision making process. 
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As for the perspective of takeovers, agency theory argues that the threat of a takeover 
provides a permanent mechanism to monitor management performance and discourage 
or reduce the pursuit of management interests at the expense of shareholders. In the 
event of failure of the internal control mechanisms, as boards may be dominated by 
individuals who owe their positions to their relations rather than merits, 'cronyism,' and 
thus the takeover market- as an objective, market-based mechanism- is an essential tool 
in a system of contracts (Jensen, 1993). Walkling and Long (1984) provide some 
insights into this conflict by analysing cash tender offers and management resistance to 
takeover. They concluded, for example, that management resistance to takeover 
attempts is significantly affected by the wealth chance of officers and directors. 
The dominant rationale for takeovers in agency theory is poor performance of targets. In 
the financial economic approach to the firm, the firm's share price provides the only 
objective indicator of management performance (Manne, 1965). More efficient 
management is recognised by the market and reflected in share prices. On the other 
hand, low share price will provide the means for other management teams to acquire the 
resources/assets of these companies. This process not only provides an opportunity for 
outsiders who detect undervalued firms and an economic safety net for shareholders; 
moreover, it provides a mechanism to discipline top managers that fail to serve 
shareholder interests, as they usually find that their employment terminated following a 
takeover. 
Besides the market for corporate control, there exist certain natural, regulatory and 
contractually designed mechanisms on the market to align the interest of shareholders 
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with managers and reduce the self-interest seeking behaviour of agents. It is worthwhile 
to examine some of these mechanisms which have been introduced or already existed in 
order to minimise the managers' incentives to deviate from their contractual purpose of 
profit maximisation and eventually shareholder wealth maximisation. Since some of 
these mechanisms will be used as a justification to include some of the variables that are 
put to use in the following chapters, it is worthwhile examining them here. 
2.4 Agency Cost and Control Environment 
Agency theory demonstrates that divergence from the shareholder wealth maximisation 
creates an agency cost. As it is mentioned earlier, in an agency-principal relationship, an 
agency problem arises due to the divergence of interest between the two parties. In an 
ideal world where the actions of agents or outside factors influencing an outcome can be 
observed perfectly and information is available without any incurring cost, agents act in 
the best interest of principals, and any deviations from the ideal create agency problems 
and agency costs. However, due to the reasons outlined above, in reality managers have 
incentives to deviate from their contractual obligations. Managers not only pursue their 
benefits through perks such as company cars, expensive office items, etc., but through 
selecting investment, operating, or financial policies that are suitable to their personal 
risk and time preferences (Byrd el al., 1998). The conflicts arising from a principal-
agency relationship are called agency problems and the loss of value due to these 
problems is called an agency cost. 
It can be summarised here that an agency cost arises from (i) a divergence of interest 
between principal and agent which in short can be defined as a self-interest seeking 
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behaviour of both parties (ii) an existence of asymmetric information which complicates 
the monitoring process of the agent's actions. Agency cost comprises of (i) monitoring 
costs incurred by principals to monitor agents to make sure that they direct their efforts 
in the principal's interest, (ii) bonding costs incurred by agents to bond themselves to 
act in the interest of principals, and (iii) residual lost incur because not all actions of 
agents can be monitored. 
Four types of possible causes of these problems are identified. These are (Byrdel al., 
1998): 
I. Effort: managers might spend less time with business than might be expected 
from them by shareholders. 
2. Horizon: managers' horizons for expected returns tend to be shorter than for 
shareholders. 
3. Differential risk preference: unlike shareholders, managers cannot diversify 
their wealth and have a different attitude to risk. 
4. Asset use: managers have incentives to misuse a company's assets or 
consume excessive perks. 
Hence, decisions and objectives taken by the management would not necessarily be 
aiming to maximise shareholders' value and it has been argued that necessary steps 
should be taken to minimise this divergence by aligning the interest of agents with 
principals. Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, suggested that by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit 
the divergent activities of agents, the problem of divergent interests of two parties can 
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be overcome. Nonetheless, even with these incentives and costs there may still be some 
actions of agents that wiU differ from the actions that principals would take. This is 
defined as residual cost. On the other hand, according to Fama ( 1980), agency costs are 
driven to zero by market forces both within and external to the firm. A form of full ex 
post settling up occurs which penalises self-interest seeking managers and causes them 
to act in the best interest of shareholders. 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) provide an extensive insight into an organisation's decision-
making process as well as a framework to reduce agency problems. An organisation's 
decision process consists of decision management (initiation and implementation) and 
decision control (ratification and monitoring) (Fama and Jensen 1983b). Separation of 
residual risk bearers (owners) and the decision functions (management) leads to an 
important agency problem. In order to prevent or minimise this problem, initiation and 
implementation functions of decision making should be separated from the ratification 
and controlling functions. 
As suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983a), devices for separating decision management 
from decision control include: 
I. Decision hierarchies, in which the decision initiatives of lower agents are 
passed on to higher level agents for ratification and monitoring. 
2. Boards of directors that ratify and monitor the organisation's most important 
decisions hire, fire and compensate top level decision managers. 
3. Incentive structures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision 
agents. 
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As outlined by Stapledon (1996), many monitoring mechanisms exist and are applied by 
shareholders to reduce the conflict of interest. In addition to these available 
mechanisms, the external monitoring environment is also in place to exert pressure on 
management. The final goal of these internal monitoring devices, such as a Performance 
Related Pay Scheme, is to cope with agency problems. Some of these mechanisms are: 
(i) Market Forces: The most important of all market forces is the market for corporate 
control by takeovers. The market for corporate control theory was first put forward by 
Manne (1965), providing the theoretical foundations for most of the research in 
takeovers thereafter. According to Manne ( 1965), a fundamental premise underlying the 
market for corporate control is the existence of a high relationship between corporate 
managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company. Therefore the 
stock market provides an objective evaluation of management performance through the 
price it places on a firn1's equity. As a result, inefficient managemert would be 
evaluated on the market by the equity price that will eventually create an incentive for 
others to take control of the fi•m for better utilisation of the firm's assets. Obviously, a 
high share price of an equity is not only to deter other firms from bidding due to the 
cost, but can also be seen as a sign that the market is quite happy with the current 
management and its way of running the firm's assets. Takeovers, as discussed above, 
redistribute the corporate assets from poorly performing teams to more efficient ones. 
Agency theory argues that the existence of a takeover market as a threat is an extra 
incentive for management teams not to divert from the profit maximisation objective. 
Furthermore, capital markets exert pressure on incumbent management by making it 
difficult for them to raise equity capital or debt financing. The higher pricing of 
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securities of the successful finns enables them to have cheaper access to investment 
funds and the lower pricing for the lesser successful ones will havea penalising effect. 
On the other hand, however, this idealistic pricing of securities depends on accuracy of 
forecasting of future profits and there is a good deal of evidence that the prices yielded 
by stock markets are quite far from such perfection. Share prices are known to be 
influenced by asymmetric information, speculation and other market imperfections. 
Third, the product market plays a monitoring role as the company may lose its market 
share as a result of inefficient management and may become insolvent. Finally, the 
market for managerial talent puts pressure on the management team to run the company 
successfully so it can open up its job prospects within the market. 
In their study of"Market for Corporate Control", Jensen and Ruback (1983) discu;sed 
corporate control and viewed it as an arena where management teams compete for 
corporate resources for their better utilisation. Therefore, through this competition those 
management teams who cannot utilise their company resources efficiently will be 
eliminated by the other competing teams in the market in order to maximise resources. 
(ii)Executive Incentive Remuneration!Perfonnance Related Pay Scheme: this theory 
suggests that, linking executives' remuneration to the share perfom1ance or to changes 
in shareholder wealth provides the means for aligning the interests of the two groups 
and reduces the managerial self interest seeking behaviour. 
(iii) Mandatory Disclosure of Infom1ation and Auditing: the requirement to disclose 
periodic financial and non-financial infonnation and auditing of this infom1ation by 
independent auditing finns provide the means for the shareholders to assess the 
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condition of the company and discourages management diverting from the shareholders' 
profit maximisation. 
(iv) Non-executive Directors: it is accepted that non-executive directors on the board 
can monitor management as outside observers. Their presence on the board may deter 
management from diverting from their primary responsibilities. 
(v) Shareholder/Large block of Shareholder Monitoring: shareholders of companies, as 
laid down by the Companies Act 1985, have the right to remove directors without a 
reason. Therefore, any management team that diverts from the profit maximisation goal 
may eventually be fired by the unsatisfied shareholders. Large shareholders have an 
incentive to monitor managers as they benefit more from monitoring. Unlike small 
shareholders they are less likely to be free riders. 
There are also other mechanisms such as regulatory investigations and inspections of 
Directors' and officers' duties. Regulators have statutory powers by Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 to investigate the affairs of companies and take actions such 
as disqualifying directors. 
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2.5 Discussions and Summary 
Although acquisition literature has come up with some theoretical explanations on 
motives and reasons for mergers and acquisitions, the empirical evidence on these 
hypotheses has not produced a conclusive result to accept or dismiss one or the other 
explanation. It has been reviewed above that empirical research is deeply divided on the 
motives of mergers. 
Research shows that target shareholders benefit from acquisitions by the premiums paid 
irrespective of the acquirers' motives. It is obvious that acquirers' motives are to be the 
determinant factor as to whether their shareholders benefit from the acquisition activity. 
Sudarsanam et al. ( 1996), in their research, for example, clearly demonstrate that when 
an acquiring companies' management engages in takeovers in order to utilise synergies, 
their shareholders gain as well as the target shareholders. On the other hand when their 
actions are clouded with hubris or motivated by self-interest seeking then an acquisition 
can have a negative effect on share price and tht:re will be a reduction of shareholders' 
value. 
Diffusion of ownership has benefits as well as drawbacks to the modem corporations. 
While the day to day running of large corporations has been improved in the hands of 
professional managers, their lack of involvement in some aspects of risk sharing, short 
and long term expectations, and small or non-existent share interest have created a 
conflict of interest with the shareholders. This has led to agency problems and cost. 
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In the face of these problems, several incentive and control mechanisms that operate 
either independently or in conjunction with each other are designed to reduce or at best 
eliminate agency costs. The characteristics of these mechanisms vary with the existing 
risk and uncertainty. However, even with application of these internal and existence of 
external devices, it is hard to assume that the managers' self interest-seeking behaviour 
is totally eliminated and the agency cost is driven to zero. 
As outlined above, the failure or lack of application of these mechanisms or the failure 
in product market or the market for managers will further decrease management 
efficiency if they pursue their own interest and reduce firm value which will be reflected 
in the share price. In a market place where management teams compete for better 
utilisation of corporate resources, the market for corporate control, which is often 
referred to as the takeover market, will act and shift these resources for better utilisation. 
However, it is also likely that in a market where stock prices show random behaviour, 
some of the companies may become undervalued and become a target. This occurs not 
because managers have failed to maximise profits or as a result of failure in any of the 
control mechanisms or markets, but through the stock market's random pricing. This 
will create opportunities for those that are overvalued through this process and give 
them the incentive to make a bid. 
As mentioned earlier, the monitoring or control environment is important from a 
takeover perspective since they form the basis of some of the assumptions for efficient 
design of a company management structure on a corporate governance level and their 
implementation to minimise the agency costs. 
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In the event that some of these monitoring mechanisms are not in place, or are 
inefficiently designed, this may lead to agency costs and a lower value of a firm. The 
absence or internal design and implementation of these mechanisms within the company 
structures will be analysed and exploited from a takeover prediction perspective in this 
study. 
43 
Chapter 3 -Classification Methods in Takeover Prediction Studies 
3.1 Introduction 
Theoretical background to mergers and acquisitions and it relevance to this study has 
been explained in the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to provide similar 
background information to the statistical techniques that were used in the takeover 
likelihood modelling as well as to present some derivation and application details of the 
techniques applied in this study. 
The main statistical techniques that have been used in the previous empirical studies, 
which were carried out to predict those companies which are a target or likely to receive 
take-over bids, are Discriminant Analysis (DA), Logistic Regression (LR) and recently 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). Only in one of these studies that Senet al., (1995), 
applied ANNs to takeover predictions. Some of these studies can be listed as, 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973), Singh (1975), Belkoui (1978), Wansley 
and Lane (1983), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Bartley and Boardman 
( 1990) and Barnes ( 1990), Sen et a/ ( 1995), Powell ( 1997). 
Even though only LR and ANNs are applied in this study a brief description of DA 
along with LR and ANNs will be also provided in this section. Moreover the reasons for 
not selecting DA in this study as well as a comparison with LR will be explained. 
However, the emphasis will be on the explanation of ANNs, compared with LR and 
DA, as this is the emerging technique. This overview of concepts of ANNs will enhance 
the understanding of terms and structures of the technique in the following sections. 
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Furthermore in section 3.3 examples of research studies which used and applied ANNs 
in finance and accounting will be listed and their main results will be reported in 
addition to the list provided in chapter I . The aim here is to see the type of applications 
of ANNs in finance and accounting as well to have an understanding of these techniques 
measured outcome against the traditional multivariate statistical models. 
3.2 Classification Techniques 
The literature on classification techniques is vast and these techniques can be divided as 
numeric and non-numeric (quantitative). Numeric techniques cover deterministic and 
statistical measures, while non-numeric techniques fall into the area of symbolic 
processing that is dealt with by such methods as fuzzy sets (Beale and Jackson, 1990). 
Although the most commonly used classification techniques in takeover studies seem to 
be DA, and LR, there are numerous statistical techniques that are also available for 
classification purposes such as multiple regression, K nearest neighbour, classification 
trees, multidimensional scaling, machine learning and expert systems. Kennedy ( 1992), 
for example, has applied and compared the results of seven classification teclmiques, 
such as linear discriminant analysis, quadratic discriminant analysis, McKelvey and 
Zavoina n-chotomos probit, Walker and Duncan ordinal logit, Nerlove and Press 
polytomous logit, ordered classification trees, and unordered classification trees, that 
have been used in accounting research. Furthermore, Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel ( 1991) 
have applied multidimensional scaling teclmique to corporate failures. As can be seen, 
the classification techniques are by no means restricted to DA or LR. 
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The reason why LR, rather than the other ones mentioned above, is used in this study is 
that, as explained above, its widespread use in the field and many applications of ANNs 
are ultimately bench marked against it in tem1s of perfom1ance (Tarn and Kiang, 1992; 
Yoon et al., 1993; Curram and Mingers, 1994; Serrano-Cinca, 1997; Miranda and 
Burgess, 1997; Luther, 1996; de Carvalho et al., 1998). 
3.2.1 Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) 
Discriminant analysis is used to examine the differences between two or more naturally 
occurring groups of objects with respect to the related predictors. The basic assumption 
in LDA is that two or more naturally occurring groups exist and differ on several of 
their characteristics. (Klecka, 1980). In corporate takeover predictions, LDA is used to 
detem1ine the group membership of companies as targets and non-targets from their 
given characteristics or discriminating variables. The employed predictors are generally 
the financial ratios of companies. Discriminating variables must be measured in interval 
or ratio level in order to satisfy the assumption of multivariate normal distribution of 
variables. 
The most widely used DA method, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), is the one 
developed by Fisher (1936). Linear discriminant analysis is the two-group case of 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA). The Fisher procedure builds a discriminant 
function by maximising the ratio of between groups and within group variances. 
Provided the following conditions are satisfied the Fisher procedure minimises the 
expected cost of misclassification. 
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The assumptions are; 
I. Non of the variable should be a linear combination of another variable. 
Hence the correlated variables should be excluded from the analysis. 
2. Population covariance matrices are equal for each group. 
3. Each group is extracted from a population which has a multivariate normal 
distribution. Multivariate normal distribution holds that the scores on 
predictors {discriminators) are randomly distributed, and that sampling 
distribution is of any linear combination of predictors and is linearly 
distributed. In the event this assumption is violated, the estimated 
probabilities are not exact. 
The discriminant function is a linear combination of independent variables. The 
function assigns a score, Z, to each company in a sample through the discriminating 
characteristics of the companies. Discriminant function has the following mathematical 
form. 
Z = bo + b1X1 + ......... + b,Xn (3.1) 
Where, 
b1 = discriminant coefficients, 
X1 = independent discriminating variables, 
Z = the score on the discriminant function for observation. 
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In order to allocate new observations to previously defined groups, a cut-off score is 
established such that companies can be assigned to groups with respect to their scores. 
The ones that have scores below the cut-off will be considered as possible targets and 
vice versa. In the estimation of weights the score (Z) variance between two groups 
(target and bidder) is maximised relative to the variance in scores within groups. 
Simply DA classifies companies into one of the groups (target or non-target) on the 
basis of individual scores (Z). These scores are the weighted combination of identified 
characteristics that best separates targets and non-targets. 
As mentioned above this technique assumes that independent variables are multivariate 
normal and covariance matrices of two groups are equal. Nevertheless, the assumption 
about the multivariate normal distribution has frequently been ignored and violated in 
the applications. The assumption is especially violated when a dummy independent 
variable is used in the analysis. On the other hand, it is suggested that some remedial 
actions can reduce the severity of this violatirn. Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan 
(1977) improved the normality of asset size variable by using logarithmic 
transformation. Even though various researchers claimed that the DA is relatively robust 
to non-normality, Eisenbeis (1977) stated that violation of normality assumption may 
bias the test of significance and estimated error rates. 
The second assumption states that the covariance matrices across the variables are equal 
for target and non-target companies. Eisenbeis ( 1977) explained that the significance 
test for the differences in group means is effected when this assumption is ignored or 
relaxed. It is suggested (Tarn and Kiang, 1992) that if the covariance matrices are 
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different, quadratic functions can be used rather than linear functions. However it is 
pointed out that even though quadratic classifiers are quite accurate in classifying the 
training sample, they perform (their generalisation ability) poorly on hold-out samples 
compared with linear models (Aitrnan et al., 1981; Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1985). 
Even though, as stated generally by researchers, the discriminant analysis is relatively 
robust to non-normality, it is highly sensitive to outliers. 
DA has been quite popular as a statistical technique in finance and accounting and 
applied for predictive purposes by employing accounting data. One of the most popular 
and related areas to takeover predictions where DA is applied is bankruptcy prediction. 
In takeover studies DA is used to estimate a linear model that best discriminates 
between targets and non-targets. The model is then applied to determine group 
membership of companies as targets and non-targets. 
In order to eliminate the above assumptions about the population, for example other 
forms ofDA can be utilised. As suggested by Curram andMingers (1994) kernel DA or 
nearest neighbour DA do not make assumptions about the underlying populations. 
However they have also stated that these two procedures are essentially heuristic 
procedures and do not provide consistent performance. 
As a linear classifier LDA is trying to find a straight line that separates two groups. This 
is causing some shortcomings for the technique. One of the common problems that can 
be faced with the application of LDA can be exemplified in "exclusive-or" problem. 
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The "exclusive-or" problem IS summarised below (Yoon el al., 1993; Beale and 
Jackson, 1990). 
0 
0 
x2 
0 
0 
y 
Where X, and X2 are input variables. Y is the output. 
0 
0 
In this case the oulpul is 0 if the inputs are (0,0) or (I, I). While the inputs are (I ,0) or 
(0,1) the output is I. When a linear function (Z=bo + b 1X 1 + b2X1) is formed to model 
above example with a cut-off point z•, the "exclusive-or" problem is unavoidable. If X 
= (0,0) and X= (0, I) then b1 > 0. Similarly b1 > 0 if X= (0,0) and X= (0, I). If both b1 
and b2 are positive, when X= (I, I) then z• < bo + b 1 + b2 as a result X= (I ,I) will not 
be classified as group 0. 
Graphically the "exclusive-or" problem can be depicted as; 
0 
0 
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As can be seen the pattern is linearly inseparable since no straight line can be drawn to 
separate two groups. This situation can arise in circumstances where non-linear 
relationship exists. Simple example of this can be drawn out fTOm Palepu's 1986 paper 
where growth-resource imbalance variable would fit into above graph. If horizontal axis 
represents growth, such as turnover growth, while vertical axis represents resource, such 
as liquidity, then I on the graph represents companies that have growth-resource 
imbalance problem. In the mean time zeros indicated those companies that do not have 
the imbalance problem. TI1ese two groups of companies can not be separated by a 
straight line. 
3.2.2 Logistic Regression (LR) 
LR has been another multivariate statistical model widely used in empirical research. It 
is an extension of multiple regression analysis techniques and follows the same general 
principles as linear regression. The difference between the two models is the outcome 
variable. Unlike in the linear regression where the dependent variable is continuous, the 
outcome variable is binary or dichotomous in logistic regression. This difference 
between the two modelling approaches is reflected both in the choice of a parametric 
model and in the assumptions (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). 
Although LR performs the same task as LOA, there are some differences between these 
two techniques. LR uses a sigmoid function that provides an output between 0 and I and 
very suitable for studies on takeover or bankruptcy predictions. Also LR estimates the 
coefficients through a probabilistic method based on maximum likelihood while DA 
mostly uses Wilks's Lambda to estimate them. This approach ofprobabilistic estimation 
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of coefficients means that LR is free of the assumptions of DA about the underlying 
assumptions of population. 
The logistic model is formulated as; 
(3.2) 
where the response variable takes only one of two possibilities. The mathematical 
expression on the right side the logistic model formulae is the gemral logistic function. 
I 
'(z)= --
11 I+ e-' 
Where z = B0 + L::=, B,X,. Here the f(z) function ranges from 0 to I as z various from-
oo to +oo. Graphical depiction of the function is also shown in figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1. Logistic function. 
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LR provides the conditional probability of an observation belonging to a certain class, 
given the values of independent variables (covariates) for the observation. It is based on 
the cumulative probability function and does not require the multiwriate normality of 
the covariates. The general method of estimating the model parameters is called 
maximum likelihood (Maddala, 1989; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Kleinbaum et al. 
1998). 
Maximum likelihood estimation refers to a general algorithm for obtaining estimators of 
population parameters. When the underlying distribution of the dependent variable is 
normal then maximum likelihood estimation is identical to least squared estimation. 
However when compared to least squares method maximum likelihood can be applied 
to linear as well as nonlinear models. Maximum likelihood estimation can be explained 
with an example of the problem at hand, simply the estimation of covariates of takeover 
likelihood. This discussion below is based on Kleinbaum et al. ( 1998) explanation of 
maximum likelihood. 
If the population contains a certain unknown proportion 0(0 :<=; B :<=; 1) of some 
companies with characteristics of receiving a bid and a random sample of m companies 
is sampled from the population, there will be random number of companies, Y, with the 
characteristics of receiving a bid in the random sample of m. The possible values of Y 
are the m +I integer values of0,1,2, .... /ll. The estimation problem here is to use Yand 
m to obtain an estimate of B. 
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Above the underlying probability distribution of the discrete random variable Y is 
binomial and for an observed value of Y, the maximum likelihood estimator of 8 is the 
0 
value of 8, for which the expression (3.3) attains its maximum value as a function of8. 
(3.3) 
where m Cr =m!! Y!(m- Y)!. 
0 
The specific value of 8 that maximises (3.3) can be obtained by taking the derivative of 
(3.3) with respect to 8. The resulting equation gives, 
(3.4) 
Equating (3.4) to 0 provides three solutions 0, I and Y I m. Here 0 and I mimmise 
equation (3.4) while Y I m maximises. The second derivative of (3.4) with respect to 8 
is negative when it is replaced by the value of Y I m. Thus the maximum likelihood 
A 0 
estimator of 8 is 8 = Y I m when Y has the binomial distribution. Here 8 is the sample 
proportion of companies with characteristics of receiving a bid. 
The maximum likelihood estimator B = y I Ill has the property that pr(Y; B) > pr( Y; e· ). 
Where 8' is any other value of 8 satisfying 0 ~ e' ~I. As pr(Y; 8) gives the 
A 
probability of observed Y, the estimator 8 = Y I 111 is called the maximum likelihood 
estimator of 8 and most agrees/fits with the data. 
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In a general sense the method of maximum likelihood gives values for the unknown 
parameters that maximises the probability of obtaining the observed data. However in 
order to apply this method first the likelihood function (function of the unknown 
parameters) is constructed. This function represents the likelihood of observing the data 
or gives the probability of the observed data as a function of the unknown parameters. 
Once the likelihood function is determined, the maximum likelihood estimates that 
estimator of the set of unknown parameters which maximises the likelihood function. 
Thus, the resulting estimators are those which most agree/fit with the data (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 1989; Kleinbaum, 1994). 
The cumulative probability assumption is needed in order to constrain the predicted 
values to be in the range of zero-one (O=non-target, 1 =takenover) (Figure 3.1 ). The 
coefficient of each variable can be interpreted as the effect of unit chang: in an 
independent variable on the probability of the dependent variable (Zavgren, 1983). 
Thus, the parameters of logistic regression give the importance and sensitivity of each 
predictor in the model. 
In our modelling of takeovers, logistic regression weights the independent variables and 
creates a score (y) for each company. The observed score then used to calculate the 
probability of group membership. 
exp(B0 + B,X, + B2 X 2 + ... ) Probability of M & A (P(y = !))= ' ' (3.6) 
1 + exp(B0 + B1X; 1 + B2 X; 2 + ... ) 
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Where XiJ, .......... ,X;n are predictor variables. As explained above, theB; are estimated by 
maximising the likelihood function (3.7). More detailed derivation of likelihood 
function can be seen in Kleinbaum et al. ( 1998). 
D exp( B0 + E, B1X") 
L(Y; B)=----'----'--~ (3.7) 
0[1 +exp( B0 + t B1Xu )] 
i-1 
Where the B is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The maximisation leads to a 
series of nonlinear equations that are solved for B using iterative mechanisms. Once B is 
estimated group probabilities are estimated using (3.5) for a given set ofvariables,.-fi. 
The main advantage of applying LR, for example compared with Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis, is that, as mentioned above, it does not depend on the assumptions of 
multivariate normality and equal covariance matrices for each group. Given the 
violation of these assumptions in accounting and finance data, application of LR as a 
benchmark against ANNs seems most appropriate rather then MDA (Eisenbeis, 1977). 
The imposed normality assumption on the independent variables is clearly violated 
when dichotomous or categorical variables are used in the model. As put forward by 
Kleinbaum ( 1994) " if any of the independent variables are dichotomous or categorical 
in nature, then the discriminant jimction method lends to give biased result:, usually 
giving estimated odds ratios that are too high". On the other hand, maximum likelihood 
estimation does not require any restriction of any kind on independent variables. 
Therefore the independent variables can be ordinal or nominal. 
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As suggested by Kleinbaum, (1994), one of the main reasons why DA has been applied 
extensively in financial modelling until recently even with the widespread violations of 
the fundamental assumptions of DA, was the absence of available computer software 
and power for the estimation of maximum likelihood. 
3.2.3 Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) 
The concept of ANNs is developed from the workings of the human brain and its 
different computational abilities. Although ANNs are developed from the workings of 
the brain, it is not, however, the exact replica of it. Their aim is to mimic the brains 
network structure not to replicate it. 
A neural network is made up of layers of information processing units called neurons. 
Each neuron performs a simple weighted sum of the infornntion it receives. The 
weightings or coefficients are called synaptic weights in neural network terminology. 
An activation/transfer function is applied and an output obtained which, in turn, outputs 
as an input to another layer of neurons. The transfer function is usually sigmoid, but it 
can also be a linear function. The schematic description of this process can be seen 
below in Figure 3.2. 
57 
3.2.3.1 Artificial Neuron 
A neuron is an information-processing unit of the ANNs and its basic function is to add 
its inputs, and if this summed inputs exceed a value known as threshold value, to 
produce an output value. The working of a neuron is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Artificial Neuron 
x.---+ 
tp( x) Output (a) 
x,__-
Xrrll--
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, an artificial neuron receives inputs as data and firstly sums 
them up and then squashes them by the activation/transfer function tp(x) . Then this 
value is compared with the threshold value to produce an outcome or output (0), if the 
sum of the inputs exceed the threshold value, otherwise it does not. This system of 
transforming and passing the inputs to produce an output is called feed forward system. 
The working of a neuron can be formulated in mathematical terms taking the following 
form: 
11 
0 = LXiWi 
i=l 
Where:O =linearly combined output 
Xi= input values 
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Wi = weightings 
11 = number of observations. 
This sum is then compared to the threshold value and if the sum is greater then the 
output is produced. It can also be formulated as: 
n 
0 = LXiWi- 0 
j ... l 
Where: 0 = threshold value 
Therefore the decision is taken to produce an outcome on the basis of whether the 0 
exceeds the value of 0. The decision is taken on the following basis before activating 
transfer function: 
Transferred 0 > 0 
Not Transferred 0 <= 0 
The process explained above can be reorganised so that the same result would be 
obtained. Instead of subtracting the threshold value, an additional input can be 
connected to the neuron. By doing this the extra input of +I is multiplied by a weight 
equal to minus the threshold value, -0, and added with the other inputs. This is called 
biasing the neuron. This process is shown in the figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 Artificial Neuron with Bias 
Where: b =bias. 
In this case the output is formulated as: 
n 
0 = fP(L XiWi + bi) 
i=l 
or the formula can be rewritten as: 
" 0 = fP(L XiWi) 
1=0 
Where Xo is set to zero. 
3.2.3.2 Transfer Functions 
Transformation to other neurons is determined by a non-linear function. In other words, 
the transformation function as denoted by tp(x) determines how a neuron will scale its 
response to incoming data as it is considered before the transfer function produces an 
output. In addition to the step function below, transfer function can take some of the 
forms presented below in Figure 3.4 (adapted from Maren, 1990, p.48). 
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Figure 3.4 Neural Network Transfer Functions 
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Logistic sigmoid functions are often used as activation functions among the transfer 
functions (Bishop, 1995). Because of its s shape it represents a balance between linear 
and non-linear behaviour (Haykin, 1998). The reason for their popularity is that they are 
complex, differentiable, unlike the step function, and suitable for many applications, 
especially in finance (Refenes, 1995). 
There are t\-vo types of sigmoid functions, symmetric and asymmetric and they take the 
following form : 
0 = I I I+ exp( -x) 
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3.2.3.3 The Perceptron and the Learning Rule. 
A perceptron consists of an input and output layer without a hidden layer. Each neuron 
in the input layer is connected to each neuron in the output layer. Weights between the 
connections are adjusted as the perceptron tries to find an optimum solution to the 
problem presented. 
Given any input pattern, a perceptron produces a set of output values from the neurons 
in the output layer, and the network's output is determined by the input pattern and the 
weights of the connections. At the beginning of the model estimation/training, the 
connections are initialised as small random values, so the output produced by the 
network is unlikely to exceed the output desired for any particular pattern. The 
connections are adjusted during the training so that the output produced by the network 
approaches the desired output as more information is fed into the system. 
The basic principle is that the connections from the input neurons are unchanged if the 
output produced by the network is correct. However, if the output exceeds the desired 
output then the connections between the neurons are decreased, on the other hand the 
weights are increased if the output produced is smaller than the desired output. 
The basic training, Perceptron Learning Algorithm (PLA), of the perceptron can be 
summarised as (Beale and Jackson, 1990): 
Step 1: Initialise weights and threshold (set the weights and thresholds 
randomly). Set W; (0 <= i <= 11) to small random variables where W; is the 
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weight for input i, and {) to be the threshold value in the output node. Also, set 
Wo to be -8, the bias, and b; to be always I. 
Step 2: Present inputs and the desired outputs. Present inputsx; ( 0 <= i <= n) 
with the desired outputs d. 
Step 3: Calculate the actual output. 
" 0 = rp(L_XiWi) 
i=O 
Step 4: Adapt weights to reduce the error to an acceptable level. Alter the 
weights so that the correct decisions are reinforced and the incorrect ones are 
corrected. 
Wi = WiXiT7(d- 0) 
Where 'I ( 0 <= 'I <= I) is the positive gain tern1 (learning rate) that controls the 
adaption rate. 
This procedure is continuous until the error term (d- o) reaches a pre-set acceptable 
level. This learning algorithm is known as supervised learning as the correct answers are 
imposed on the net. 
Another learning algorithm similar to this one is known as Delta Rule. In this case the 
adjustment of the weights is larger when the weighted sum deviates significantly from 
63 
the desired value which is measured as~ = (d- o ), and the adjustment is smaller when 
the deviation is also smaller. 
The perceptron, though able to discriminate between two linearly separable classes, is 
unable to solve non-linear problems. However this problem of the perceptron is 
overcome by the Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP). They differ from the perceptron in 
respect to number of hidden layers between the input layer and the output layer. The 
activation of hidden and output layer neurons is the same as in the case of a simple 
perceptron, and the response function is a non-linear function which is usually a 
sigmoid function. 
3.2.3.4 Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) and the Learning Rule. 
Multi layer perceptrons are feed-forward nets with one or more layers of nodes between 
the input and output nodes (Lippmann, 1987). A simple MLP contains three layers: an 
input layer, a hidden layer and the output layer. Each layer in a MLP has a weight 
matrix, a bias vector and an output vector. This is presented in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Multi-Layer Perceptrons 
The net\;vork shown above has n inputs z number of neurons in the hidden layer and the 
two in the output layer. lt is important to note that the number of neurons in the hidden 
layer do not have to be equal to the number of input units. MLP may contain more than 
one hidden layer and if added, the neurons in the second layer may also be different in 
number than the first hidden layer. As can be seen outputs of each layer form the inputs 
of the following layer. 
MLPs with just one hidden layer can learn to approximate any function to any degree of 
accuracy given enough hidden un its, enough data and training time. As a result, MLPs 
are known to be universal approximators. Although one hidden layer is sufficient in 
most situations, there are cases where a net\¥ork with h¥o or more hidden layers may 
require fewer hidden units and weights than a nework wi th one hidden layer, so using 
extra hidden layers sometimes helps to improve generalisation (SAS, 1999). 
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Training takes place in a similar manner as with the perceptron. As a start, the weights 
and biases are initialised to small random values. The training pattern is fed into the 
network from input units, and outputs of neurons in the first layer are calculated. The 
output, called activation, produced by these neurons is transmitted through the response 
function onto the neurons in the second layer. This process of forwarding is repeated 
until the final output is obtained. 
As in the case of the perceptron, the output from the network will be subject to a 
learning algorithm. The weight connections will be adjusted until the desired output is 
achieved. This is achieved by the back pass during which the changes in the connections 
are back propagated (BP) through the network. 
The BP algorithm is used to adapt the weights such that the final output of the net 
approaches the desired output. This process is achieved by determining the differences 
between the actual output and the desired outputs and using these differences to adjust 
the weights. However, compared to the weight adjustment in Perceptron Learning 
Algorithm (PLA), the desired output of the hidden units are unknown. Therefore, the 
desired and actual outputs of the output layer are used to change the weights by 
propagating it back through each hidden layer to minimise the error. It is suggested that 
that the hidden units that are connected to the outputs with large errors adjust their 
weights more than the ones with small errors. The mathematics shows that the weights 
for a particular node should be adjusted in direct proportion to the error in the units to 
which it is cormected. This is the reason that back-propagating Ire errors in the net 
allows the weights to be adjusted correctly. 
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3.2.3.5 ANNs Learning Procedures. 
ANNs use two types of learning procedures. One is the supervised learning and the 
other one is unsupervised learning known as Kohonen's self-organising feallre maps. 
The two learning algorithms, PLA and BP, mentioned above are the examples of 
supervised learning where desired output is presented to the net so that the net learns 
from each input-output pair. Supervised learning is instruction-orientated. The objective 
of this type of learning is to minimise the cost function by eliminating the differences 
between the desired output and the actual output (Refenes, 1995). In supervised 
learning, the desired output is presented to the net so that the net learns from each inpu~ 
output pair. An analogy can be made to a classroom situation where a teacher corrects 
the networks' response to its inputs. As inputs are fed in to the net, an output is 
produced and compared with the desired or correct output. The teacher forces the 
network to change its internal presentation of data in order to capture the essential 
features of the input data. The teacher determines the learning rule and the weight 
adjustments. This form of learning has been employed in the majority of neuni network 
applications. 
On the other hand, in an unsupervised learning procedure there is no such desired output 
presented to the network to minimise the cost function. Unsupervised learning is self-
organisation orientated (Refenes, 1995). The objective of this learning rule is to model 
the features (cluster) in the data. Compared with the supervised learning in unsupervised 
learning, there is no teacher to correct the answer. Instead the network is left with the 
inputs and is expected to discover patterns in the training data by creating the most 
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appropriate solution to the problem. This self-organising feature of neural networks 
involves competition or co-operation, or both, amongst the neurons. 
3.2.3.6 ANN Algorithms 
Based on the learning rules, there are different algorithms. The most common 
supervised learning algorithm, as already mentioned above and used in this study, is 
Standard Back Propagation Algorithm (SBP). Radial Basis Function (RBF) is another 
algorithm under the supervised learning. The reason for not applying RBF algorithm in 
this study is that it requires the training target to be continuous analogue data, not binary 
or categorical text (NCS, 1997). 
The major algorithm that corresponds to unsupervised learning is the Kohonen 
Algorithm. Kohonen networks are one of the most widely used unsupervised learning 
techniques. In the case of unknown desired output for each training pattern, the network 
self-organises so as to group the training patterns into similar categories. As this 
algorithm is more suited to unknown desired outcome (clustering) it will not be used in 
this study. 
A mathematical working of SBP Algorithm based on Lippmann (1987) and Beale and 
Jackson (I 990) is discussed in the section below, as it is SBP algorithm that will be 
applied in this study. However, the more detailed mathematical explanations of the 
backpropagation algorithm can be seen in Rumelhart et al. (1992) and Beale and 
Jackson ( 1990). 
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3.2.3.6.1 Backpropagation and Generalised Delta Rule 
The mm of the backpropagation algorithm is to reach convergence at a desired 
mmtmum level. To do this it uses the Generalised Delta Rule (GDR). In GDR, the 
convergence is achieved through a gradient decent procedure that uses incremental 
changes in the network's weights. Manipulating the learning rate and momentum 
controls the level of this change. 
The general goal is to find the combinations of weightings which provide global 
minimum error. The first step is to calculate the minimum error for panernp, Ep, in 
order to achieve target output for patternp, lpj. The next step is to compare this with the 
actual output for the same pattern, OpJ. 
I 2 
Ep = 2 L (f Pi- 0 p) 
1 
(I) 
This is a specific error function for palternp. 
The activation for each node,j, for patternp becomes 
(2) 
This is equivalent to the weighted sum in the single layer perceptron. 
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As in the case of simple neuron, the weighted sum for each node,j, is passed onto the 
transfer function,jj. TI1e transfer function in MLP can be any of the above mentioned. 
As mentioned it is sigmoid activation function that is most commonly applied. 
(3) 
The error function for pattemp, Ep, is determined by incremental changes in weights in 
the network. So, the derivative of error function for pattemp with respect to weightings, 
with chain rule, can be expressed as 
a Ep a Ep anetpj 
= 
awij anetpj awij (4) 
The first part shows the change in error with respect to the net input node whereas the 
second part measures the effect of the changes in the net with respect to particular 
weights on the net input. 
Consider the second tem1 in equation (4), and substituting in equation (2), the effect of 
the changes in the weights on the net can be expressed as 
(5) 
. awki h ~r-· h . smce -- = 0 except w en -1 w en tt equals to I. 
awij 
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Changes in error with respect to the change in the net inputs to a node can be defined as 
(6) 
So equation (4) becomes 
(7) 
In order to decrease the value of Ep, weight changes proportional to s: . 0 . are made. U PJ PI 
This is simply the implementation of the gradient descent inE, where '7 is the learning 
rate which determines the level of changes. 
(8) 
it is s: . that should be estimated for each of the nodes to decrease the global error,Ep. UpJ 
Recalling equation (6), the chain rule can be written as 
8 .=- aEP = aEP aopj 
PJ anetP..; ao anet , pj pj (9) 
The second term can take the following form as in equation (3) 
(I 0) 
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The first term in equation (9), recalling equation (1), by differentiatingEp, with respect 
to 0 . , becomes 
PJ 
Thus the error term for each node can be written as 
8pj= f~<netp)<tpj-op) 
(11) 
( 12) 
As for the written nodes, the error term can be presented as follow, by using the chain 
rule, 
8Ep=l: BEl' Bnetpk 
Bopj k Bnetp, aopj 
By using equation (2) and (6), and being aware that the sum decreases and the partial 
derivative is non-zero for only one value, such as in the case of equation (5). When a 
substitution between equation (14) and (9) takes place, the changes in the error function 
with respect to weights in the net can be written as 
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Op1 = / 1Cnetp)L8p. wj. k (15) 
In summary, the equation (12) calculates the error in the output nodes and propagates 
back to the network to change the connection weights of previous nodes. This 
calculation and modification is done by equation (15). A multi-layer network uses 
equation ( 12) and (I 5) in parallel in a backpropagalion learning framework. 
3.2.3.6.2 Backpropagation Learning for Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) 
The majority of MLPs uses sigmoid activation function that takes the form of 
1 (16) 
where () 
1 
is a bias. In order to apply the learning rule, the derivative of the activation 
runction with respect to its total input, 11etp1• where net pj = :L wji o ,,, + B j . should be 
known. When we take the derivative of OpJ with 11etp1, 
(17) 
For a logistic activation function, the error signal, s: , for an output unit given, is UpJ 
(18) 
and error for a hidden unit, U;, is 
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(19) 
The learning rate detern1ines the changes in weights, which is proportional to 
a Epjaw. The larger this rate, the larger the changes in weights. However, for rapid 
learning, a high learning rate may cause instability in the learning process. The 
momentum term is included in the generalised delta rule in order to increase the 
learning rate without causing any instability during the process. A reduction in the 
learning rate will take network to converge in longer time period. 
Another factor that effects the convergence is the momentum term in the weight 
adaptation process. Momentum determines the effect of past weight changes on the 
current weight changes process. This process can be represented as 
L't.w (n+l)='7(.s: .0 .)+at.w (n) 11 ~m ro 1' (20) 
where; 
n = presentation number 
17 = learning rate 
a= momentum 
The learning rate and momentum ranges between 0 and I. 
A backpropagation algorithm, with a sigmoid activation function, functions as follows 
(based on Lippmann, 1987 and Rumelhart et al., 1992): 
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Start 
Initialise the weights 
Step 1 Present inputs and desired outputs. 
Step 2 Calculate actual output. 
1 
y = Cy .. y. , ........ ,y ) 
11 12 m 
Step 3 Calculate error term for output nodes. 
8"j = f~ <net p)(t pj- o") 
Step 4 Go back to hidden nodes and calculate error values. 
Step 5 Adjust weights 
L'lw (n+l)=ry(~ ·0 .)+aL'Iw.(n) 
fl Um m fl 
75 
Step 6 Until a desired level of error is achieved, go to Step 2. Once global minimum is 
achieved, show weights in the network. 
3.2.3.7 Learning Issues and General Characteristics ofNeural Networks 
Unfortunately there is no rule of thumb that determines, for example the optimum 
learning algorithm or the activation function to be applied to a specific problem. It 
largely depends on experience, judgement and trial and error. Often it is not guaranteed 
that a network with given algorithm and training set will produce the desired output. As 
put forward by Wasserman (1993), there are many questions in regard to the learning 
process and they range from the applied training algorithm to the training sets. For 
example, the selected training algorithm may not be able to achieve the optimum 
weights for the desired mapping or ensure the network will train to the best set of 
values. Also there is the possibility that, with the gradient descent technique, the 
training converges into a local minimum (Feldman and Kingdon, 1995). 
Even though the splitting of training data as training and validation helps in terms of 
when to stop the training, the process is still judgmental. Also with the application of 
gradient descent procedure there is always the danger that the training converges into a 
local minima prematurely (Feldman and Kingdon, 1995). One of the other issues from a 
practical perspective is the training time required to achieve such convergence. The 
training process can consume a lot of computer time on each training exercise. Different 
methods have been suggested to speed up the training time such as calculation of second 
derivative of the error term with respect to a weight in relation with the first derivative. 
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However, as Feldman and Kingdon ( 1995) pointed out more complex weight update 
rules must be applied to avoid cases of negative values in using the second derivative. 
One other method mentioned by Feldman and Kingdon ( 1995) is the dynamic learning 
rate. This type of learning adjusts the learning rate (the value of 17) in relation to each 
weight dynamically. Therefore the step size associated with each weight change is 
adjusted during the training. 
However it is argued in the literature that some of the special characteristics of ANNs 
offset these negative issues. These are; 
I. Generalisation: Generalisation is the ability of the network to solve new 
cases without being retrained. Once the training is complete the essential 
features of the problem are modelled and can be applied to a new data. The 
measure of generalisation is the difference between the two error rates of 
training data, er, and a new data, er, from the same distribution I er - e1l 
(Wasserrnan, 1993). 
2. Non-linear Modelling: The purpose of the training is to model the g1ven 
problem, which in most the cases is non-linear and complex. This feature is 
important in this study and might provide advantage to ANNs in their 
modelling power of takeover predictions as some of the variables considered 
show non-linear characteristics. Morck et al., (1988), for example, found that 
the relationship between the shareholdings of executive directors and 
shareholders' wealth maximisation is not linear. Their result can be an 
evidence of management entrenchment. Therefore it is possible that at high 
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levels of managerial ownership of companies, managers act to enhance their 
own interest rather than their wider shareholders. Stulz ( 1988) reported that 
the relationship between managerial shareholding and market value of the 
firm is non-linear. He identified such a critical value that if management 
shareholding is below this value then market value of the company increases 
otherwise it decreases. 
3. Tolerance to Noise: Neural networks are tolerant to the noise in the data due 
to the properties of the hidden layers and the nodes in these layers, which 
distribute and store the information among the different neurons in the 
network. 
4. Tolerance to Missing Data: In the event of missing data, the network 
completes the task by using partially available data. Missing data does not 
impede the network from retrieving the processed information from other 
neurons. For example, logistic regression does not produce an outcome 
variable if there is a missing value in one or any of the cases in the data while 
ANNs produces an outcome by using the partially available information. 
5. Parallelism and C01mectionism: TI1e parallel connection in neurons allows 
the network to solve a problem simultaneously. 
6. The Performance Degradation: Since the information is stored through the 
system rather than one part of the network, the performance of a network 
degrades slowly when damage or noise occurs. 
7. Adaptability: As the new information is fed into the network, there is no need 
to retrain the network. The network adapts itself to the new environment. 
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3.3 Application of ANNs in Business, Finance and Accounting 
Most of ANNs applications in finance and accounting are directed to empirical testing 
of the technique and benchmarking it against the more traditional modelling techniques 
of multivariate statistics. Feldman and Kingdon (1995) discuss some of ANNs 
applications in finance and highlight the increasing number of research papers published 
within the last five years. 
Tarn and Kiang (1992) applied ANNs to bank failure prediction in comparison with 
LOA, LR, k nearest neighbour and decision trees. The dataset used in the study 
comprise of 59 failed and 59 non-failed Texas banks. They have selected nineteen 
financial ratios and constructed two network structures. One with a two layer network 
(no hidden units) and the other one with three hidden layers with ten nodes. The results 
show that ANNs (three layer network) with ten nodes outperformed in its prediction all 
of the other classification techniques and the two layer network with no hidden nodes 
one year prior to bankruptcy. On the other hand, LOA has given better prediction results 
two years prior to bankruptcy. Overall their results suggest that ANNs offer an 
alternative/additional technique that can be utilised in monitoring banks in terms of their 
financial healthiness. However they also emphasise problems of deploying such a 
technique in terms computational efficiency (training time), the black box properties, as 
not being able to extract the relative importance of each input, and the retwork structure 
as there is no method to structure a network for a given classification task. 
Yoon et al., (1993) applied ANNs to prediction of stock price performance of 151 
companies from 1989 and compared the results with OA. They have used four financial 
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ratios as inputs and the companies are separated into two groups' being those whose 
stock price performed well or poorly depending on market value or total return. They 
further divided the dataset into estimation (76 firms) and hold-out samples (75 firms). 
They have employed back-propagation algorithm with sigmoid activation function. 
Different hidden units (0 to 9) with different hidden layers (2 to 4) have been tested. For 
a OA, the quadratic discriminant function was computed. The results show that the 
performance of ANN model increased with the increased hidden layers. While a two 
layer network with zero hidden unit successfully classified 65% of the hold-out sample, 
four layered network classified with 76% success. However the difference between Ire 
three and four layer network on the hold-out sample is the same even though the four 
layer network had a better mapping of the training sample. In comparison to OA, 
however, all of the constructed ANNs performed better both on the training and hold-
out samples. DA only classified 63% of hold-out sample successfully. This is two 
percentage points lower than the two layer network. So their overall conclusion was that 
the multilayer ANNs has outperformed the quadratic DA model in forecasting stock 
price performance. 
Curram and Mingers (1994) compared ANNs with LOA and decision tree induction 
rule. The comparison is perfornted on seven datasets from different fields. Four of these 
datasets were real and the remaining three were created artificially. Obviously the 
network structures were different for each of these seven datasets. The results of these 
seven datasets suggest that ANNs provided better classification results on the datasets 
where non-linearity existed. On the other hand, LOA performed better on the datasets 
that were linearly separable. One of the peculiar outcomes of this study is that they have 
found that the real datasets seem to be linearly separable compared with the artificial 
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datasets. They also highlight the problems associated with ANNs such as training time 
and fonning the network strucn1res. 
Luther ( 1996) applied ANNs to predict whether a finn that filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 will emerge reorganised tluough the bankruptcy process. It is stated in the 
study that those fLnns, which reorganise by the Chapter 11 process successfully, 
produce investment returns up to 50%. The data set is comprised of 73 reorganised and 
31 liquidated finns. Luther also employed LR as a comparative modelling tool to 
ANNs. Thirteen financial ratios, one year prior to the bankruptcy filing, are used as 
inputs. Tiuee layer, one hidden layer, neural net work model has been applied. The 
number of hidden units in the hidden layer was changed between 2 to I 0 and 
perfonnance of these different units was also compared. It is reported that 8 nodes in the 
hidden layer perfonned better than the other nodes. The training of ANNs is perfonned 
using Genetic Algorithm. The reported prediction accuracy of ANNs is higher than LR 
in all the different cut-off points. At 0.5 cut-off point, for example, the overall error rate 
for ANNs on the hold-out sample was 37% compared to 48% with LR. It is also shown 
that ANNs are less sensitive to cut-off points. The variation of error rate between 
different cut-off points with ANNs was only 12.5% (35% to 4 7 .5%) point while it 
increases to 25% (38.5% to 63.5%) with LR. As a result Luther reported that as ANNs 
produced better prediction rates they could be used in bankruptcy prediction. 
Miranda and Burgess ( 1997) applied ANNs to forecast market volatility changes 
implied in the transaction prices of the Ibex35 index options, which contains the 35 
most liquid stocks that trade in the Spanish Stock Exchange. They have also applied 
classical statistical modelling, Linear Regression (LR) and Moving Average model 
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(MA), in order to compare the results. In the training of ANNs, they employed cros& 
validation selection procedures where the training data was split into training and 
validation sets. When the results of different models were compared on the basis of root 
mean squared error and percentage of correct change predicted (correlation), ANNs and 
regression models performed similarly and compared with MA in terms of root mean 
squared error. However in predicting the correct change ANNs outperformed the 
regression model. Moreover they have carried further testing for better performance 
comparison between the models. The followed methodology is called comparison by 
forecast encompassing. This means that if one model is to be preferred to anotherone, 
the model one should explain what the other one could not explain. In order to establish 
which model encompasses the other one, first forecast error from model one is regressed 
on the forecast from model two and vice versa. If the resulting regression coefficient is 
not significant in model one but with model two then model one encompasses model 
two. This test simply estimates if model one's forecast can explain some of the forecast 
error of model two. On this test, it is reported that ANNs encompasses linear regression 
and linear regression encompasses MA. ANNs is the only model whose forecast is not 
encompassed by any other models' forecast. The overall results in the study suggest that 
ANNs' forecast generally outperforms the forecasts of linear regression and moving 
average modelling. 
Steiner and Wittkemper ( 1997) applied ANNs to portfolio optimisation. The model is 
based on the coherent market hypothesis (CMH) as a non-linear dynamic model of the 
capital markets. The nonlinear dynamic capital mode~ CMH, relaxes some of the 
assumptions of capital asset pricing model or arbitrage pricing theory such as rational 
investors and normal distribution of stock returns. Daily returns of highly liquid 31 
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shares that traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange are used to construct a simple market 
portfolio. The time period ranges from September 1991 to April 1994. First of all 
probabilistic ANNs are used to highlight the underlying stock return distribution from 
the previous two months stock returns. Then by using this information the CMH 
parameters are estimated. Based on the estimated parameters and the actual returns, a 
second general regression ANNs model is used to forecast the future returns of each 
stock relative to the market portfolio returns and each stock is ranked according to its 
performance. Two groups of stocks are established as high and low performance stocks. 
This process is repeated every day to update portfolios. The results show that a 
constructed portfolio outperforms the market portfolio by approximately 60%. Also, it 
is reported that the highest ranked 10 stocks show, on average, positive excess return. 
The overall results of the study conclude that as nonlinear modelling technique ANNs 
can be applied to excess stock return forecasting as well as being used as a tool to 
extract the underlying distributional properties of stock returns. 
Serrano-Cinca (1997) applied ANNs (MLP) 111 corporate failures in 66 Spanish 
compames and compared the results of MLP with LDA and LR. First, he tried to 
observe the functioning of ANNs and its similarities with LDA. When a single layer 
perceptron with a linear transfer function in the output layer was applied to the whole 
sample the classification outcome was very similar to the LDA. Eight misclassifications 
with LDA compared to seven with ANN. In a similar manner a single layer perceptron 
with a logistic transfer function obtained similar results with LR. In this case four 
misclassifications compared to five with LR. Therefore he concluded that LDA and LR 
could be interpreted as a particular case of a single layer perceptron even though the 
three models are using different methods of estimating the parameters. [n the second 
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testing of these techniques Serrano-Cinca applied jackknife technique to LOA and 
ANNs. LOA produced nine misclassifications with 86.36% accuracy compared with 
four misclassifications in ANNs. In this case the network had four neurons in the hidden 
layer with a hyperbolic tangent as the transfer function and one neuron in the output 
layer with a linear transfer function. 
The only application of ANNs to takeover predictions, so far, has been conducted by 
Sen et al., (1995) on listed US firms in New York Stock Exchange. The study aims to 
compare the predictive and explanatory abilities of ANNs and logistic regression in 
corporate takeovers. The data collected over the period from 1980 to 1985 and 1984 
data used to estimate the parameters and train the neural network. 1985 data on the other 
hand is used as a hold-out sample to test the predictive abilities of the models. Equal 
numbers of target and non-target companies (39 target and 39 non-target) are used in the 
estimation sample. The selected twelve company financial information is similar to the 
variables used by Palepu (1986). 
Among the twelve variables used in the study only three of them (average excess return, 
average growth, and market to book ratio) were significant in the prediction of merger 
targets. They have also used the approach that is applied by Palepu (1986) to determine 
the probability cut-off point and the cut-off point of 0.6 is chosen as the intersect point 
between the probability distribution curve of targets and non-targets. 
The neural network model with two hidden layers, four nod~s in the first layer and two 
nodes in the second, and a hyperbolic tangent activation function was applied. Even 
though this network correctly classified 34 out of 39 targets and 37 out of 39 non-targets 
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in the estimation sample, its prediction success on the hold-out sample was not so 
successful. Neural network predicted 28 out of 78 (36%) targets successfully compared 
with 23 (29%) logistic regression. On the non-target sub-sample however logistic 
regression had a better prediction rate (68%) than neural networks (63%). Overall 
neural networks correctly classified 61.2% compared with 66.4% of logistic regression. 
Moreover in order to show that the network can map the estimation sample with only 
one hidden layer, they trained a network with one hidden layer, 23 nodes in the hidden 
layer, to maximum learning. By doing this, the model is forced to over-fit to the training 
data. This network correctly classified 97% of the data but performed poorly (50%) on 
the hold-out sample. 
Their conclusions suggest that ANNs performed similarly to logistic regression in the 
prediction of takeover targets even though none of the modelling techniques produced 
such results that could be used in the prediction of takeovers so that abnormal excess 
return can be obtained through their application. On the other hand as is shown in the 
study, neural networks provided better mathematical fit to the data. 
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3.4 Discussions and Summary 
As can be seen from the brief and overall explanation of the techniques and the 
empirical application of them in business, finance and accounting, there are some 
similarities between LR and neural networks. Neural networks share a number of 
characteristics with traditional techniques. They include hierarchical structures, 
clustering, pattern association, and learning or training (Schalkoff, 1992). A two layered 
network with sigmoid activation function corresponds to LR. In a general sense, 
maximum likelihood estimation, where the unknown parameters are calculated by 
maximising the probability of obtaining the observed set of data through an iterative 
process, is very similar to the workings of neural computing, especially, when a sigmoid 
threshold function is used as the activation function. On the other hand, as can be seen 
from the characteristics of neural networks, there are also differences between them. For 
example, the missing data may result in LR not producing any score for the observation 
while the neural networks does. As reported by Sen el al., (1995) for example, with 
noisy data neural networks model the data better than logistic regresson. 
In a more general comparison, the artificial neural network paradigms provide tools that 
are equivalent to those of classical classification and pattern recognition techniques. 
However as a distribution free method, ANNs are more robust to the cross sectional 
data and produce better solutions while multivariate statistical techniques, such as LOA, 
are subject to specific forrns of distribution and assumptions. As the previous research 
suggests (McLeay, 1986; Ezzamel el al., 1987; Barnes, 1987; So, 1987; Watson, 1990; 
Ezzarnel and Mar-Molinero, I 990; Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1995), if the distribution of 
financial ratios deviates from norrnal distribution, the reliability of techniques that infer 
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through this assumption will be questionable. In addition to normality, another critical 
assumption is that the group dispersion (variance-covariance) is equal across groups. 
Eisenbeis ( 1977) suggests that both assumptions are probably violated in most samples 
used in empirical research. 
On one hand it is suggested or recommended that application of any statistical 
techniques such as MDA should be accompanied by trimming or transformation of 
variables until their distributions provide a reasonable approximation to normal 
distribution. Sudarsanam and Taffler (1985), in their study of industrial classification, 
found out that none of the 18 variables (financial ratios) were nom1ally distributed 
hence they transformed these variables so that they approximate normality. Furthem10re 
in their empirical analysis of proportionality condition of financial ratio components, 
Sudarsanam and Taffier (1995) found that most of the accounting ratios show loglinear 
relationship in their components and seem to suggest that most of these ratios may be 
lognormaly distributed. However, when they also examined whether this established 
relationship was constant over time, they found out that functional relationship of ratio 
component change over time resulting same type of transformation of same variables at 
different time points invalid. Their results on time variability of financial ratios support 
the findings of Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel (1989). 
On the other hand though it is suggested by McLeay (1986) that rather than ''drawing 
inferences from trimmed means, or from re-expressed data, it would seem more 
straightforward to leave the data IIIIQfljusted and use a better-fitting moder'(p.209). 
Therefore it is only appropriate that in analysis and application of financial ratios one 
should try to construct models with statistical techniques, such as Logit or Probit 
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analysis, that do not depend so much on normality assumption of accounting ratios. 
Also as mentioned above, one of the claimed advantages of ANNs is that they are free 
of multivariate normality. Consequently it is expected that ANNs will produce more 
robust results in finance and accounting applications. This expectation has been 
deducted as a result of the propositions and results of those studies that were 
summarised above. 
As a result of above discussion that DA will not be applied in this study. It is quite 
obvious from the assumptions of DA that the technique is not suitable to the type of 
data that is intended to be utilised in this study. It is possible that DA could be applied 
to the financial ratios with application of variable transformation, but it would be highly 
inappropriate to apply it to the non-financial variables and eventually the combined 
variables as financial and non-financial. Binary variables of non-financial characteristics 
of companies would violate the normality assumption of DA such that it would bias the 
estimated error rates and lead to an incomparable classification outcome. 
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Chapter 4- Financial Ratio Modelling and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter ANNs and LR will be applied to takeover prediction by using publicly 
available information (financial ratios) of UK manufacturing companies. The aim is to 
assess, firstly whether it is possible to predict takeovers by employing these two 
techniques and secondly to see if ANN will provide a better prediction compared with 
LR modelling. 
Ratios based on historical accounting information are often used for evaluating the 
financial condition and performance of firms and used as input in statistical models. 
Usage of financial ratios as performance measurement of companies comes from a very 
simple fact that companies operating in the general market or within specific industries 
are of different size. Ratios, therefore, are used to control for the effect of firm size as 
well as for industry wide factors. 
Whether in corporate takeover predictions or profiling the characteristics of firms 
subject to takeovers, several studies (Simk.owitz and Monroe, 1971; Stevens, 1973; 
Singh, 1975; Belkaoui, 1978; Wansley and Lane, 1983; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; 
Rege, 1984; Walk1ing, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Bames, 1990; Sen et al. 1995; Powell, 
1997; and Bames, 1998) have already used financial ratios to model takeover 
likelihood. The different ways to determine the likelihood for being takenover using 
past financial information is well documented. 
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Most of these studies have fonnulated successful prediction models for takeovers by 
using financial variables. The financial ratios that were employed by these studies as 
well the statistical methods used are briefly summarised below. The prediction results 
and successes of these studies will be reported in the summary section the end of the 
chapter. 
Simkowitz and Monroe ( 1971) selected 24 ratios from seven different financial aspects 
of a fim1 and applied MDA. These are; growth, size, profitability, leverage, dividend 
policy, liquidity, and firn1's stock. They have found out that seven of the 24 variables 
were significant. These reported significant ratios were; price-earning ratio, average 
dividend yield over three years, average growth rate of equity over three years, size, loss 
carry-over for tax, high volume of market activity, and average dividend yield to the 
equity over three years. 
Stevens (1973) used 20 ratios under five categories that highlight the overall financial 
characteristics of finns. He selected these ratios from classes such as liquidity, 
profitability, leverage, activity, dividend policy, and price earnings. He reported that 
four ratios, EBIT I Sales (profitability of finns in relation to sales), Net Working Capital 
I Assets (liquidity measure), Sales I Assets, and Long-tenn liabilities I Assets (capital 
structure), found to contribute to the discriminatory ability of the models. He did not 
find that dividend pay out and price-earning ratio were significant. Some of his results 
contradict the conclusion of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) for example that they found 
out that the price-earning ratio was a significant indicator. 
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Singh (1975) has constructed one of the earliest studies of takeover selection process in 
the UK. He used seventeen ratios from seven variable classes (Profitability, Change in 
Profitability, Growth, Liquidity, Gearing, Retention Ratio, and Size). He applied MDA 
and reported that Size, two-year average profitability, growth, two-year change in 
profitability, two-year average liquidity, two-year average gearing, and two-year 
average retention ratio were significant variables. The also reported that the model was 
able to classify 83% of the firms correctly. 
Belkaoui (1978) employed 17 ratios under four different financial classes. He indicated 
that the ratios were selected on the basis of their popularity in the literature as well as 
their relevance to takeovers, and their distinction between liquid and non-liquid ratios. 
The classes are determined on the basis of their difference between liquid and non-
liquid characteristics of companies. These were; Non-liquid Asset group (six ratios 
under this group), Liquid Asset to Total Asset group (four ratios), Liquid Asset to 
Current Debt group (three ratios), and Liquid Asset Turnover group (four ratios). 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) on the other hand viewed takeovers (especially takeover 
decisions) as a capital acquisition decision and outlined that higher the value of 
expected net present value of cash flow from an acquisition the more attractive a 
possible takeover candidate become. In turn they concentrated on ratios (ten ratios) that 
directly or indirectly affect initial cash outlays and random future net cash flows. They 
have reported that Payout (dividends I earnings), Asset turnover (sales I total assets), 
Size (market value of the equity), and Trading volume were significant indicators of 
takeover likelihood. 
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Palepu ( 1986) applied a logistic regression technique to a group of ratios, which were 
derived from different mergers and acquisition hypotheses that were indicated as 
probable causes of takeovers in the literature. These hypotheses (Inefficient 
Management, Growth-Resource Imbalance, Industry Disturbance, Size, Market-to-
Book, and Price-Earning) are further discussed in detail in the following section. He 
reported in one of the models that growth-resource dummy, growth, leverage, industry 
dummy, and size were detern1ining factors in acquisition likelihood estimation. 
Sen et al., (1995) applied almost exactly the same hypotheses and ratios of Palepu 
(1986) to their takeover modelling of both logistic regression and artificial neural 
networks. They have reported that Average Excess Return, Average Sales Growth, and 
Market-to-Book values to be significant values. Compared to Palepu 's (1986) study 
they did not find industry dummy to be significant. 
Bames (1990) selected nine basic financial ratios for his study. However he did not use 
these ratios directly in the modelling but averaged them with the relevant industry 
average (industry relative ratios). In the second stage he factor analysed them and found 
that five factors were explaining approximately 92% of the variance in the data. Hence 
five ratios that were most correlated with these factors used in the factor analysis. These 
ratios were; Quick Assets I Current Liabilities, Current Assets I Current Liabilities, Pre-
tax Profit Margin, Net profit Margin, Return on Shareholders' Equity. 
Powell (1997) modelled takeover likelihood of targets in the UK from the time period 
1984 to 1991. He, like Sen et al., (1995), constructed variables for acquisition 
characteristics of companies from similar hypothesis that were outlined by Palepu 
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(1986). He employed eight ratios ( ROCE, Size, Tangible Fixed Assets I Total Assets, 
MTB, Operating Cash Flow I Total Assets, Average Change in Total Sales, Liquidity, 
and Leverage. However unlike above studies Powell (1995) did not apply the models to 
a hold-out sample to measure their classification/prediction abilities. He rather used 
them to see if there are differences between hostile and friendly takeovers as well as 
impact of change on acquisition characteristics of companies in time. He reported in the 
general model (consists of both contested and friendly takeovers) that Liqtidity, 
measured as Cash and Marketable Securities I Total Assets, Size, measured as Log of 
Total Assets, and Market-to-Book ratio were significant variables. He further sub-
sampled the data and divided into two separate time periods 1984-1987 and 1988-1991 
to measure whether any significant changes could be observed in the characteristics of 
companies. He reported that the impact of firm characteristics on takeover likelihood 
changes over time. The model constructed with the data from period 1984-1987 
produced only one significant variable (Size) while 1988-1991 model revealed three 
significant variables (Liquidity, Size and MTB). 
Bames (1998) also utilised similar hypotheses as outlined by Palepu (1986) in the 
construction of the variables. However rather than selecting a representative ratio for 
each hypothesis he formed a forty-two ratios and eliminated twenty-five of them after 
performing a correlation analysis. They were simply dropped from the analysis if they 
had a correlation coefficient greater than 0.65. This procedure reduced the list of ratios 
to seventeen and they were grouped under the hypothesis of Inefficient Management 
(seven ratios), Growth-Resource Imbalance (nine ratios), Size (one ratio), and 
Anticipatory Share Price Change (one ratio). He found that Profit Before Tax I Sales, 
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Profit Before Tax I Shareholders' Equity, Total Remuneration I Sales, and Sales growth 
over last two years were significant in the Non-share price model. 
Findings of these outlined studies above, such as Sen et al. ( 1995), Powell (1997), or 
Bames ( 1998), are discussed in detail in the discussion and summary section. The 
purpose of discussing the results of these studies later in the discussion and summary 
section is to highlight as well as to measure the significan:e for the results of these 
studies alongside the results of this work. 
Correspondingly, following the methodological principles of earlier studies outlined 
above, the aim of the first phase of this study is to identify and model those financial 
characteristics of two groups of companies as targets and non-targets by employing 
Logistic Regression (LR) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). In the second part, 
these models will be applied on hold-out samples in order to find out whether it is 
possible to classify these companies into their correct groups. Furthermore the result of 
these models will be compared to determine if any particular modelling technique is 
better at classifying companies into correctly. 
4.2 Methodological Issues 
Zmijewski (1984) and Palepu (1986) have made critical examination of the 
methodology used by other studies in prediction studies and argued that there are three 
methodological problems that make those successful reports of previous studies 
(Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971; Stewens, 1973; Belkaoui, 1978; Dietrich and Sorensen, 
1984) unreliable. These problems can be grouped under three headings; 
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1. The use of non-random, matched sampling in the model estimation eventually 
leads to a biased estimation of the model's parameters and through this acquisition 
likelihood; 
n. The use of non-random, matched sampling in the hold-out sample leads to a biased 
estimation of parameters affecting the models' predictive ability of the population; 
111. The use of arbitrary cut-off probabilities in prediction without specifying a 
decision context makes the prediction accuracy difficult to interpret. 
It is argued that usmg matched sampling without appropriate modifications to the 
estimators will lead to estimation bias in the models' parameters. The estimation bias 
will result an overestimation of prediction results in the hold out sample. This bias 
occurs when the application of a choice-based sample is used in the estimation where 
the inclusion of targets is not random. The econometric justification of such a selection 
is that the number of target firms (111) in the population (N) is so small that random 
selection would lead to a very small number of targets being included in the estimation 
sample. Such a sample would not convey the necessary information needcrl to form the 
model as it would be dominated by the non-targets (112) and lead to imprecise parameter 
estimates. Therefore, the information content of a sample would be greatly reduced. So, 
in order to improve the information content of the sample, equal target and non-target 
sampling is generally used in the derivation sample. It seems obvious that the main 
disadvantage of using such a choice-based sample in prediction modelling is the 
restriction on the model, when it is tested for other samples, that do not hold such an 
artificial composition (Bartley and Boardman, 1990). 
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However, Manski and Lennan (1977) and Manski and McFadden (1981) show that in a 
population such as takeovers or corporate failure, a choice-based sample provides more 
efficient estimates than a random sampling of the same size. Also, Cosslett (1981) and 
Maddala (1983) show that the bias introduced by a choice-based sampling for the Logit 
model is limited to the constant tenn only. 
In a takeover prediction study such as this, the target ilfonnation captured by the model 
that is constructed by random sampling would be weak, as there would be only few 
target companies in the estimation sample. As a result, a sample of one to one matching 
(choice-based sampling) is used to estimate model parameters in this study. 
As can be seen in most of the previous studies, a one to one matched holdout sample is 
used to test the predictive ability of the models. Although this process does not affect 
the probabilities assigned to each individual finn, it nonetheless leads to misleading 
expected error rates. As one-to-<lne matching is a non-random sampling, the estimated 
error rates would not be generalisable to the population. In other words, the estimated 
error rates will not be equal to the expected prediction error rate in the population 
(Palepu, 1986). 
It is also possible to utilise techniques such as bootstrapping or jackknifing rather than 
dividing the sample into estimation and hold-out groups. The jackknife technique, for 
example, requires that the estimation sample is fonned with n-1 of the original cases 
and applied to the remaining one as a test case. Then the process is iterated until all of 
the cases are excluded from the estimation process one by one and used as a test case. 
Even though application of these methods enables all of the cases to be utilised in the 
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estimation of the models, it is an extremely time consuming process (Serano-Cinca, 
1997). In the case of this study for example it would take 300 iterations to complete the 
analysis for only one model. Furthermore these processes are not embedded in the 
software that is used this study. Therefore in the interest of time and practicality the 
sample is divided into two groups as estimation and hold-out. As presented later in the 
chapter, in this study the composition of the hold-out sample is formed to reflect its real 
composition as closely as possible. 
In prediction studies the predictive classification of models of sample companies 1s 
based upon the cut-off probability. After the estimation of each firm's takeover 
probability, companies are classified into groups according to whether their individual 
acquisition probabilities are smaller or higher than the predefined cut-off value. In most 
of the prediction studies of takeovers and corporate failure alike researchers preferred to 
use an arbitrary cut-off probability of0.50. As Palepu (1986) showed, a predefined cut-
off probability of 0.50 is arbitrary and the appropriate cut-off probability should be 
determined by the decision context in which the model's predictions are to be used. In 
this study Palepu (1986) applied error-minimisation criteria to compute the optimum 
cut-off probability by using the estimated probabilities of companies in the estimation 
sample. However, this procedure assumes that the cost of classification errors of both 
groups (Type I and Type Il) are the same (Hsieh, 1993). Although the error 
minimisation is the most popular measure that is used in the applied classification 
studies, certain types of misclassifications are more serious then others. As stated by 
Hand (1997), if the expected cost of misclassification can be quantified, an optimum 
decision surface can be selected to minimise this cost instead of error minimisation on 
the actual number. However as it will be explained later on that not only the overall 
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predictive accuracy of the models will be presented but also a significance test 
(proportional chance criterion) will be performed. The aim of this test is to see whether 
the magnitude of these classifications is significant as well as to see that the results can 
not be attributable to simple chance or fluke. 
4.3. Methodology, Data and Variables 
The sample set for the UK companies is extracted from Acquisition Monthly's annual 
index for completed as well as failed UK public takeovers from January 1990 to 
December 1996. However, monthly issues of the journal had to be inspected in order to 
identify the bidding dates rather than the completion dates that have been supplied by 
the annual index reports. Financial data for the target companies is collected from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) and Datastream data bases. The rationale behind 
the identification of bidding dates is obvious as the intention of a takeover becomes 
public, and share price data of targets are affected with this expected takeover. Also 
sometimes this pending process may take up quite some time as a result affecting the 
quality of data during the pending period. 
It has also been decided to concentrate on manufacturing companies in order to exclude 
the specific industrial effects of financial services, oil and gas and utilities. By trying to 
select companies that are subject to more common environmental circumstances will 
enable us to form more stable models. Inclusion of financial sector characteristics, for 
example, might further delude this common environmental circumstances. This is 
especially important in the case of financial ratios due to the extreme variations between 
different industries (Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel, 1989; Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1985). 
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Moreover, in order to obtain the max1mum information available, Public Limited 
Companies are targeted in the sample set. Therefore, the sample companies had to fulfil 
two criteria: 
i.to be a fully quoted manufacturing firms and, 
ii.to receive a bid during the time period outlined. 
In the end, the list provided us with I 03 target firms with available data in 
manufacturing from January 1990 to December 1996. At this point two types of sample 
division are followed. In the first instance I 03 target companies are divided into two 
groups for each year, randomly to be included in the estimation and test samples. Each 
target company matched up with healthy companies from the same four-digit SIC code 
and one of these healthy companies is selected to be used in the estimation sample. The 
composition of this sampling is presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Second, in order to test 
the predictive power of models in time, another estimation sample is formed with 
companies that were taken over from January 1990 to December 1994 and tested on the 
companies that were taken over during 1995 and 1996. The reason for establishing this 
second sample is the occurrence of population drift. Population distribution of 1990-94 
might not be the same as of 1995 and 1996. This approach will measure the stability of 
the model in time since takeover characteristics of the market change in time. Powell 
( 1997) tested whether takeover characteristics are consistent in time and reported that 
firm characteristics on takeover likelihood change over time. Some of the reasons why 
these characteristics change and models may not be stable over time are outlined by 
Bames {1990) as: inflationary effects, technological reasons, changing accounting 
policies, and the change in the distributional cross.,sectional parameters of financial 
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ratios. The composition of this sampling is presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In order to 
simplify these two approaches, the first one is called "Mixed Data" (MD) and the 
second one is "Time Data" (TD}. Moreover, in order to see the industry relative 
performance of the fim1s, respective ratios of the companies are calculated as (Firm 
ratio/industry average) * 100 and called "Industry-Relative Data" (IRD). IRD is only 
computed for TD. 
The reason for forming a data set as mixed data, where selected target firms from all 
years under consideration are included, is twofold. First, it was the preferred way of 
model estimation in some of the previous studies (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984) and 
second, more importantly, it will be used as a benchmark for the TD model. Since the 
estimation sample as well as hold-out sample includes data from 1990 to 1996, it is 
expected that the prediction results of the MD model will be higher and a drop in the 
prediction power of TD model can be observed. It will not be attempted to construct 
IRD for MD because it is composition is already artificial and any significant result 
produced could not be taken as evidence that it is possible to predict takeovers. The 
purpose of having such a composition as MD is to see how much change, whether it is 
model significance or prediction result, will be observed compared with TD. A reality 
check is needed at this point. In actuality, it is only possible to make prediction for the 
coming event and not for what already has taken place. 
The same approach was applied to the second year data to see the whether it is also 
possible to model takeover probabilities two years before the actual takeover bid. The 
term 'year' used in this context does not necessarily imply a calendar year but it actually 
represents accounting period. One year data means accounting information published 
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just before the bid made public. Hence two year data means accounting data published 
one period prior to the one just before the bid made public. In order to differentiate 
these two data periods, acronym TD(-1) will be used for data one year prior to takeover 
bid and TD( -2) will be for the data two year prior. 
As will be seen in the results, variables for the second year model were not significant 
(except LIQD) and the model itself is insignificant. This result indicated that, first of all, 
the variables contain more information about the companies' takeover likelihood one 
year prior to the takeover bid and posed a question of the possibility of using this 
information in the modelling process. Therefore, a different data set is formed by 
measuring the change in the variables, except Sales Growth (TUT) because it already 
measures the change in turnover, from one year to two years prior to the takeover bids 
and is called Variation Data (VD). VD, as in the case ofiRD, is only calculated for TD. 
It is also important to note here that the results of the IRD should be viewed with 
extreme caution as the industry averages have been calculated from two digit SIC codes 
rather than four digit as in the case of matching. The obvious reason for this is that these 
variables (except PIE and MBV, because they were to be extracted from Datastream) 
had to be calculated/extracted from the FAME and in some cases there is not a 
sufficient number of companies in some of the four digit SIC groups. The main problem 
with this type of averaging is that companies operate in such a wide array of other 
groups that using a two digit SIC simply can not be used as a benchmark against 
companies. Secondly, comparisons of company ratios against industry averages are 
problematic (McLeay, 1986; So, 1987). Sudarsanam and Taftler (1995) reported, for 
example, a huge variation in the functional relationship of ratio components between 
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industries and recommended caution m the use of financial ratios m inter-industry 
comparisons. As mentioned by Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel (1989), and Lawrence 
(1982) that one of the main limitations of using industry averages is that product 
diversification hinders precise industry classifications and dilutes the averages. Also 
industry averages can be heavily influenced by extreme variations in the data that can 
not be observed especially if there is no remedial action, such as trimming, performed 
on individual company information that forms the industry data and average (Mar-
Molinero and Ezzamel, 1989). 
The reason for choosing this time period is to identify the characteristics of target 
companies before the expected stronger European integration that will be completed by 
the so-called monetary union. Also, selecting a seven year time period prohibits a longer 
time period for the financial data and some other effects such as changes in the market 
for mergers and takeovers (Powell, 1997 and, Jarrell and Bradley, 1980). As already 
mentioned above Powell ( 1997) examined whether takeover characteristics are 
consistent in time and found out that characteristics of companies on takeover likelihood 
change over time. His results suggest that in order to form stlble models the estimation 
period should concentrate on a relatively short period of time where effects of changing 
economic environment do not alter the causes of takeovers. Mitchell and Mulherin's 
(1996) study confirms that takeovers do not occur evenly over time. Their result suggest 
that economic shocks at different times induce takeovers and restructuring in specific 
industries leading to increased acquisition activity. As a result it is important that the 
sample data should concentrate on a reasonable short period time so the effects of these 
shocks and their impact on industries can be captured. Rising stock prices along with 
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the economic recovery started at the beginning of 1990s has resulted an increase in the 
takeover activity in the UK and the result can be observed in Figure I in chapter one. 
The target sample set of I 03 is comparable to the sample set of Gammie and Gammie 
( 1996) who examined almost the same time period, 1990.93, and came up with 102 
target firms (23 hostile an 79 non-hostile) and Weir ( 1997) who also used 1990-93 
period with 94 target companies. Of these 94, 71 were non-hostile while 23 were hostile 
bids. However their data sets covered all sectors of the economy, not only 
manufacturing. The comparison of the sample with some other similar studies can also 
be made with Table-4.1 provided below. 
Table 4.1 Sample and Technique Characteristics of the Some Major Studies 
Study Sample Size Matching Technique 
Acquired/Non-acq. Criteria Applied 
Simkowitz and Monroe 23 to 25 Random MDA 
( 1971) 
Stewans ( 1973) 40 to 40 Asset size MDA 
Belkaoui ( 1978) 25 to 25 Industry & Asset Dichotomous/DA 
size 
Rege (1984) 44to 44 Industry MDA 
Dietrich and Sorensen 30 to 30 Industry LR 
(1984) 
Palepu ( 1986) 163 to 256 Random LR 
Bartley and Boardman 41to 153 Industry MDA 
(1990) 
Bames (1990) 92 to 92 Industry MDA 
Sen et al. (1995) 39 to 39 Random LR/ANNs 
Powell ( 1997) 411 to 532 Random Multivariate 
Logit 
Bames (1998) 82 to 82 Industry & Size Log it 
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Table 4.2. Composition of the estimation/derivation sample for the Mixed (MD) and 
Time (TD) data. 
Year Acquired 
Targets 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total Targets 
Matched Firms 
Total Sample 
MD 
9 
9 
7 
6 
8 
8 
5 
52 
52 
104 
TD 
16 
18 
IS 
13 
16 
78 
78 
156 
Table 4.3. Composition of the test/hold-out sample for the Mixed (MD) and Time (TD) 
data. 
Year Acquired 
Targets 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total Targets 
Matched Firms 
Total Sample 
MD 
7 
9 
8 
7 
8 
7 
5 
51 
145 
196 
TD 
15 
10 
25 
119 
144 
As can be seen in the previous tables, estimation samples are formed with one to one 
matching rather than random sampling. The reasons for this type of sampling method 
have already been explained above (Manski and Lerrnan, 1977; Manski and McFadden, 
1981; Cosslett, 1981; Maddala, 1983). On the other hand, in the hold-out sample, this 
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type of one to one matching is avoided. In the MD, target firms make up 26% (51/196) 
of the total hold-out sample and in the TO, they constitute 17.3% (25/144) of the total 
hold-out sample. Although these percentages do not exactly match population 
percentages, they are far from the 50-50 sampling composition. The FAME database on 
average consists of 500 manufacturing companies and if the 103 target companies are 
taken in total during the sampling period then 17 companies on average are taken over 
yearly which constitute 3.4% of the total. Also, it should be noted that 300 out of 500 
manufacturing firms are included in the following analysis and this sample constitutes 
60% of the total manufacturing population in the UK. 
This matching is done on two bases. First, SIC; 4 digit SICs are used for matching in the 
estimation sample, and, second, financial year ends, in order to make sure that time 
differences are eliminated and to identify the main differences between the companies 
that are affected by the same external factors. 
An analysis of financial ratios in decision models produces certain problems such as 
normality, missing data and outliers. Even though the techniques that are used in this 
study are free of the multivariate normality assumption for the independent variables 
and equal variance within each group, the issue of missing data and outliers and the best 
method for dealing with them remains. Missing observations can be problematic in 
analysis, although ANN is robust for missing values LR does not compute the cases 
where a missing value exists. SPSS provides several estimation techniques for replacing 
missing values. These are: 
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(1) Series mean. Replaces missing values with the mean for the entiie series. (2) Mean 
of nearby points. Replaces missing values with the mean of valid surrounding values. 
The span of nearby points is the number of valid values above and below the missing 
value used to compute the mean. (3)Median ofnearby points. Replaces missing values 
with the median of valid surrounding values. The span of nearby points is the number of 
valid values above and below the missing value used to compute the median. (4)Linear 
interpolation. Replaces missing values using a linear interpolation. The last valid value 
before the missing value and the first valid value after the missing value are used for the 
interpolation. If the first or last case in the series has a missing value, the missing value 
is not replaced. (5) Linear trend at point. Replaces missing values with the linear trend 
for that point. The existing series is regressed on an index variable scaled I to n. 
Missing values are replaced with their predicted values. 
There is no specific guideline on this point and in order not to lose any cases in the data 
set, the missing values are replaced by the series mean. 
Outliers, on the other hand, can be quite problematic in cross sectional analysis of 
companies from different industries. The presence of a few extreme values can have an 
important effect on summary statistics for example. There are different remedies for the 
treatment of outliers. These are listed by Kennedy et al., (1992): 
i no-adjustment, 
ii trimming where a set percentage of observations are deleted, 
iii winsorizing where the range of a variable is limited, 
iv replacing the value of a variable with its relative rank, 
v imposing a linear relationship within ranges (piecewise linear regression), and 
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(1) Series mean. Replaces missing values with the mean for the entite series. (2) Mean 
of nearby points. Replaces missing values with the mean of valid surrounding values. 
The span of nearby points is the number of valid values above and below the missing 
value used to compute the mean. (3) Median of nearby points. Replaces missing values 
with the median of valid surrounding values. The span of nearby points is the number of 
valid values above and below the missing value used to compute the median. (4)Linear 
interpolation. Replaces missing values using a linear interpolation. The last valid value 
before the missing value and the first valid value after the missing value are used for the 
interpolation. If the first or last case in the series has a missing value, the missing value 
is not replaced. (5) Linear trend at point. Replaces missing values with the linear trend 
for that point. The existing series is regressed on an index variable scaled I to n. 
Missing values are replaced with their predicted values. 
There is no specific guideline on this point and in order not to lose any cases in the data 
set, the missing values are replaced by the series mean. 
Outliers, on the other hand, can be quite problematic in cross sectional analysis of 
companies from different industries. The presence of a few extreme values can have an 
important effect on summary statistics for example. There are different remedies for the 
treatment of outliers. These are listed by Kennedy et al., ( 1992): 
i no-adjustment, 
ii trimming where a set percentage of observations are deleted, 
iii winsorizing where the range of a variable is limited, 
iv replacing the value of a variable with its relative rank, 
v imposing a linear relationship within ranges (piecewise linear regression), and 
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vi fitting a polynomial model (nonlinear regression). 
Also as shown by Kennedy et al., (1992) application of the winsorizing and ranking 
procedures has resulted in a regression model that fits the data well and has a low level 
of prediction error. Mar-Molinero and Ezzamel ( 1989) have also highlighted the 
outliers' problem and stated that, according to the Tchebyschev inequality, if all the 
observations that are three standard deviations away from the mean are removed from 
the data set, the maximum error value that treating non-outliers as outliers is 0.11. 
Therefore in this study observations located three standard deviations from the mean are 
accepted as outliers and replaced by the nearest observation. In this way the extreme 
observations are brought into a more reasonable range by winsorizing. 
4.3.1 Variables 
As it is true for every empirical analysis, success in the explanatory ability of any model 
is highly dependent and determined by the selection of the variables in the model. 
Unlike in corporate failure predictions where the lack of theoretical support leads 
researchers, for example Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Taffier 
(1982), to select financial ratios due to their popularity and predictive success in the 
literature, the mergers and acquisitions literature provides hypotheses on the types of 
companies that are likely to become targets. Therefore, the financial variables applied in 
the models of the study are selected from the related mergers and acquisitions literatme 
that has empirically tested these variables as predictors of the corporate takeovers (Rege 
1984; Dietrich and Sorensen 1984; Palepu 1986; Sen et al. 1995; Powell 1997; Bames 
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1998). These hypotheses and the ratios, as summarised below, are mostly used hy 
Palepu (1986) and other researchers, such as Sen et al. {1995), Powell (1997), and 
Bames (1998) in takeover prediction studies. Using these ratios will also provide the 
means for comparison of this research's results with the earlier studies. 
Even though a single ratio is selected for each hypothesis, it is possible to employ 
groups of ratios as representative of each hypothesis. Bames ( 1998), for example, used 
18 ratios under four hypotheses because he stated that changing patterns and 
motivations of the market for corporate control make it unclear which variables are 
related to the probability of acquisitions. However, this type of model forming would 
lead to serious multicollinearity in the model resulting in bias in the model estimators. 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
As mentioned earlier unlike in corporate failure prediction literature where there is a 
lack of theoretical support for which variables to employ in the model construction, 
merger and acquisition literature provides some underlying fundamentals or motives of 
takeovers. These fundamental reasons are frequently suggested in the acquisition or 
popular financial literan1re and consistently applied in the empirical analysis (Palepu, 
1986; Sen et a/, 1995; Powell, 1997; and Bames, 1998), are employed in the variable 
selection process in this study as indicators of acquisition likelihood and their 
representative ratios are explained below. Obviously the six hypotheses or theories that 
are selected do not cover all the theories of mergers and acquisitions but provide a 
comprehensive coverage of most of the important indicators. 
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Hypothesis 1: Inefficient management hypothesis. 
Inefficient management is replaced by more efficient management by means of 
takeovers (Palepu 1986). Jensen and Ruback (1983) viewed the takeover market as 
where managers compete for corporate resources. Hence, firms with inefficient 
management teams are replaced by other management teams for better utilisation of 
corporate resources. Those firms with under-utilised resources are more likely to be 
acquired and their management teams will be replaced by more skilled teams. The 
market for corporate control was first put forward by Manne (1965), providing the 
theoretical foundations for most of the research in takeovers afterwards. According to 
Manne (I 965), a fundamental premise underlying the market for corporate control is the 
existence of a strong relationship between corporate managerial efficiency and the 
market price of shares of that company. The stock market provides an objective 
evaluation of management performance through the value it places on a firm's equity. 
Therefore, inefficient management would be evaluated on the market by a low equity 
price that will eventually create an incentive for others to take control of the firm for 
better utilisation of the firm's assets. Obviously, a high share price of an equity not only 
deters other firms from bidding because of its cost, but is also a sign that the market is 
quite happy with the way assets are utilised by the incumbent management. 
Agency Theory argues that the threat of a takeover provides a permanent mechanism to 
monitor management performance and discourages the pursuit of management interests 
at the expense of shareholders. The nexus of contracts is at the centre of agency theory 
and it focuses on the inherent conflict between the interests of shareholders md the 
interests of those who run and work for the firm (Gerald and Stout, 1992). Walkling and 
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Long ( 1984) provide some insights into this conflict by analysing cash tender offers and 
management resistance to a takeover. They concluded that management resistance to a 
takeover is significantly affected by potential wealth changes of officers and directors. 
Wealth change of directors and officers is defined as summation of offer-induced 
changes in share and option wealth. 
In order to measure the management efficiency or inefficiency Return on Shareholders' 
Fund (RSHF) has been selected as an indicator. RSHF was also the preferred variable 
for this hypothesis in Palepu 's {1986) study while Powell {1997) used the accounting 
rate of return (ROCE). Some of the previous studies, such as Barnes (1990), have used 
the profit figure, such as pre-tax profit margins, as a measure of a company's 
performance. As can be seen these ratios are to cover the firm's managerial 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Growllz-Resource Imbalance. 
Firms with high growth and low resources or low growth and high resources are likely 
to be acquired (Cosh el al., 1980; Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 
1997; Barnes, 1998). Growth-resource mismatch dummy (GRDUMMY) along with 
Sales Growth (TUT), Liquidity (LIQD), and Gearing (GEAR), are used to test the 
hypothesis. GRDUMMY is estimated from Liquidity, Gearing and Sales Growth. 
GRDUMMY is assigned a value of one for combinations of high growth-low liquidity-
high gearing or low growth-high liquidity-low gearing. Otherwise it is assigned as zero. 
These variables have been utilised by other studies besides Palepu ( 1986) (Ambrose and 
Magginson, 1992; Powell, 1997; Barnes, 1998) and appears it to be an important 
variable. Sudarsanam et al., {1996) estimated a different growth-resource imbalance 
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variable that takes bidders' as well as targets' growth-resource characteristics into 
account. However in this study growth-resource imbalance is estimated in a similar 
fashion to Palepu (1986), Senel al. (1995) and Powell (1997) in order to be in line with 
these earlier takeover likelihood estimation studies. The reason why growth-resource 
mismatch might be significant is that high growth firms with low resources might be 
acquired or targeted by companies with the opposite growth-resource imbalance or vice 
versa (Powell, 1997). 
Hypothesis 3: Proportion of Fixed Assets. 
The hypothesis states that the greater the percentage of tangible fixed assets in a firm's 
total asset structure, the higher the likelihood that the fim1 will become a target. 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) tested the hypothesis and found it to be a significant 
indicator. The rationale behind this assumption is that fixed assets are easy to value 
compared with intangible assets and can be used for debt financing to finance the 
takeover (Stulz and Johnson, 1985). Second, asset rich firms in declining industries 
could attract attention as a method of restructuring the firm (Ambrose and Megginson, 
1992). The proportion of fixed assets (PROPHX) is estimated by Fixed Assets divided 
by Total Assets (FA plus CA). 
Hypothesis 4: Size. 
Smaller companies are more likely to be acquired, due to size related transaction costs 
(Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Conn, 1985). The hypothesis considers the cost of 
acquisition and integration of targets into the acquiring firm. These costs are likely to 
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increase with the target size. Some of the previous studies (Levine and Aaronovitch, 
1981; Palepu, 1986) found size to be a significant variable. 
In order to measure this size effect Current Liabilities are deducted from Total Assets 
(FA+ CA) and transformed logarithmically. 
Hypothesis 5: Price-Earning Ratio (PIE). 
The rationale behind the P/E hypothesis is that bidders with high PIE ratios acquire low 
P/E firms to acquire an immediate capital gain based on the belief that the stock market 
values the earnings of the combination at the higher PIE ratio of the acquirer. This 
calculation is based on the expectation that P/E ratio of the bidder would remain the 
same after the merger (Hutchinson, 1995). No special remedies are applied to the 
negative values of PIE other than winsorizing that was explained earlier in this chapter. 
Hypothesis 6: Firm Undervaluation (Market to Book Ratio (MBV)). 
Firms with low market values compared with their book values are likely to be targets, 
since a low market-to-book value ratio is an indicator of cheapness. Palepu (1986) 
views these variables with suspicion since the book value of a firm does not necessarily 
reflect the replacement value of its assets. The appropriate measure for this value should 
be Tobin's q. The lower the Tobin's q, the higher the probability of receiving a bid. 
Tobin's q is also an indicator of management inefficiency. However in this study MBV 
is used for this hypothesis because neither replacement costs nor current costs are 
consistently produced by UK firms during the period (Powell, 1997). 
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The above hypotheses and their respected variables as well as their expected signs are 
summarised below at Table 4.4. Furthermore the more detailed definitions and 
estimation of the variables can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 4.4 Takeover Hypothesis, Variables and Expected Signs 
Hypothesis Variables Expected sign 
l.lnefficient Management Return on Shareholders' Fund -
(RSHF) 
2.Growth-Resources Imbalance Sales Growth (TUT), Liquidity n.a. 
(LIQD), Gearing (GEAR), and 
High-Growth Resource-Poor or 
Low-Growth Resource-Rich 
(GRDUMMY) 
3.Fixed Asset Proportion of Fixed Assets to + 
Total Assets 
4.LOG(Size) Total Assets (FA+CA)-Current -
Liabilities 
5.Price-Eamings (PE) Price-Earnings Ratio (PE) -
6.Market to Book Market to Book Value -
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4.4. Univariate Data Analysis Results 
Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 provide the summary of descriptive statistics for the MD, 
TD(- 1), TD(-2), and IRD. As can be seen along with mean and t-values, median and 
Wilcoxon non-parametric test for median differences are also provided. Even though no 
analysis has been done to test the propottionality condition of financial ratio 
components of the variables used in this study, Sudarsanam and Taftler (1995) reported 
that accounting ratios do not satisfy the proportionality condition and for many ratios 
lognormal distribution may provide a better fit to underlying distribution. Their 
conclusion means that median rather than mean might provide a better statistic for the 
central tendency. 
Further to univariate analysis correlation matrixes are supplied in Appendix C. 
Table 4.5. t-statistics: Mixed data (MD) 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
RSHF 2.1929 27.9581 11.555 20.780 -3.55 ... -3.74.H 
TUT 1.3452 12.8958 0.820 9.060 -3.29 ... -3.29' .. 
GEAR 82.9484 52.2608 64.025 40.225 2.33 .. 2.oo·· 
LIQD 0.9640 1.0280 0.938 0.993 -1 .47 -2.17 .. 
SIZE 72029 102161 28770 24701 -1 .25 0.003 
PROPFIX 0.3913 0.3706 0.363 0.351 0.56 0.35 
P/E 7.7786 17.3355 9.760 10.368 -1 .26 -1.01 
MBV 9.8327 14.2135 6.200 11.496 -2.19'' -2.49 .. 
GRDUMMY 0.3076 0.3461 0.000 0.000 -0.40 -0.41 
Notes: 
1' .. Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, .. 5% level, 2 tail test, ' 10% level, 2 tail test 
2 Observations (52 Targets and 52 Non-targets) 
As can be seen in Table 4.5, the mean and median differences in RSHF and TUT are 
statistically significant at the I% level. Also GEAR and MBV are significant at the 5% 
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level. These indicate that non-target companies have higher sales growth and return on 
their shareholders ' fund than the target fi rms. These firms, as a result, increased their 
MBV and their share price. Hence non-target fi rms have higher P/E and MBV. Results 
are consistent with the hypothesis outl ined above that target companies are under-
performers compared with matched ones. On the other hand, none of the other variables 
are statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is obvious that target fi rms have higher 
gearing, are less liquid and are smaller. In terms of fixed assets, however, there is no 
real difference. It is interesting to note that, even though the mean or median difference 
is not statistically significant, GRDUMMY for non-target companies is higher. This 
result is not expected as it implies that there are more growth-resource mismatch 
companies in the non-target group than target sample. The median test also affi rms the 
t-statistic results except in LIQD that becomes significant at the I 0% level. ln add ition 
median statistic shows that contrary to mean, non-target companies are actually smaller 
than target ones. However this is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.6. t-statistics: Time data (TD -1) 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
RSHF 5.4021 23.1870 10.330 19.400 -3.22*** -3.29*** 
TUT 0.1400 11.0300 -1.280 7.020 -3.35*** -3.32*** 
GEAR 78.4541 57.4397 64.025 54.155 2.61** 1.97** 
LIQD 0.9571 1.0530 0.968 1.005 -2.54** -2.15** 
SIZE 50322 110362 25527 22242 -2.21** -0.14 
PROPFIX 0.3819 0.3595 0.364 0.338 0.86 0.91 
PIE 5.2311 13.9021 9.051 10.565 -1.67* -1 .21 
MBV 9.8258 12.7729 7.500 8.108 -1.94* -1 .84* 
GRDUMMY 0.3200 0.3070 0.000 0.000 0.17 0.16 
Notes: 
1***Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, **5% level, 2 tail test, *1 0% level, 2 tail lest 
2 Observations (78 Targets and 78 Non-targets) 
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Table 4.6 shows that the differences in means are statistically significant in all of the 
variables except in the cases of PROFIX and GRDUMMY. RSHF and TUT are 
significant at the I% level. GEAR, LIQD, and SIZE are significant at the 5% level and 
PIE and MBV are significant at the I 0% level. Target firms make a significantly lower 
return on their shareholders' fund than the matched ones and their market values as a 
result are lower in comparison. The significant SIZE variable indicates that target 
companies are smaller than their counterparts in the matched sample. However the 
median statistic of size indicates otherwise. Median shows that, like in MD data sample, 
non-target companies are actually smaller in size even though the difference is not 
statistically significant. Also, targets show significantly lower liquidity and growth as 
well as higher gearing in line with the growth-resources imbalance hypothesis This can 
also be obseiVed from GRDUMMY, contrary to MD data sample, GRDUMMY for 
target companies is higher. The overall result from these statistics show that target 
companies are under-achievers compared with those which had not received any 
takeover bid during the time period examined. These results are in line with the 
hypothesis outlined above. 
The overall results for MD and TD suggest that the target companies are inefficiently 
run, had lower profitability, and as a result under-performed. This resulted in them 
either being taken over or receiving a bid so that their assets can be utilised better under 
a new management. 
It is noteworthy to mention that some of the statistics have become significant with the 
time data set that includes more companies namely !56 compared with I 04 in the mixed 
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data set. This is encouraging due to the fact that these results support almost all of the 
hypotheses postulated above. 
Table 4.7. !-statistics: Industry relative statistics for the time data (IRD) 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median t-vatues 'Nilcoxon Z 
RSHF -0.3259 1.5646 0.647 1.454 -2.66 ... -3.48''* 
TUT -0.0013 0.3594 -0.075 0.362 -1.02 -2.55'* 
GEAR 1.0771 0.7550 0.874 0.525 2.80 ... 2.28'' 
LIQD -5.9752 1.8980 3.424 10.056 -1.14 -1 .17 
SIZE 247 483 132 104 -2.18' ' 0.07 
PROPFIX 0.8797 0.8265 0.848 0.824 1.02 0.78 
P/E 0.3761 0.9443 0.510 0.775 -2.04'* -2.11'* 
MBV 0.6481 0.9389 0.515 0.803 -2.54'* -2.15 .. 
GRDUMMY 0.2692 0.2820 0.000 0.000 -0.17 -0.17 
Notes: 
1''' Significant at the 1% level , 2 tail test, "5% level , 2 tai l test, ' 10% level , 2 tail test 
2 Observations (78 Targets and 78 Non-targets) 
As mentioned earlier, above results of the industry relative data should be viewed with 
caution. Table 4.7 shows that RSHF and GEAR are significant at the 1% level. S£ZE, 
PIE and MBV, on the other hand, are significant at the 5% level. The results are mostly 
in line with the TO data set, but at a lesser significant level. The only notable difference 
is that TUT does not seem to be significant compared to the other data sets with t-
statistic but it becomes significant when median is considered. This means that when 
TUT is adjusted with the industry average the significant diffe rences that were observed 
in the earl ier data sets disappear. However in line wi th TO, target companies in relation 
to their industry are still significantly smaller with high gearing and provide lower 
return on their shareholders. A direct result of this can also be observed with their 
significantly lower PIE and MBV ratios. Like in TO (-1) data sample, SIZE becomes 
insign ificant and non-targets companies are smaller in comparison to their counterparts 
in target sub-population. 
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Table 4.8. t-statistics: Time data (TD -2). Two years prior to takeover. 
Ratios Tarqet Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
RSHF 17.5117 25.0624 17.230 20.235 -1 .90* -1 .45 
TUT 6.4680 10.0708 7.720 8.000 -0.96 -0.55 
GEAR 66.3651 67.8638 53.455 54.515 -0.14 0.35 
LIQD 0.9380 1.0029 0.952 0.975 -2.21 .. -1 .1r 
SIZE 59693 55483 27056 20477 0.29 0.94 
PROPFIX 0.3756 0.4773 0.359 0.347 -0.97 -0.09 
PIE 11 .3584 12.5761 10.249 9.157 -0.39 1.35 
MBV 11 .0238 13.0740 8.880 8.745 -1.14 -1 .07 
GRDUMMY 0.2940 0.3460 0.000 0.000 -0.66 -0.68 
Notes: 
1* .. Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, .. 5% level, 2 tail test, *10% level, 2 tail test 
2 Observations (78 Targets and 78 Non-targets) 
As expected the quality of the information in the data deteriorated two years prior to the 
takeover bid compared with the one year prior data. Furthermore the signs of some of 
the variables did not come up as expected. GEAR, SlZE and PROFLX have opposite 
signs to the outlined hypothesis as well as MD and TD data sets. The results are quite 
interesting, as it shows a drastic change of target characteristics from two years prior to 
takeover to one year. The figures above indicate that target companies are actually 
bigger than non-target companies with less fixed assets i.n their books. Moreover they 
are less geared and there are more resource imbalance companies in the non-target 
group compared with the target sample. However their lower return on their 
shareholders' fund and lower P/E and M B V ratios suggest that they were already 
performing badly compared with their non-target counterparts even though the 
differences are not as significant as one year prior to takeover. LIQD seems to be the 
only variable that is significant with both parametric and non-parametric statistics 
indicating that target companies are less liquid compared to non-target companies. 
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Table 4.9. t-statistics: Variation Data (VD) 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
RSHF -2.7365 0.1579 -0.179 -0.108 -1.78* ·1 .55 
TUT 0.1400 11.0300 -1.280 7.020 -3.35* .. -3.32*** 
GEAR 1.0752 0.4706 0.120 -0.054 0.90 2.60*** 
LIQD 0.0256 0.1282 -0.011 0.010 ·1 .16 ·0.96 
SIZE 0.0082 0.8599 ·0.001 0.077 -2.20** -3.48*** 
PROP FIX 0.0222 -0.0188 0.001 -0.025 1.17 1.57 
PIE -0.3833 -0.4402 -0.144 0.005 0.09 -2.09** 
MBV 0.0391 0.2972 -0.050 -0.008 -1.51 -1 .02 
GRDUMMY 0.0256 -0.0384 0.000 0.000 0.72 0.72 
Notes: 
1***Significanl at the 1% level, 2tailtest, **5% level, 21ailtest, '10% level, 21aillesl 
2 Observations (78 TarQels and 78 Non-laryel~ 
Results in Table 4.9 show that the target companies experienced a significantly lower 
growth compared with non-target companies. TUT is significant at the I% level at both 
in parametric and non-parametric statistics. SIZE is significant at the 5% level as 
measured by t-statistic and at the I% by Wilcoxon Z. RSHF is significant at the I 0% 
level. The negative return on shareholders' funds along with positive changes in TUT 
and SIZE suggest that even though the target companies increased their size and growth 
from two year to one year prior to takeover, management could not translate these 
changes into return for their shareholders. Even though these changes are significantly 
lower compared with non-target ones it still indicates a growth on the target companies. 
As a resu lt the target companies had a negative change in their P/E ratios and this 
change is significant according to Wilcoxon Z statistic. Apart from those three 
significant variables, the P/E ratio and market value of the target company deteriorated 
in proportion to the non-targets. On the other hand, gearing increased comparatively 
more for the target companies. In the mean time PROFlX for target compan ies 
increased while non-target companies experienced a negative growth. 
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4.5. Multlvariate Models and Results 
The logistic regression estimation of the five models is presented below. Table 4.10 
shows the estimates of one year prior to the takeover bid while Table 4.14 presents the 
estimates for the two years prior to takeover bid. Unfortunately, there is no way of 
determining the individual weights of each variable in ANN models to compare it with 
LR models, therefore each ANN model's classification tables and percentages for 
estimation samples are displayed under each table where the LR models are presented. 
Although these comparisons of classification tables do not show weights of variables, 
they provide a guideline of each ANN's mathematical fit to the estimation data. Also, it 
should be emphasised that this study is concerned more with the prediction powers of 
each model than the model's estimators. 
All the computing was performed on standard Pentium processor. NEUframe Version 3 
from Neural Computer Science for development of the standard back propagation 
ANNs. There are many other commercially available packages. However this particular 
software seems to be the most popular one both within academia and industry. Alici 
( 1996) used this particular software successfully in his study on bankruptcy prediction 
applications. On the other hand, LR analysis was performed on SAS (v.8.2). 
The neural network models for each data group were obtained after many trials of 
different nodes and hidden layers. It is important to perform multiple training runs in 
order to eliminate the possibility that the network might be caught at local minima. 
Although it has been shown (Cybenko, 1989 and Hornik et al., 1989) that a single 
120 
hidden layer network structure with sigmoid activation function can approximate any 
function with arbitrary accumcy, it was found in this study, after many trials of single 
hidden layer networks, that a two hidden layers' network provided a higher 
generalisation on the hold-out sample. This might be as a result of lesser hidden units 
and weight (nodes) being required in two layer network which sometimes improves 
generalisation. This of course further complicated the !mining process that is usually 
time consuming. Many combinations of hidden layers and nodes in these hidden layers 
were constructed before an optimum model was determined. The sigmoid activation 
function with learning rate of 0.1 and momentum value of 0.8 is used in this study. The 
learning and momentum rates define the speed and accuracy with which the 
backpropagation algorithm converges on the optimum solution through error 
minimization. Higher values for these rates induce speeder convergence but run the risk 
of overshooting the optimum solution. Taresenko (1998) indicates that a typical learning 
rate should be between 0.0 I and 0.1 with a momentum value between 0.5 and 0.99. 
Even though the training process/algorithm is explained in detail in the previous 
chapter, it is worthwhile to summarize it here for better understanding of its workings. 
First of all before the training the weights between neurons are randomised. During the 
training, input data (variables) are presented to the network one case at a time. The 
network then tries to predict whether it is a target or non-target and compares it with the 
correct answer. It then records the error, adjusts the weights between the neurons and 
repeats the process. Also the network is specified to stop at intervals to check its 
progress on the test sample. This iteration process goes on until further training fails tl 
improve the network (Gately, 1996). 
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The summary of the training process followed in this study can be summarised as: 
1. The data has been partitioned into training, validation and test sets. 
11. The network has been trained until the stopping criterion has been met. 
111. The optimum network has been selected and tested on the test set. 
Since this research is primarily concerned with the predictive power of the models, the 
produced prediction results or results of the prediction tables of the hold-out sample 
should be measured accurately. As will be seen, the prediction results of LR and ANNs 
models are presented in a classification matrix form which is similar to SPSS's 
classification tables. It is a common practice to use the overall predictive accuracy of 
the models presented and accordingly this figure is used to measure the success rate of 
classifications. As pointed out by Hair et al., (1995), it is essential that the magnitude of 
the overall predictive accuracy is greater than the maximum classification that oould be 
attributable to change. Accurate prediction of group membership or predictive 
efficiency can be measured in several ways. Some of these measures are listed by 
Menard ( 1995) as phi, Good man and Kruskal's gamma, kappa, the contingency 
coefficient, Pearson 's rand the odds ratio. However in this study /-statistic will be used 
for its simplicity. In unequal group sizes, like the TD hold-out sample where there are 
119 non-targets and 25 targets, the proportional chance criterion is 71.3% and computed 
as (Hair et al., 1995): 
c = p2 +(1- p)2 
where 
c = proportional chance criteron 
p = proportion of companies in group I 
1-p = proportion of companies in group 2. 
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On the other hand, the proportional chance criterion for MD is 61.5%. Therefore, a 
prediction accuracy of above 71.3% for TD and 61.5% for MD would be acceptable in 
order to accept the models' classification rates as successful. 
The statistical test for the classification accuracy of the model when compared with a 
chance model is t- statistic and computed as (Barnes, 1998): 
t=z-c/[z(l-z)/n]ll2 
Where 
z = the proportion of companies correctly classified 
n = total sample size. 
The /-statistic will only be provided if and when the overall prediction rates of the 
models exceed the proportional chance criterion, because if the classification accuracy 
were not higher than the proportional chance criteria, the t-statistic provided would be 
misleading. As put by Hair et al., ( 1995): 
if the percentage of correct classifications is significantly larger than would be 
expected by chance, an attempt can be made to interpret the discriminant jimctions in 
the hope of developing group profiles. However, if the classification accuracy is 110 
greater than can be expected by chance, whatever :Jmctural differences appear to exist 
merit little or 110 interpretation; that is, differences in group profiles would provide 110 
meaningful information for identifj•ing group membership. " 
In a decision context, two types of error occur: Type I and Type 11. Type 11 classifies 
target companies as non-targets. On the other hand a Type I error classifies non-target 
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companies as targets. The overall objective of prediction is to minimise both types of 
errors. The method of determining the error-minimisation, for example, depends on this 
assumption (Hsieh, 1993). However, in takeover predictions a Type I error is more 
costly than the Type II error. Although a Type 11 error means an opportunity lost for not 
investing in those prospective target companies for excess return, a Type I error means 
that investment will be tied up in companies which will not become a takeover target 
within a year. Altrnan and Eisenbeis (19978), and Tarn and Kiang (1992), mentioned in 
bankruptcy prediction studies for example that priory probabilities of failure and the 
relative cost of Type I and Type li predictions are not equal. 
If any of the prediction results are higher than what could be expected from a 
proportional chance criterion the results would become significant and merits further 
analysis on the Type I or Type 11 error. If they are not significant or higher than would 
be expected proportional chance criterion than the results would not merit any further 
interpretation (Hair et al., 1995). Second, it is possible that by increasi~ the cut-off 
probability to higher percentages would certainly reduce misclassification of non-target 
companies in the event of modelling takeover likelihood. Bames (1998}, for instance, 
experimented with different cut-off probabilities in this way in order to classify more 
targets correctly with fewer non-targets classed as targets. Even though this is a viable 
option with LR, it is not possible to manipulate cut-off score of ANNs at least with the 
software that is utilised in this study. The Neural network software that is used in this 
study only produces two possible outputs as targets and non-targets, and it is not 
possible to obtain individual scores or probabilities as such so that cut-off point can be 
manipulated. Hence the black box argument of ANNs. As a result, in order to facilitate a 
comparison of the methods equal expected misclassification costs are implicitly being 
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4.5.1 Estimated Models 
Table 4.10. Logistic Regression Models for MD, TD and IRD. One year prior to 
takeover bid. 
IJanaliles ~[i ID JRD 
RSHF -0.0459 -0.00968 -0.1512 
(5.474)** ( 1.607) (2.326) 
TUT -0.0518 -0.0254 0.00796 
(7.646)*** (5.705)* 0 (0.0087) 
GEAR 0.00917 0.0026 0.4629 
(3.707)* (0.5 118) (3.633)0 
LIQD -3.2318 -2.2717 -0.00382 
(5.919)** (5.429)** (0.744) 
LOG(SIZE) 0.225 -0.0781 -0.2159 
(0.21 5) (0.062) (0.652) 
PROPFIX -0.2918 0.3577 0.605 
(0.040) (0.095) (1.314) 
PIE -0.0088 -0.00826 -0.1037 
( 1.387) ( 1.698) (0.984) 
MBV -0.0467 -0.0188 -0.4313 
(3.309)0 (0.994) (2.307) 
GRDUMMY 0.1751 0.1549 -0.0626 
(0.0925) (0.152) (0.0269) 
Constant 3.5630 2.8456 0.0832 
(2.051 )) (3.0 11 )* (0.0148) 
N 104 156 1564 
Model chi-square 31.6463* .. 26.1999··· 18.354** 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.2925 0.1364 0.1000 
Correct classification % 
Target 69.23% 69.23% 58.97% 
Non-Target 80.77% 57.69% 67.95% 
Overall 75.00% 63.46% 63.46% 
o/es: 
'"'Significant at the I% level, 2 tail test 
"Significant at the 5% level, 2 tail test 
'Significant at the I 0% level, 2 tail test 
2 Figures in the parentheses are Wald statistics. 
3 The likelihood ratio index is defined as ( 1-(log likelihood at convergence/log likelihood at zero)). It is 
similar to the R2 statistic of multiple regression and gives an indication of the Logit model's explanatory 
power. 
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The Logistic regression results of for MD, TO and IRD are presented above in Table 
4.\ 0. A positive sign on a parameter/coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
associated variable increases the likelihood of takeover. On the other hand a negative 
sign decreases the likelihood. 
MD and TO are significant at the I% level while IRD is significant at the 5% level. 
These significance levels indicate that the above three models provide a statisti:ally 
significant explanation of a firn1 's acquisition probability. Likelihood ratio indices are 
lower in TO and IRD compared with MD. The likelihood ratio index provides an 
indication of the overall explanatory power of the models and as explained above is 
similar to the R2 statistic of multiple regression. So that at 0.2925, the MD provides a 
better explanation of a firm's acquisition probability. TO has a lower likelihood ratio 
index, 0.1364, that indicates a lower proportional reduction in error rate. The index is 
even lower with the IRD. 
In the MD model, the variables RSHF, TUT, GEAR, LIQD and MBV are statistically 
significant. The coefficient signs of these variables indicate that companies with low 
turnover trends, low liquidity, low return on their shareholders' fund and low market to 
book ratio have a higher probability of becoming takeover targets. On the other hand 
target companies are geared significantly higher than non-target companies. However 
SIZE, PROFIX, P/E and GRDUMMY do not have statistically significant coefficients 
indicating that they do not contJ.ibute significantly to the acquisition likelihood. The 
results are in line with the univariate analysis and parameters' signs are as expected. 
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In the TD(-1) model on the other hand, the variables TUT and LIQD are statistically 
significant. Unlike in the MD model, RSHF, GEAR and MBV are not significant. The 
coefficient of these two variables are negative indicating that the companies, which 
have low liquidity and are slow in growth have higher probability of becoming targets 
during the examined period. Hence, the target companies in the estimation sample are 
characterised by lower growth (TUT) and liquidity (LIQD). Although the other 
variables are not statistically significant, their coefficients have expected signs. Other 
than GEAR, PROPFIX and GRDUMMY, all the other variables have negative 
coefficients as expected. The coefficients of the variables in the TD model indicate that 
target companies are less profitable, have a negative sign for RSHF, are highly geared, 
with a positive GEAR, and proportionally have more fixed assets in their asset structure 
than the non-target companies in the sample. Unlike Ambrose and Megginson's (1992) 
finding of significant proportional fixed assets, PROPFIX is not significant in the TD 
model, although the targets had higher fixed assets proportional to total assets. Also 
compared with Palepu 's results (1986) GRDUMMY is not statistically significant in 
this sample. 
Finally in IRD, GEAR is statistically significant at the I 0% level while none of the 
other variables seem to be significant. This indicated that when the company 
characteristics are adjusted with their industry average ratios the differences between 
target and non-target companies disappear. Although the model is significant at the 5% 
level, its likelihood ratio index and its classification rate are smaller than for the TD and 
MD. As it is mentioned above the results of the IRD model should be viewed with 
caution in line with the arguments explained before. 
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Below tables present the classification rates of ANN models on the 
derivation/estimation samples of the above data samples. The classification rates 
provide mathematical fit of the network models on the estimation samples. They are 
useful in comparing to LR classification on the estimation samples. 
Table 4.11. ANNs classification table for MD. 8-5 nodes in the hidden layers. 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target 'Yo 
Non-target 4:l I IS!J.:lJ'Yo 
Target () jf /l.l:l'Yo 
overall /IS .1!4 '7'o 
In the case of MD, a two-hidden-layer network with 8 nodes in the first hidden layer 
and 5 nodes in the second hidden layer proved to be the best model which generalises 
well on the test sample. It is quite possible to train the network to reach better 
classification rates by training the network to an error limit of 0.05 that almost classifies 
almost all the cases correctly. Further training of this model, for example produced a 
classification of 49 non-targets and 4 7 targets successfully with an overall classification 
rate of 92.3%. But the model lost its generalisation ability and perfonned poorly on the 
hold-out sample classifying 32 targets and 87 non-targets correctly with a 60.71% 
overall classification rate. In comparison with the LR model for MD, the ANN model 
had a slightly higher classification rate overall and on both the target and the non-target 
companies. It successfully classified 45 of the 52 non-targets with an 86.53% 
classification rate compared to 37 of the 52 targets with a 71.15% classification rate. 
Overall classification rate is 78.8%. 
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Table 4.12. ANNs classification table for TD( -1 ). I 0-7 nodes in the hidden layers. 
PreCIICteCI 
uoserveo Non-target Target % 
Non-target (J4 14 !SL.U:>'ro 
Target l.j 55 /U.:> I 'ro 
Overall /tJ.l.!S% 
The ANN model for TD(-1) with two hidden layers (10 in the first hidden layer and 7 in 
the second) resulted in the best classification rate for the data which generalised well on 
the test sample. In line with the MD, the network performed better with the non-target 
sample than the target group. In contrast to the LR model, the network's overall 
classification rate is considerably higher though number of targets classified correctly is 
almost similar. It classified 55 targets successfully in comparison with 54 in LR model. 
On the other hand it classified substantially higher number of non-targets (64) correctly 
in contrast to LR ( 45). 
Table 4.13. ANNs classification table for IRD. 9-7 nodes in the hidden layers. 
Preoicteo 
Observed Non-target 1 arget 'ro 
Non-target 62 ltJ /';1.41S'ro 
Target 25 53 tJ /.';14'ro 
Overall 73.71% 
As for the IRD, ANN with two hidden layers (9 nodes in the first hidden layer and 7 
nodes in the second) provided the best classification results for this data set. Again the 
network classified more companies into their correct groups than LR model for the IRD, 
especially with the non-target companies. Overall classification rate is considerable 
higher for ANN. 
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Table 4.14. Logistic Regression Models for TD, two years prior to takeover bid, and 
VD. 
Vanaliles IIJ( -2) VIJ 
RSHF -0.0104 -0.0746 
(I. 765) (1.366) 
TUT -0.00752 -0.025 
(0.688) (5.993)** 
GEAR 0.000628 0.0181 
(0.041) (0.0987) 
LIQD -3.2117 -0.7555 
(7.281)*** (0.657) 
LOG(SIZE) 0.38 -9.5456 
( 1.452) (4.351)** 
PROPFIX -1.2733 0.8329 
( 1.305) (0.879) 
PIE 0.00176 0.0327 
(0.036) (0.3466) 
MBV -0.0122 -0.2599 
(0.624) ( 1.848) 
GRDUMMY -0.1147 -0.1203 
(0.095) (0.133) 
Constant 2.3468 0.2361 
( 1.802) (1.486) 
N 156 156 
Model chi-square 13.79 17.83** 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.0726 0.1270 
Correct classification % 
Target 62.82% 66.67% 
Non-Target 57.69% 66.67% 
Overall 60.26% 66.67% 
otes: 
""Significant at the I% level, 2 tail test 
""Significant at the 5% level, 2 tail test 
"Significant at the 10% level, 2tail test 
2 Figures in the parentheses are Wald statistics. 
3 The likelihood ratio index is defined as (1-log likelihood at convergenceflog likelihood at zero). It is 
similar to the R2 statistic of multiple regression and gives an indication of the Logit model's explanatory 
power. 
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In model TD(-2), the only statistically significant variable is liquidity at the I% level. 
As can be seen the model itself is not statistically significant with a very low likelihood 
ratio index. This result shows that the model does not provide a statistically significant 
explanation of a firm's acquisition probability. However, it is interesting to note that 
during the time period between two years and one year prior to the takeover bid, the 
target companies experienced some changes that increased their likelihood of becoming 
takeover targets. This can be observed by the significant difference between TD(-1) and 
TD(-2) models. In TD(-2), other than liquidity, it is not possible to distinguish target 
companies from non-targets. 
As explained above, the result of the minus two years model in contrast to the minus 
one year model might mean that a change in these variables from year two to one 
increased the takeover probabilities of target companies. As a result a new model that 
measures this change from year two to one is estimated for the TD and given the title 
Variation Data (VD). 
The VD model is statistically significant at the 5% level. TUT and SIZE are the only 
significant variables at the 5% level. The negative coefficient sign of the TUT variable 
indicates that companies which experienced lower growth had a higher probability of 
receiving takeover bids during the period examined. Data shows that target companies 
experienced significant reduction in their growth. On the other hand, however, target 
companies experienced a significant reduction in size, though their fixed assets 
proportional to total assets were increased. Even though PROFIX is not significant the 
sign of the coefficient is positive. This implies that even though the proportion of fixed 
assets increased as a proportion of the total assets, this happened at the expense of either 
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an increased level of current liabilities or reduced levels of current assets that lead to a 
reduction in the net assets. [t is possible to conclude in line with the positive sign of 
GEAR, even though it is not statistically significant, that target companies increased 
their short term borrowing by bank overdrafts that lead to an increase in their current 
liabilities. 
Below tables present the classification rates of ANN models on the 
derivation/estimation samples of the TD( -2) and VD data samples. 
Table 4.15. ANN classification table for TD(-2). (9-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
unserved Non-target Target 'Yo 
Non-target )I Ll o).JlS'Yo 
1 arget JU 41S (J l.)J'ro 
Overall oJ.4o'7'o 
The ANN model with 9 nodes in the first hidden layer and 5 nodes in the second hidden 
layer provided the best results for TD(-2). In this sample ANN has provided better 
classification overall compared with LR. However the overall classification rate is the 
lowest in comparison with the earlier samples. 
Table 4.16. ANN classification table for VD. (8-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
unserved Non-target Target 'Yo 
Non-target 59 I~ f) .o4'7'o 
1 arget LL )(J /I. /~'ro 
uverall I J.ll 'ro 
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The ANN model for the VD shows that the network classified more non-targets, 59 out 
of 78, than targets, 56 out of 78. Overall, the network provided a better fit to the 
estimation sample than LR. 
4.5.2 Hold-out Test Results 
In this section the results of the above models on the hold-out sample will be presented. 
As explained earlier, the cut-off point for logistic regression is detem1inedex ante from 
the estimation sample rather than using an arbitrary point of 0.50 (Palepu, 1986). 
Therefore, first of all the prediction results of the 0.50 cut-off point are pres;:nted in 
comparison with other predictions of estimated cut-off values in order to observe the 
differences. However as already mentioned earlier the Neural network software that is 
used in this study only produces binary outputs as targets and non-targets, and it is not 
possible to obtain individual scores or probabilities as such so that cut-off point can be 
manipulated. As a result of this limitation only one set of prediction results of ANNs 
will be presented. This process of estimating error-minimisation by estimated 
acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets for time data is presented in detail 
below. Estimation of this process for the other models is not dealt with in this chapter 
but the relevant data is presented in Appendix A. 
The predictive results of the TD(-2) model will not be attempted since the model itself 
is not significant and does not provide a statistically significant explanation of a firm's 
acquisition probability. However the relevant data for probability distribution of targets 
and non-targets in TO( -2) is presented in Appendix A. 
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4.5.2.1 Time Data (TO) Results 
Table 4.17. LR. Cut-off value of0.50 
Observe 
Non-target 
Target 
on-target arget 0 
The predictive results of TO are presented in Table 4.17. The overall prediction rate of 
64.6% is not greater than proportional chance criterion of 71.3%. The model predicted 
93 of 144 companies correctly with an overall predictive rate of 64.58%. The model's 
classification of non-target companies is higher than the target companies. 
Unfortunately, only 56% of the target companies are classified correctly compared with 
66% of non-targets. The model classified 40 non-target companies as targets along with 
14 other companies from the target sample. The total number of companies that are 
classified as targets are 54 and only 26% of this group are classified correctly as target 
companies. 
In order to estimate the optimum cut-off probability of the model, the marginal 
probabilities of targets and non-targets in the model development sample are estimated 
and plotted. The graph is obtained by calculating the frequency distribution of the 
estimation sample over ten equal intervals of 0.00 to 0.999. The number of targets and 
non-targets which fall within each interval is obtained and their percentages are 
computed and plotted on a graph. 
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Table 4.18. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TO. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 3 3.85% 0 0.00% 
0.100-0.199 0.15 4 5.13% 0 0.00% 
0.200-0.299 0.25 8 10.26% 3 3.85% 
0.300-0.399 0.35 14 17.95% 6 7.69% 
0.400-0.499 0.45 16 20.51% 15 19.23% 
0.500-0.599 0.55 20 25.64% 25 32.05% 
0.600-0.699 0.65 8 10.26% 15 19.23% 
0. 700-0.799 0.75 2 2.56% 9 11 .54% 
0.800-0.899 0.85 3 3.85% 5 6.4 1% 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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Probabilit ies 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1 , the distribution of acquisition probabilities of the two 
groups intersects at 0.465. It can also be observed from the figure that the separation 
between the two distributions is not ideal, which means that targets and targets were not 
separated well by the model estimates. In an ideal situation it is expected that target 
distribution should mainly concentrate on the right hand side (high acquisition 
likelihood for targets) while non-target distribution on the left (low acquisition 
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likelihood for non-targets). This cut off value is quite close to the 0.50 and the results 
based upon this new cut-off probability are presented below. 
Table 4.19. LR. Cut-off value of 0.465 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 64 55 53.78% 
Target 8 17 68.00% 
Overall 56.25% 
The result of Table 4.19 shows that lll)Ving the cut-off probability from 0.50 to 0.465 
has improved the classification TM model slightly on the target sample but not on the 
non-target sample. Moreover, the overall classification rate decreased and the overall 
classification is not enough to exceed the 71.3% chance criterion either. At this cut 
value, 64 non-target and 17 target companies are classified correctly with an overall 
classification rate of 56.25%. The result slightly worsened for the group where the 
targets and non-targets are classified as targets. In this prediction rate a total of 72 
companies are identified as targets, increased from 54, and the percentage of real targets 
in this group is down from 26% to 23.6%. 
Table 4.20. ANN. (10-7 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 77 42 64.70% 
Target 9 16 64.00% 
Overall 64.58% 
The overall prediction result of ANNs is not different from LR. Although ANNs' 
overall prediction result outperformed LR with a 0.465 cut off value, it did not provide 
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better results when the cut-off point for LR was increased to 0.50. In fact the network 
has exactly the same overall classification figure of 64.58%. Compared with 0.50 cut-
off point, the network predicted more targets correctly but performed lower on the non-
target companies. Furthermore the network fai led to provide classi fication rates better 
than can be expected by chance. 
The results of Table 4. 19 and Table 4.20 indicate that neither the LR nor the ANNs 
models provided a classification model with the time data which could be used to 
develop group profiles. Both models predicted very similar number of targets. Although 
LR classified 79 out of 11 9 non-target companies compared with ANNs' 77 non-targets, 
the difference is not signifi cant. 
4.5.2.2 Mixed Data (MD) Results 
Table 4.21. LR. Cut-off value of 0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 89 56 6 1.38% 
Target 17 34 66.67% 
Overall 62.76% 
Figure 4.2. Distribution of acquisition probabil ities for targets and non-targets 
Est lm ato d Probabbll lt y Dis t ribu tions 
30.00% .---~------------------., 
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Probab ility 
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The two distributions intersect at 0.44. Figure 4.2 indicates a better separation of 
distribution of probabilities between targets and non-target companies compared with 
the TD(-1). 
Table 4.22. LR. Cut-off value of0.44 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 81 64 55.86% 
Target 15 36 70.59% 
Overall 59.69% 
The overall predictive ability of the LR model has not been improved by choosing the 
new cut-off probability. At the 0.44 cut off value, the model's prediction rate is lower 
than the proportional chance probability of 61.5%. On the other hand the overall 
classification rate at the 0.50 cut off level is higher even though the moving of the cut-
off point to 0.44 has improved the accurate classification rate of target companies. 
However the drop in the correct classification of non-targets companies reduced the 
overall rate of successful classification. Because the overall classification rate at the 
0.50 cut off level is higher than the proportional chance probability of 61.5% /-statistic 
is calculated to see if it is significantly higher than the proportional chance probability. 
The /-statistic for the classification accuracy of LR at the 0.50 cut value is 0.364 and is 
not statistically significant. The estimation of the cut-off probability of 0.44 is presented 
in Appendix A. The cut-off probability of 0.44 has classified 81 of 145 non-targets and 
36 of 51 targets correctly with an overall classification rate of 59.69%. This is an drop 
from 62.76% by 0.50 cut value. Again 100 companies are classified as targets at the 
0.44 cut-off point and only 36% of them are real targets. 
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Table 4.23. ANN. (8-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 89 56 61.37% 
Target 14 37 72.54% 
Overall 64.28% 
As the result Tables of both models indicate none of the models outperformed the other 
one significantly enough to be called a better modelling technique with MD. At the 0.50 
cut value, the LR model classified 89 of 145 non-targets and 34 of 51 targets correctly 
with an overall classification rate of 62.76%. On the other hand, although ANNs 
outperformed LR at the 0.44 cut off value, it did not improve the classification rate 
much for the MD in comparison to 0.50 cut off value. Despite the fact that the overall 
classification rate is higher than the proportional chance probability of 61.5%, the 
estimated t-statistic, 0.812, is not statistically significant. The total target companies 
classified in the target group with LR are 36% compared with 39.8% using ANNs. 
Although the overall classification of ANNs is slightly higher compared with LR, the 
overall results are not significant. 
The explanatory power of models with MD is higher than the models with TD and the 
considerable difference in prediction results are as expected. The results of the models 
with MD are as a result of the formation of the sample split between the estimation and 
hold-out sample. In terms of percentages, the MD model predicted more target 
companies correctly but performed slightly worse in predicting non-target companies. 
As emphasised earlier, MD is used as a benchmark to measure and compare how much 
the prediction ability of models with TO would be reduced. It shows that even in a time 
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period of one year target characteristics change so that the prediction results are 
affected. 
4.5.2.3 lndustry Relative Data (IRD) Results 
Results of the LR and ANNs models with IRD prediction on the hold-out sample are 
presented below. In this section, as above, the results of the 0.50. 0.55 cut off points and 
the result of the ANN will be presented. The estimation of the cut-off probability of 
0.55 is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 4.24. LR. Cut-off value of 0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 59 60 49.58% 
Target 9 16 64.00% 
Overall 52.08% 
Figure 4.3. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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The Figure 4.3 indicates that the two probability distributions intersect at 0.55. As can 
also be seen from the figure, the separation of two distributions is not well defined 
compared to MD. 
Table 4.25. LR. Cut-off value of0.55 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 70 49 58.82% 
Target I I 14 56.00% 
Overall 58.33% 
Table 4.26. ANN.(9-7 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 70 49 58.82% 
Target 6 19 76.00% 
Overall 61.80% 
None of the above classifications is statistically significant. Interestingly, the ANN 
model classified more non-target companies, 70 out of 119, as well as target companies, 
19 out of 25, compared with the LR model at the 0.50 cut of point. On the other hand 
the network classified the same number of non-targets while it performed better on the 
target companies compared to 0.55 cut of point. The percentage of actual targets 
classified as target for the LR model is 21% (16176) at the 0.50 cut-off point, 22.2% 
(14/63) at the 0.55 cut-off point and 27.9% (19/68) for the ANN model. The difference 
is not significant. Overall, the IRD model's prediction rate is slightly lower than the 
TD's prediction rate. 
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4.5.2.4 Variation Data (VD) Results 
Finally, the prediction results of the VD on the hold-out sample is presented below. 
Although the estimated cut-off point is 0.47, the cut value of 0.50 has performed better 
classifying companies in the hold-out sample. Therefore, the results of both cut-off 
points are displayed below. Again the table for the distribution of both targets and non-
targets data is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 4.27. LR. Cut-offvalue of0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 53 66 44.54% 
Target 13 12 48.00% 
Overall 45 .14% 
Figure 4.4. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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The above figure shows a better separation of probability distribution compared to TD(-
1) and lRD. Non-target distribution peaks up at 0.45 while target population at 0.55. 
However the two distributions are not well separated. 
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Table 4.28. LR. Cut value of0.47 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 46 73 38.66% 
Target 12 13 52.00% 
Overall 40.97% 
Results show that using the estimated cut-off point did not improve the model's 
prediction. Although there was hardly any change in the classification of the number of 
target companies, at the estimated cut-off point the model classified 46 non-target 
companies, a reduction of 7 from 53 companies. 
Table 4.29. ANN.(8-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 64 55 53.78% 
Target 12 13 52.00% 
Overall 53.47% 
The ANN model has performed better on VD even though the results are not significant. 
As can be seen in the tables, ANN has classified more non-targets and same number of 
non-target companies with an overall rate of 53.47%. In terms of the number of real 
targets correctly classified within all identified targets, LR had 15.4% while ANN had 
19.1 %. The results of the above three models are quite different from the other models' 
prediction with their poor prediction results. 
In conclusion, VD did not provide a better takeover modelling than the TO model. A 
simple comparison of two LR models in terms of likelihood ratio index and their 
prediction results on hold-out samples reveals that the TO model is more robust to 
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4.6 Discussions and Summary 
This chapter has tried to answer the question as to whether it is possible to discriminate 
between two groups of companies as targets and non-targets on the basis of their 
financial characteristics. All the estimated models, except TO( -2), were significant at 
the 1% or 5% levels indicating that they provide a higher explanation of a firm's 
acquisition probability. However their predictions on the hold-out sample did not 
produce the desired outcome. 
The prediction results of all the models that were applied to takeover predictions show 
that the TO model has produced the best results compared with the rest of the models. 
As said in the beginning, the MD model is only used as a benchmark for the TO model 
in order to be able see the deterioration in the predictive power of the model in mergers 
and acquisitions where the characteristics which affect the takeover likelihood of target 
companies change constantly through time. A simple comparison of the two model's 
statistics reveals that the MD model provided a better explanation of a firm's acquisition 
probability and prediction results that were higher than can be attributable to the 
proportional chance probability even though the estimated /-statistic for these prediction 
results were not significant. However, it should be noted here that the higher prediction 
results of the MD model could be attributable to usage of the same time period in the 
estimation and hold-out sample as well as the higher sgnificance in the estimation 
sample which has a likelihood ratio index of 0.29 compared with 0.13 in the TO model. 
The overall outcomes of the above models are similar and comparable to the results of 
the some of the previous models that are discussed below. In these previous studies, 
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however, the success of the models' predictions were measured as the proportion of 
companies correctly classified and no attempt was made to measure the significance of 
these overall classification results. On the other hand, it is a simple procedure to 
compute /-statistic for significance for the results of these studies. Some of these 
previous studies and their results are briefly examined below for comparison. It should 
be noted here that, as pointed out earlier, those studies which published significant 
classification rates on one-to-one matched hold-out samples suffer from a bias in their 
reported error rate. The estimated error rate from the hold-out sample will not be equal 
to the expected prediction error rate in the population (Palepu, 1986). 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) reported a significant prediction rate of 64% on the 
target companies while it was 61% on the non-target sample by applying MDA. They 
used a hold-out sample of 87 firms which consist of 23 targets and 64 non-target firms. 
They performed at-test of the proportion of correct classification and found that results 
were significant at the 5% level. 
Stevens (1973) also applied MDA to a sample of 40 (20 target and 20 non-target) firms 
and reported an overall classification rate of 67.5%. However he did not provide any 
specific classification percentages over the sub-groups of targets and non-targets. He 
also did not test the significance of these results. 
Belkaoui (1978) constructed his discriminant analysis model on a sample of SO target 
and non-target Canadian companies and tested its discriminatory power on a hold-out 
sample of 11 finns. The results indicate a misclassification rate of 15% or correct 
classification rate of 85% three years prior to takeover. His results are particularly 
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interesting as he actually found out that the error classification rate for one year prior to 
takeover was 30%, which means that the model constructed with data three year prior to 
takeover provided more infonnation to likelihood of firms being takenover. 
Wansley and Lane's (1983) linear discriminant analysis model reported a 69.2% 
classification accuracy on a hold-out sample of 78 firms. Because they used equal 
matching in their hold-out sample, the reported classification rate is significant (1-
statistic = 2.54) at the I% level. These results also suffer from estimated error rates 
calculated on a matched hold-out sample. 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) find that their Logit model can predict 90% of the targets 
and non-targets in the estimation sample and 91% of the targets and 83% of the non-
targets in the hold-out sample (/-statistic = 3.83). They used a sample of 67 fim1s (24 
merged and 43 non-merged) to built the model and tested it on a hold-out sample of 22 
cases (6 targets and 12 non-targets). But the drawing of their estimation and hold-out 
sample from the same time period makes it very difficult to compare it with the TO 
model. This result is also biased due to an equal number of targets and non-targets in the 
hold-out sample. 
Bames (1990) applied multiple discriminant analysis to publicly quoted UK companies 
and reported that the overall classification ability of the model on the estimation sample 
was 68.48% and 74.3% on the hold-out sample that was formed by 37 acquired and 37 
matched non-acquired companies. However, Bames (1990) did not attempt to use his 
model's predictive ability on a subsequent period due to the market crash. This result 
again under the circumstances of one-to-one matching, is significant (Htatistic = 4.18). 
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In contrast to above-mentioned studies, the prediction results from some other studies, 
such as Palepu ( 1986), Sen et al. (1995), Bames ( 1998), were not so encouraging as 
they have corrected the issues surrounding the hold-out sample. 
Palepu (1986) applied logistic regressiOn technique and estimated the acquisition 
likelihood on a sample of 419 cases ( 163 targets and 256 non-target) and tested on a 
hold-out sample of 1117 firms (30 targets and 1087 non-targets). He found out that the 
model classified 625 firms to be targets while only 24 were actual targets and 492 
companies as non-targets. The prediction results suggest that the model correctly 
classified 80% of the targets while it only classified 45% of the non-targets correctly. 
Overall classification rate of 45.6% indicates a very poor prediction and this prediction 
result is significantly lower than can be expected from a proportional chance probability 
o£94.8%. 
Bames ( 1998) reported his results on a sample of UK takeovers. He used a sample of 
companies from a period of 3 years from 1991 to 1993 and tested it on a hold-out 
sample comprised of 1994 data. Hold-out sample consist on 16 target companies and 
1169 non-target companies. He estimated the cut-off point in a similar method as in 
Palepu (1986) and experimented different cut-off levels in order to minimise the error 
classification rate. In most of those predictions with different cut-off points, the models 
performed badly especially on the target sub-population. None of the models at any cut-
off point managed to predict a single target correctly. 
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The only study that used ANNs in takeover predictions was conducted by Sen et al., 
(1995) in the USA. Sen et a/ (1995) followed the same methodology of Palepu (1986) 
in terms of modelling and similar financial ratios. They used 78 targets and 1285 non-
targets in their hold-out sample. LR predicted 66.4% of the companies successfully 
compared with ANNs' prediction of 61.2%. LR classified more in the non-target group 
(68.6%) than in the target group (29.5%) On the other hand, ANNs performed better 
with the target group (35.9%) than the non-target group (62.7%). None of the model's 
prediction rates was significantly higher than proportional chance probability (89.2%) to 
be considered significant. 
Although a relatively smaller hold-out sample is used in this study compared with the 
one in Sen et al., (1995), the prediction results of both studies are very similar. Even 
though both techniques performed the same on the target group, LR classified more 
non-targets. The results of this study in conjunction with Senet al., (1995) indicate that 
ANNs neither outperformed LR as a prediction tool nor can be used to predict takeover 
targets, hence it did not produce any significant prediction results. The advantage of 
employing ANNs lies in its ability to fit complex non-linear models to the data. On the 
other hand, the training time is longer when compared with LR, identifying the number 
of hidden layers and nodes in each layer, and the relative importance of weights can not 
be known hence the black box criticism. However, employing some of the techniques 
such as Optimal Brain Damage (OBD) (Cun et al., 1990; Mozer and Smolensky, 1989), 
training time can be reduced. OBD removes unimportant weights from a ncrwork 
leading to better generalisation, fewer training examples and improved speed of 
learning. 
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Chapter 5 -Corporate Governance Data Modelling and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
The internal monitoring of companies is undertaken by their board of directors. Fama, 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen, {1983) stress that the board of directors is an important 
internal governance mechanism. Jensen ( 1986), states that "the internal control 
mechanism of corporations which operate through the board of directors, generally 
work well" (p.9). Effective monitoring by the board should result in shareholder wealth 
maximisation and resolve the agency conflict between management and shareholders. 
The view that the board is an important internal monitoring mechanism (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983), and the quality of monitoring depends on the composition of 
the board is important from the perspective of takeovers and takeover prediction. Jensen 
(1986) argues that the market for corporate control or external takeover market would 
come into play when internal controls and board level control mechanisms fail or 
defunct. Jensen's (1986) view suggests or implies that where internal corporate 
mechanisms are ineffective, the market for corporate takeovers would discipline the 
management. The findings of Kennedy and Limmack (1996) seem to support this 
assumption. They have reported that takeovers in the UK act as part of a disciplinary 
mechanism on inefficient companies, measured on shareholder return, and also found 
out that the takeovers result in the replacement of inefficient management as they 
observed a significant increase in CEO turnover two years after the takeover. 
[n the UK, in order to investigate the problems of financial reporting and effectiveness 
of auditing, the Cadbury committee was set up. The Cadbury Committee's Report 
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( 1992) outlined the optimum link or interactions between shareholders, board members 
and auditors and formulated a code based on openness and accountability. The 
Committee furthermore identified a number of board characteristics that were claimed 
to represent a good govemance practice and this aspect of their conclusion is central to 
this section of the study. The outlined good govemance characteristics included the 
separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer, containing a significant 
number of independent high-calibre non-executive directors on the board, and the 
setting up of independent remuneration committees to establish management 
remuneration packages. 
As outlined and articulated by the Committee, where there is such an optimum 
composition of the board for effective monitoring and hence good financial 
performance, the failure of this monitoring can be identified by examining the structure 
of the board. Since the market for corporate control implies that the companies will be 
targeted for better utilisation of their assets, it can safely be assumed that the companies 
which become targets for corporate control fail to deliver this optimum board structure 
and can be identified accordingly (Weisbach, 1988: Shivdasani, 1993). 
The corporate govemance literature supports the concept that composition of the board 
of directors is an important element in shareholder' wealth maximisation, especially in 
transactions where the interests of shareholders and managers may diverge (Rosentain 
and Wyatt, 1997). Weisbach (1988) reports that the boards that are dominated by 
outside directors are more likely to replace CEOs in the face of bad perfonmnce. The 
research of Morck, et al., (1988) on how shareholdings by board of directors effect 
performance show that performance, measured as Tobin's q, is highest at low levels of 
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share ownership by the board. Also they reported that this is the same for he ownership 
by the firm's top management and for the rest of the board. Their results are supportive 
of an optimal governance structure. Boyd (1995) looked at the firm performance and 
separation of chairmanship and chief executive officer and concluded tint the separation 
has a positive effect on firm perfonnance. 
The appointment of the Cadbury Committee on corporate governance practices in the 
UK was as a result of concems about business failures, creative accounting practices 
(Smith, 1992), directors' pay especially in the former state-owned corporations, and the 
highly criticised corporate short-termism (Whittington, 1993). The concerns which lead 
to the examination of corporate governance practices and the conclusions of the 
committee (Lumby and Jones, 1999; Forbes and Watson, 1993) are also in support of 
optimal corporate govemance structure for better performance. 
Due to the reasons outlined above the qualitative characteristics (non-financial) of 
companies have received extensive attention from the researchers in finance and 
accounting particularly in corporate failure predictions. Argenti (1976), for example, 
argued that financial ratios, because they were simply "symptoms" of business failure, 
are unable to yield significant insights into the underlying process or "causes" of 
corporate collapse. Accordingly, Argenti ( 1976) has developed a dynamic model of 
business failure which mainly covered the fundamentals of the business and its 
management structure rather than financial ratios. 
Walkling (1985) demonstrated that, in order for a tender offer to be successful, other 
factors such as managerial resistance, size of the bid premium, use of the solicitation 
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fees, and the initial bidder ownership of targets should be taken into account. Therefore, 
the success of a takeover attempt is also dependent on factors other than the financial 
characteristics of firms, and models that include only financial accounting data is 
seriously misleading (Bartley and Boardman, 1990). 
Likewise, in their study of target selection, Gammie and Gammie ( 1996) stressed the 
importance of corporate governance variables in a difficult macroeconomic operating 
environment to firm performance in the UK. [n their study, they have included five 
governance variables. These are: whether the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman 
positions are filled by a single individual, the effect of large external shareholders, 
additional outside directorships held by non-executives, additional outside directorships 
held by the executive directors, and share options held by the executive directors. They 
concluded that the influence of governance structures on hostile takeovers is very 
strong. 
Furthermore, Weir (1997) looked at the relationship between the probability of being 
acquired and firm performance and governance structures in the UK. He made extensive 
references to the recommendations of Cadbury Committee, especially concerning the 
board structure and utilised comparable variables to the Gammie and Gammie (1996) 
study in his analysis. He ustrl seven board characteristics as variables that were; 
whether the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman positions are filled by a single 
individual, proportion of executive directors, sum of the three largest external 
shoreholders, percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors, mean number 
of additional outside directorships held by the non-executive directors, mean number of 
additional outside directorships held by the executive directors, and share options held 
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by the executive directors as a percentage of the total issued ordinary share capital. The 
study concluded that the internal governance structures of the acquired firms had been 
ineffective which lead to poor performance. 
Findings of these above studies, such as Shivdasani (1993), Ganmie and Gammie 
( 1996), and Weir ( 1997), are discussed in detail in the variables section. The purpose 
here is to highlight the significance of individual variables/hypothesis employed in this 
study as well as to link them to the results of these studies. 
The objective in this chapter, therefore, is to analyse governance structures, along the 
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee and the relevant literature, of those 
companies in the sample. Hence the underlying rationale in the analysis of corporate 
governance variables in this chapter is that there is a causal relationship between 
corporate governance or governance structure (measured through board structure) and 
performance of a company. Therefore it is inferred that poor governance or governance 
structure will result in poor performance and vice versa. Through this inference, an 
attempt will be made to develop group profiles of corporate governance characteristics 
of targets and non-targets for prediction purposes. 
5.2 Methodology, Data and Variables 
The sample set for the UK companies that were included in the financial ratio analysis 
is used for the governance data. Therefore same sample sizes in the previous chapter 
also apply in this section of the analysis. The relevant variables were extracted from 
Price Waterhouse Corporate Register and annual reports of the related companies. The 
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Register provides information about company profiles on board composition, the names 
of executive and non-executive directors, institutional and director shareholdings and 
the profiles of executive and non-executive directors that list the names of the other 
companies in which the directors are serving. The earliest issue of the Price Waterhouse 
Corporate Register dates back to March 1989 and this issue covers 1988 data for the 
companies. Therefore it is only possible to analyse two years of data for the period of 
1990-1996 since only 1988 and 1989 data are available for the companies which were 
taken over in 1990. 
As in the financial variable analysis, the same methodology is followed with two 
different data sets "Mixed Data" (MD) and "Time Data" (TD) for one and two years 
prior to takeover. Also, in order to measure the change in the variables from the two to 
one year period, Variation Data (VD) are estimated from TD. Since there is no industry 
average presented in any known data sources, analysis of the Industry Relative Data 
(IRD) for the governance variables is not computed. It can be argued that this average 
could have been calculated from the sample, the quality of such data and results would 
have been low since the whole sample only contains approximately 60% of the 
manufacturing industry. 
Although there were no missing observations in corporate governance variables, and 
they contained few outliers, these outliers were eliminated by winsorizing where the 
range of the variables is set to a limit of three standard deviations from the mean. The 
rationale for winsorizing has already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
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5.2.1 Variables 
As in the financial variable analysis of companies, it is important that the selected 
variables are effective measures of corporate governance. The Cadbury Committee 
report's conclusions imply that a good governance structure would lead to healthy 
financial results. An effective governance structure with healthy performance should 
result in rnaximisation of shareholders' value and reduce the probability for takeovers 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore the variables are selected from the relevant literature and 
according to The Cadbury Committee's recommendations for a good corporate 
governance structure. 
As stated by Shivdasani (1993), under the corporate governance structure three factors 
can contribute to the imperfect control of managerial actions. These are, the 
composition of the board of directors, the structure of equity ownership, and the 
characteristics of the directors. 
The selected variables in this research are complementary to the two other recent 
takeover studies (Gammie and Gammie, 1996; Weir, 1997) that used corporate 
governance variables in their analysis ofUK public companies and Shivdasani (1993) in 
the US. The difference in these two UK studies is that their sample included companies 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange and covered all sectors of the economy. 
Some of the limitations of the variables used in this section are that they do not take into 
account the varying circumstances and different experiences of companies. It can be 
postulated that different governance structures are optimal for different firn1s and vary 
between different industries and sizes. Larger firms, for example, are likely to have 
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more non-executives because of their expertise in monitoring and project evaluation 
(Shivdasani, 1993). The effect of the industry is controlled by matching companies 
according to their four digit SIC codes but the size effect still remains. However, the 
analysis in the previous chapter demonstrated that size is not statistically significant 
characteristic between target and non-target companies. The Committee on Corporate 
Governance ( 1998) stated that the Cad bury Committee report lays down guidelines for 
corporate governance that are appropriate in most cases and not to be treated as set 
rules. 
The independent variables are: 
SepChair: Whether the position of chairman and chief executive are separated. It is 
identified as l if the roles are separated and 0 if not. The expected sign of the coefficient 
is negative as the separation of the roles is likely to produce efficient running of the 
board, eliminating or reducing the possibility that the board is dominated by one strong 
individual. Malette and Fowler (1992), show that the adoption of defensive measures 
such as position pills is reduced if the roles of CEO and chairman are separated. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991), reported that the firms which separated these roles had 
higher financial performance than the ones did not. This is in line with the Cadbury 
proposal that recommends a separation of these two posts in boards. The Cadbury 
Committee (1992) recommended that if the internal monitoring mechanisms of the 
companies to operate effectively, it is important that no individual should held too much 
power. The committee concluded that separation would diffuse the power concentration 
in one person and increases the ability of the board to exercise effective control. 
!59 
The theoretical foundations of separating the roles of CEO and chairman comes from 
Fama and Jensen (1983b). As put forward by them, an organisation's decision process 
consists of decision management (initiation and implementation) and decision control 
(ratification and monitoring). Fama and Jensen ( 1983a) argue that agency cost in large 
organisations is reduced by institutional anangements that separate decision 
management from decision control. In order to prevent or minimise agency problems 
initiation and implementation functions of decision making should be separated from 
the ratification and controlling functions. The main objective of separating the decision 
making functions of agents from the ratification and monitoring functions is to 
minimise the agency cost, which inevitably occurs in open public corporations where 
ownership and management functions are separated. For example, in order to make the 
Chief-Executive of an company, who is responsible for the initiation and 
implementation functions of management, more accountable to the board of directors, 
their duties and responsibilities should be separated from the chairman's and the two 
posts should be occupied by different people. On the other hand though Brickleyet al., 
(1997) argued that the cost of separating the roles of chairman and CEO is larger than 
the benefits for most large firms and disagreed with the separation notion. 
Shivdasani (1993) reported that the combining the roles of CEO and Chairman reduces 
the probability of hostile takeover bids while Gammie and Gammie (1996) found out 
that in both hostile and non-hostile samples, the separation was significant and target 
companies were more likely to combine the roles. The results of Weir (1997) also 
support the conclusions that target firms are more likely to combine the roles. 
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NEX: The proportion of outside directors (non-executive) on the board. The expected 
sign of this variable is negative. As the proportion of non-executive directors increases 
in the board, the more likely the efficient monitoring of the executive directors will take 
place, which will lead to a better financial performance. The Cadbury Committee 
proposes at least three non-executive directors on the board. 
Brinkley and James (1987) reported that outside directors play an important role in the 
assessment of possible target firms. Moreover Shivdasani ( 1993) reported a negative 
relationship between the probability of a hostile takeover and the number of additional 
outside directorships, even though the numerical representation of outside directors on 
the board has no significant effect on hostile takeover likelihood. On the other hand, 
Weisbach ( 1988) shows that firms with outsider dominated boards are significantly 
more likely to replace the CEO on the basis of performance. Weisbach's (1988) results 
give strong support to internal monitoring role of outside directors. The Bank of 
England's quarterly bulletin (1983 and 1985) emphases the role of non-executive 
directors as "A suitable non-executive director will generally be able to offer detached 
and independent advice ... provide additional expertise in specific areas, such as finance. 
The wider perspective that a non-executive director can bring to bear may be 
particularly relevant in decisions involving company strategy, or when events of special 
importance to the company's future, such as mergers and acquisitions, are under 
discussion" (p.66). 
Weir (1997) found the proportion of non-executive directors on board to be a significant 
at the I 0% level on both hostile and non-hostile sample while Shivdasani ( 1993) did not 
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find it to be significant whether the outside directors were affiliated with the incumbent 
management or not. 
NEXOutDir: The weighted average of outside directorships held by the non-executive 
directors. The number of outside directorships held by non-executive directors is 
weighted by the number of non-executive directors on the board. This is estimated as; 
number of non-executive directorships held in other companies (outside the sample 
company) by non-executive directors I number of non-executives on the board. The 
expected sign of this variable is also negative as the proportion of outside directorships 
held by the non-executive directors increases, the more likely it is that they are valued 
for their managerial abilities by the market. This is quite an important point since 
evidence in the US and UK suggests that most of the non-executive directors are in 
close affiliation with the directors (Forbes and Watson, 1993) and their appointment as 
non-executives is as a result of this affiliation. Higher value of this variable is an 
indication of a formal and transparent procedure where appointments of directors are 
made for their managerial abilities rather than their affiliation with the incumbent 
management. However, it is also expected that it will be correlated with NEX, as NEX 
increases NEXOutDir will also increase. 
Weir (1997) reported that the mean number of additional outside directorships held by 
the non-executive directors is significant at the 5% level and Gammie and Gammie 
(1996) found this variable to be significant at the 5% level for hostile target group while 
not significant for the non-hostile sample. Shivdasani (1993) also showed that 
additional outside directorships held by outside directors was significant at the I% level. 
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XOutDir: The weighted average of outside directorships held by the executive directors. 
The number of outside directorships held by executive directors is weighted by the 
number of executive directors on the board. This is estimated as; number of non-
executive directorships held in other companies (outside the sample company) by 
executive directors I number of executives on the board. The expected sign of this 
variable is also negative. The same reasons and the logic proposed for theNEXOutDir 
also apply to this variable. 
This variable is important as it will reveal whether executives appointed to the board as 
a result of their managerial competence and skills or in order to support the existing 
directors (for their entrenchment purposes). Resenstein & Wyatt (1997) investigated this 
issue and found that unless the managerial and shareholders' interests are aligned, the 
market threats an appointment of an insider manager to the board as management 
entrenchment. Therefore, the higher the proportion of outside directorships held by the 
executive directors, the better the market values of these executive managers. 
Except Shivdasani, ( 1993), none of the pervious studies mentioned above (Gammie and 
Gammie, 1996; Weir, 1997) found this variable to be a significant factor between target 
and non-target companies as well as across hostile and non-hostile samples. 
DirShHo: Percentage of the companies' ordinary shares held by the executive directors. 
Higher shareholdings by the executives will result in a reduction of the agency cost, as 
this will align the interests of executives with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shivdasani, 1993). A higher shareholding will have an influence on the likelihood of 
receiving a takeover bid from two angles. First, as mentioned, it will align the interests 
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of shareholders' with managers (alignment); and second, executives will have an 
increased saying in the outcome of a possible takeover proposal due to their increas:d 
shareholdings (managerial entrenchment). This will also increase the acquisition cost to 
the acquirer. The expected sign of this variable is negative. 
Song and Walkling (1993), showed that managerial ownership is significantly related 
to the probability of being a target. Their results indicated that target fim1s have 
significantly smaller levels of managerial ownership than the non-targets. 
Mikkelson and Partch ( 1997), reported that the target firms have significantly lower 
insider share holdings than non-target fim1s. However the results of Morckel al., ( 1988) 
show that the relationship between the shareholdings of executive directors and 
shareholders' wealth maximisation is not linear. They reported that at high levels of 
ownership the corporate performance, measured by Tobin's q, falls. Their result may be 
an indication of managerial entrenchment where the managers gain so much power, at 
high levels of managerial ownership, that they act to further their own interest rather 
than that of shareholders. 
Weir (1997) showed that lower the proportion of a firm's ordinary shares owned by the 
executive directors, the higher the probability of becoming a takeover target. Gammie 
and Gammie (1996) also found that share options held by executive directors are 
conversely related to the probability of receiving bids. On the other hand, Shivdasani 
(1993) did not report any significant relationship between equity ownership of 
management and takeover bids. 
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BigShHo: Outside shareholdings of major shareholders. This is measured as a total 
percentage of shareholdings held by outside interests other than those held by board of 
directors and since the majority of the big shareholders are institutional shareholders it 
can normally be assumed that the results can be applied to institutional shareholders as 
well. In theory large shareholders are considered to be effective monitors as they have a 
vested interest in minimising asymmetry of information and act in accordance with their 
own interest (Jarrell and Poulson, 1987). Nevertheless, Ambrose and Megginson (1992), 
Davis and Stout (1992), and Weir (1997) found that outside shareholder or institutional 
shareholders had no effect on the probability of becoming a takeover target. On the 
other hand though, Shivdasani (1993) found that the large external shareholdings 
significantly increased the probability of receiving a hostile bid. Even though the 
previous research contains conflicting results, the expected sign for this variable is 
negative because large shareholders have an incentive to monitor the management and 
any dissatisfaction will result in selling their shares. Some research (Shleifer and 
Vislmy, 1986) supports the notion that large blocks of shareholders monitor managers 
more effectively due to their increased interests. On the other hand, recently institutional 
investors have been criticised in the financial press for not doing enough monitoring. 
Pound (1988), for example, highlighted the fact that institutional shareholders 
monitoring role might be minimal if they choose to sell their shareholding rather than a 
positive engagement with the management to improve the its performance. Obviously 
this variable also contains the shareholdings (toehold) of bidders in the target sub-
sample. However this cannot be utilised as a separate variable as this information does 
not exist for the matched non-target sub-sample. 
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Table 5.1. Corporate Governance Variables and Expected Signs 
Hypothesis Exp. Sign 
Whether the positions of chairman and chief executive are separated -
(SepChair) 
The proportion of outside directors on the board (NEX) 
-
The weighted average of outside direclorships held by the non-executive -
directors (NEXOulDir) 
The weighted average of outside directorships held by the executive directors -
(XOutDir) 
Percentage of the companies' ordinary shares held by the executive directors 
-
(DirShHo) 
Outside shareholding of major shareholders (BigShHo) -
As in chapter four, the aim in the first part of this chapter is to identify and model those 
corporate governance differences between two groups of companies by those above 
variables as targets and non-targets by employing Logistic Regression (LR) and 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). In the second part the results of these models will 
be compared. 
166 
5.3 Univariate Data Analysis Results 
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 provide the summary of descriptive statistics for the MD, TD, 
and TD(-2). As in the previous chapter along with mean and /-values, median and 
Wilcoxon non-parametric test for median statistics are also provided. ln addition to 
univariate analysis, correlation matrixes are supplied in Appendix C. 
Table 5.2. t-statistics: Mixed data (MD) statistics. One year before the bid. 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
SepChair 0.5192 0.7692 0.000 1.000 -3.05* .. -2.64*** 
NEX% 0.3596 0.4057 0.400 0.400 ·1 .26 -0.61 
NEXOutDir 1.3567 1.4154 1.000 1.000 -0.24 -0.30 
XOutDir 0.2327 0.7179 0.000 0.105 -2.62 .. -1.45 
OirShHo 9.9306 14.7717 4.780 9.110 ·1 .67* -1.34 
Bi!lShHo 29.9269 28.0317 26.81 32.04 0.51 0.43 
Notes: 
(1) ***Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, **5% level, 2 tail test, *10% level, 2 tail test 
1(2) Observations (52 TarQets and 52 Non-targets) 
Table 5.2 shows that SepChair, at the I% level, XOutDir, at the 5% level, and DirShHo, 
at the I 0% level, are significant variables in MD. However, according to the median test 
of Wi lcoxon Z, on ly variable that is statistically significant at the I% level is SepChair. 
The results indicate that target companies combine the roles of chief executive director 
and chairman. Also, /-statistic indicate that executive directors of target companies hold 
less outside directorships in other companies compared with the matched sample. 
Furthermore these directors are less aligned to the interest of their shareholder as they 
hold significantly less shares in companies that they serve. The only variable that has a 
higher mean value for target companies is the percentage shareholding of big investors, 
however the difference is significant neither in /-test nor in Wi lcoxon Z test. 
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Table 5.3. t-statistics: Time data (TO-I) statistics. One year before the bid. 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
SepChair 0.4872 0.7179 0.000 1.000 -3.27* .. -2.93* .. 
NEX% 0.3320 0.3680 0.300 0.300 -1 .39 -1 .04 
NEXOutDir 1.1115 1.3368 0.790 1.000 -0.97 -0.66 
XOutDir 0.4279 0.4284 0.105 0.000 -0.05 0.45 
DirShHo 12.7790 13.4908 5.0300 6.6200 -0.29 -0.26 
BigShHo 30.0967 23.9979 28.5500 19.9100 2.04** 1.95* 
Notes: 
(1) ***Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, **5% level, 2 tail test, *10% level, 2 tail test 
[(2) Observations (78 Targets and 78 Non-targets) 
In TD, SepChair and BigShHo are the only significant variables at the I% and 5% 
levels while BigShl-lo is significant at the I 0% level with Wilcoxon test. XOutDir and 
DirShHo are no longer sign ificant in this data set. However, target companies sti ll have 
lower mean scores in all variables except in BigShHo. A significant difference in 
SepChair between targets and non-targets is again an indication that in the target 
companies the roles of chairman and CEO are combined indicating that the board is 
dominated by a single individual, in line with lower non-executives and their lower 
outside shareholding. On the other hand the significance of BigShHo indicates that 
target companies have higher percentage of big investors compared with non-target 
ones. 
Table 5.4. t-statistics: Time data (TD-2) statistics. Two years before the bid. 
Ratios Target Mean Matched Mean Target Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
SepChair 0.5769 0.6795 1.000 1.000 -1.30 -1 .31 
NEX% 0.3576 0.3628 0.300 0.400 -0.16 0.46 
NEXOu!Dir 1.2744 1.2437 1.000 0.775 -0.66 0.25 
XOu!Dir 0.3944 0.4388 0.210 0.000 -0.45 0.01 
DirShHo 16.2494 14.4267 6.5700 9.1200 0.68 0.10 
BigShHo 23.7206 21 .9296 24.7500 19.1950 0.65 0.65 
Notes: 
(1) ***Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, **5% level, 2 tail test, *10% level, 2 tail test 
[(2) Observations (78 Targets and 78 Non-targets) 
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Table 5.4 shows that none of the second year variables is statistically significant. This is 
an interesting result since SepChair is significant at the one percent level one year prior 
to takeover. This shows that during the time period from two years to one year prior to 
takeover a change in SepChair took place to make this variable statistically significant. 
The mean score for targets dropped from 0.576 to 0.487 compared to an increase of 
0.0385 from 0.679 to 0.718 for the non-targets. Target companies still have a lower 
mean value for SepChair two years prior to takeover in relation to non-targets but this 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 5.5. t-statistics: Variation data (VD) statistics. 
Ratios Taraet Mean Matched Mean Targ_et Median Matched Median !-values Wilcoxon Z 
SepChair -0.0897 0.0385 0.000 0.000 -1 .59 -1.52 
NEX% 0.1230 0.1043 0.000 0.000 -0.96 0.21 
NEXOutDir -0.1629 0.0932 0.000 0.000 -1.37 -1 .07 
XOutDir 0.0332 -0.0103 0.000 0.000 -0.21 0.24 
DirShHo -3.4704 -0.9359 0.000 -0.010 -1 .40 -0.19 
BigShHo 6.3760 2.0683 3.800 0.000 1.65 1.67* 
Notes: 
(1) -significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test, **5% level, 2 tail test, *10% level, 2 tail test 
[(2)0bservations(78 Taraets and 78 Non-taraets) 
None of the variables are statistically significant in the variation data accept the increase 
in the shareholdings of big investors in the target companies (BigShHo) with Wilcoxon 
Z test. The target companies experienced a reduction in the mean score of SepChair, 
NEXOutDir, and DirShi-Lo. This implies that two to one year prior to takeover, 
separated roles of chairman and CEO are combined in target companies whi le the 
process was reversed in non-target companies. Although there was an increase in the 
proportion of non-executives in target companies compared to a lower increase in non-
169 
targets, there was a decrease in the outside shareholding of these non-executive 
directors while a slight increase can be observed in non-target companies. This increase 
in non-executive directors may be to counter the perceived ill effects of combining the 
roles of chairman and CEO in the eyes of investors and financial markets alike. 
However, even though the differences in changes are not significant, the results imply 
that quality of non-executive as well as executive directors declined in target companies 
during this period. It is obvious from the numbers above that an increase in the 
proportion of non-executives in target companies did not bring the quality that was 
required. It is also interesting that there was an increase in the shareholding of big 
investors especially in target companies. This increase is statistically significant at the 
I 0% level with the median test of Wilcoxon Z. This might be as a result of a possible 
takeover rumour or expectation of such a takeover bid. 
5.4 Multivariate Models and Results 
The LR estimation of the three models is presented below. Table 5.6 shows the MD as 
well as one year TD(-1) and two years TD(-2) prior to the takeover bid. However a 
meaningful estimate of Variation Data (VD) could not be estimated. Logistic 
Regression estimate come up with a warning that 'There is a complete separation of 
data points. The maximum likelihood estimate does not exist. Validity of the model fit 
is questionable'. Nonetheless the logistic procedure continued in spite of the warning 
but as the results are questionable they will not be reported here. However the estimates 
of VD can be seen in Appendix E. As in the previous chapter, classification tables and 
percentages of ANNs on the estimation sample are presented under LR models. 
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The same procedure of obtaining the network structure is followed in this section. The 
estimation sample is divided into two as training and validation and tested on the hold-
out sample. Many trials of single and multiple hidden layers with different nodes in 
each layer were conducted. Similarly, two hidden layer networks provided better 
generalisation on hold-out samples. The sigmoid activation function with 0.1 learning 
rate and 0.8 momentum value is used in the training. 
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5.4.1 Estimated Models 
Table 5.6. Logistic Regression Models for MD, TD. One and two year prior to takeover 
bid. 
Variables MD TD(-1) TD (-2) 
SepChair -1.2198 -0.9473 -0.4644 
(6.595)** (7.000)*** (I. 726) 
NEX% -0.0825 0.0438 -0.0707 
(0.306) (0.110) (D.400) 
NEXOutDir -0.0427 -0.0595 -0.0311 
(0.536) ( 1.437) (0.426) 
XoutDir -0.2912 -0.00242 -0.0192 
(3.998)** (0.001) (0.0723) 
DirShHo -0.0462 0.00107 -0.00549 
(5.783)** (0.008) (0.2842) 
BigShHo -0.00898 0.0185 0.00761 
(0.567) (3.543)* (0.627) 
Constant 2.3875 0.1725 0.00641 
(8.228)** * (0.1 OS) (0.0002) 
N 104 !56 !56 
Model chi-square 16.08** 14.52** 3.32 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.136 0.070 0.015 
Correct classification % 
Target 69.23% 58.97% 50.00% 
Non-Target 69.23% 64.10% 58.97% 
Overall 69.23% 61.54% 54.49% 
Notes: 
'''Significant at the I% level, 2 tail test 
"Significant at the 5% level, 2 tail test 
'Significant at the 10% level, 2 tail test 
2 Figures in the parentheses are Wald statistics. 
3 The likelihood ratio index is defined as (!-log likelihood at convergence/log likelihood at zero). It is 
similar to the R2 statistics of multiple regression and gives an indication of the Logit model's explanatory 
power. 
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Apart from the TD(-2), the two other models are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
As in the financial modeling in the previous chapter, the MD has a higher explanation of 
acquisition probability with 13.6% likelihood ratio index. In contrast to financial ratio 
modelling, the above models are less significant in terms of their chi-square and 
likelihood ratio index hence provide a lesser explanation of a firm's acquisition 
probability. 
In MD, SepChair, XoutDir and DirShHo are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This indicates that combining the roles of chairman and CEO, lower numbers of 
directorships held by executive directors, and lower shareholdings of company directors 
resulted an increase in probability of receiving a takeover bid. Therefore the target 
companies in the estimation sample combined the roles of chairman and CEO leading to 
one man dominated board. Target companies also had executive directors whose 
managerial abilities were not highly rated by the market and whose appointment was 
seen by the market to be a result of their affiliation with the company directors or 
management entrenchment. Statistically significant difference of DirShHo means that, 
in comparison with the non-target sample target management interest were not aligned 
to their shareholder and this in turn lead to poor performance and eventual takeover bid. 
The results are in line with the findings of Song and Walkling (1993), Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997), and Weir (1997). 
In TD(-1), however, XOutDir or DirShHo are no longer significant. In fact the only 
statistically significant variable other than SepChair is BigShHo. Again the target 
companies in the sample combined the roles of chairman and CEO and concentrated 
two much power in the hands of one person. This finding is in contrast to the reported 
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findings of Brickley et al., ( 1997) that the cost of separating the roles of chainnan and 
CEO is larger than the benefits for most large firms and is in strong support of one of 
the recommendations of the Cadbury proposals that refer to the roles of chairman and 
CEOs. The positive sign and significance of BigShHo means that target companies had 
higher percentage of shareholdings by big investors. However the inference that can be 
drawn from this result is not what is expected as it is generally assumed that large 
shareholders are effective monitors with their increased interest in companies that they 
invest. This result is in line with Shivdasani (1993) as he found out that large external 
shareholders significantly increased the probability of receiving a bid. The models 
explanatory power is lower than MD with likelihood ratio index of 7 .0%. 
The model fonned by using TD(-2) is not statistically significant and does not explain a 
firm's acquisition probability. Even the overall classification accuracy of the model on 
estimation sample is not statistically significant. Although a 54.49% classification rate 
is higher than would be expected from chance probability of 50% for an equal sample 
size, a /-statistic of 1.1 is not statistically significant. Hence this model does not provide 
a statistical explanation of acquisition probability; it will not be used to test on a hold-
out sample for prediction purposes. The insignificant result of the second year model is 
somehow not surprising from the point of view that the market would have reacted 
earlier, if the differences between target and non-target were significant two years prior 
to the bid. This assumption, of course, depends upon the efficiency of the market to 
operate. 
As can be seen in TD(-1), for example, the coefficient sign ofNEX is positive, though 
not statistically significant, indicating that the higher proportion of non-executive 
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shareholding will increase the likelihood of a company to become a target. Although the 
coefficient sign of the same variable in TD( -2) is negative, again it is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, it is imperative to see the changes in the governance variables. 
One of the limitations of using cross sectional analysis of single year governance data is 
that it becomes too static. As pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), cross 
sectional regression of performance on board composition will be biased because of 
changes in board composition resulting merely from past performance. However the 
results of two TD models suggest two possible reasons for the coefficient sign change in 
NEX%. First, this is as a result of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. It may be that the managers of the target companies in anticipating the 
oncoming reduction in their company's performance attempt to change their board 
structure in order to be seen to be doing something positive in the face of an anticipated 
underperformance. Second, as mentioned before, in order to eliminate the negative 
perception of combining the roles of chairman and CEO. 
As a result of the difference between two models of TD( -1) and TD( -2), an attempt was 
made to form a fourth model that measures the change in the variables from TD(-2) to 
TD(-1). However as mentioned above Variation model could not be estimated. Logistic 
regression analysis could not estimate the coefficients due to complete separation of 
data points. The parameter estimates and the validity of the model were in question. The 
model, along with the warning message, is presented in Appendix E. 
Again the tables below present the classification rates of ANN models on the 
derivation/estimation samples. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
classification rates provide mathematical fit of the network models on the estimation 
samples. They are useful in comparing to LR classification on the estimation samples. 
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Table 5.7. ANNs' classification table for MD. &-6 nodes in the hidden layers 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 40 12 76.92% 
Target 10 42 80.76% 
Overall 78.84% 
ANNs with 8 nodes in the first hidden layer and 6 nodes in the second hidden layer 
provided the optimum results for MD. As can be seen the overall classification of the 
network is 78.8% and more target companies are correctly classified than non-target 
companies. Compared with LR, the networks' fit to the data is higher. 
Table 5.8. ANNs' classification table for TD(-1).6-5 nodes in the hidden layers. 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 58 20 74.35% 
Target 24 54 69.23% 
Overall 71.79% 
The two hidden layer network with 6 nodes in the first layer and 5 nodes in the second 
hidden layer provided the best model on TD. Compared with the MD data, the network 
classified more non-target companies correctly than targets with an overall classification 
rate of7l%. 
Table 5.9. ANNs' classification table for TD(-2).6-5 nodes in the hidden layers. 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 49 29 62.82% 
Target 23 55 70.51% 
Overall 66.66% 
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The networks provided a better classification than LR on the TD(-2). As mentioned 
before ANNs are able to provide a mathematical fit to complex non-linear data even 
with a single layer hidden structure. But this fit, usually, does not provide good results 
on the hold-out sample, because the network loses its generalisation ability. As can be 
seen from the classification result of the estimation sample the network trained and 
classified better on the target group than the non-target group. 
5.4.2 Hold-out Test Results 
In this section the prediction results of LR and ANNs models on hold-out samples of 
above data sets will be presented. As in the previous chapter, the classification results of 
the estimated cut-off points along with the 0.50 cut value will be shown and the process 
of estimating the optimum cut-off probability will be presented in Appendix B. 
Since TD(-2) does not provide a significant explanation of a firm's acquisition 
probability, this model will not be used for prediction purposes. However the relevant 
data for the distribution of two groups in TD(-2) is presented in Appendix B. 
Also the prediction results of the models will be compared with the proportional chance 
criterion and their significance, in the event that overall prediction exceeds the 
proportional chance probability, and will be measured with /-statistic in a similar way to 
that explained in the previous chapter. The proportional chance probability is 71.3% for 
TD and 61.5% for MD. In the event that the overall prediction percentages of the 
models exceed these chance probabilities a t-test for significance will be applied. 
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5.4.2. 1 Time Data (TD(-1)) Results 
Table 5.10. LR. Cut-offvalue of0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 79 40 66.38% 
Target 17 8 32.00% 
Overall 60.4 1% 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of acquisition probabilities oftargets and non-targets 
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As can be seen the probability distribution of targets and non-targets in the estimation 
sample intersect at 0.429. The c lassification result of this cut-off point is presented 
below. 
Table 5.1 1. LR. Cut-offvalue of 0.429 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 53 66 44.53% 
Target 11 14 56.00% 
Overall 46.52% 
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At the 0.429 cut value the overall classification rate has actually dropped compared with 
the 0.5 cut-off probability. Although 6 more companies are classified correctly in the 
target group compared with 0.5 cut-off probability, correct classifi"cation of non-target 
companies dropped dramatically to 44.5 percent from 66 percent. The distribution of 
targets and non-targets in Figure 5.1 suggest that even though the high percentages of 
non-target companies in the estimation sample are below the estimated probability of 
0.42, the classification of this cut-offpoint is somehow poor on the hold-out sample. 
Table 5.12. ANNs. (7-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 84 35 70.58% 
Target 14 11 44.00% 
Overall 65.97% 
ANNs performed better on both the target and non-target group compared with LR. 
However, the overall classification of the network is not statistically significant either in 
terms of proportional chance probability. The correct classification of 23.9% (11/46) 
actual targets within the target group is also bigger compared to 17.5% (14/80) at the 
0.429 cut-off probability. 
5.4.2.2 Mixed Data (MD) Results 
Table 5.13. LR. Cut-off value of0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 87 58 60.00% 
Target 25 26 50.98% 
Overall 57.65% 
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Figure 5.2 . Distribution of acquisition probabilities of targets and non-targets. 
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On this occasion the distributions of the two groups intersect at 0.48 which is very close 
to 0.50 cut-off point. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, a high percentage of target 
companies are concentrated at the probabilities of 0.55 and 0.85. On the other hand, the 
distribution of non-target companies is skewed to the left peaking at 0.45 . The 
prediction results of 0.48 intersect point is presented below. 
Table 5. 14. LR. Cut-off value of0.48 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 85 60 58.62% 
Target 22 29 56.86% 
Overall 58 .1 6% 
The classification point of 0.48 provided a slightly higher prediction rate than 0.50 cut-
off point. At the 0.48 cut value the prediction rate of the model on the target companies 
increased by 3 whi le it classified less on the non-target group. The close classification 
results are not surprising considering that the estimated cut-off probability of 0.48 is 
very close to 0.50 cut-off point. None of the overall prediction results are above the 
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proportional chance probability of 61.5%. Therefore it can not be concluded that by 
using MD data significant classification of target and non-target companies can be 
obtained. 
Table 5.1 5. ANNs. (8-S nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 93 52 64.13% 
Target 23 28 54.90% 
Overall 61.73% 
The network's overall classification rate of 61.7% is higher than above two LR 
classification rates. The network also classified slightly more in the target group, 
compared with 0.50 cut-off value but less on the 0.48 cut-off level, and 4 percentage 
points higher in the non-target group. Although the network classification rate is higher 
than the proportional chance probability, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Also, the network's classification rate of real targets within the target group is 35% 
(28/80) compared to 32.5% (29/89) in LR at the 0.48 cut-off point. The difference is 
again not significant. 
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5.4. Discussions and Summary 
In this chapter, the analysis is conducted to find out whether it is possible to 
discriminate target companies from non-targets by employing corporate governance 
characteristics. The estimated models, except TO( -2), were significant at the 5 per cent 
level indicating that they provide a higher explanation of a firm's acquisition 
probability. In MD it was found out that separation of chairmanship from CEO, outside 
shareholding of executive directors, and directors shareholdings in their companies were 
statistically significant. The negative estimation sign of these significant variables 
indicate that target companies combined the roles of chaim1an and CEO, included 
executive directors in their boards whose managerial skills were significantly underrated 
by the labour market, and did not align the interests of managers with their shareholders. 
Furthermore, the negative coefficient signs of other variables confirm the outlined 
hypotheses and their relationship with the outcome variable in the model. On the other 
hand, in TD( -I), outside executive directorships and shareholdings of directors in their 
companies no longer statistically significant. However shareholdings of outsiders in 
these companies became significant with a positive coefficient sign indicating that 
target companies had higher big shareholders compared with the non-target ones. 
Moreover in TD(-1) the estimation signs of percentage of non-executive directors in the 
board and shareholdings of directors are positive. The result points out, that contrary to 
the outlined hypotheses, target companies attempted to align the interest of their 
managers with their shareholders and had a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors in their board. However none of these variables are statistically significant to 
merit any comprehensive conclusions in terms of takeover likelihood modelling. As for 
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TD(-2) though, the model itself is not significant and does not provide any meaningful 
analysis of a finn's acquisition probability. 
As in the prev10us chapter, none of the models presented statistically significant 
classification results on the hold-out samples to be considered in the takeover prediction 
studies. Although one of the ANNs' models provided overall classification rates slightly 
above the proportional chance probability, these prediction rates were not statistically 
significant. Therefore it cannot be ruled out that the presented prediction rates could be 
achieved by chance. 
None of the LR models produced prediction results above the proportional chance 
criterion. On the other hand the prediction rate (61.7%) of ANNs on MD was slightly 
above the proportional chance criterion. However this overall prediction result was not 
statistically significant. As pointed out earlier MD is only used as a benchmark for the 
TD. As in the financial ratio modelling, MD provided a higher likelihood ratio index 
compared with TD(-1). However, like in the financial ratio modelling, the MD's 
prediction results were not statistically significant either. 
As in the previous chapter with the financial ratios, ANNs did not perfonn better in 
predicting target companies compared with LR modelling by using governance 
variables. Even though the overall classification of the network on both data sets were 
higher than for LR classification rates, none of the predictions were statistically 
significant. ANN classified 66% of the companies into their correct groups with TD(-1), 
which is lower than the proportional chance. LR, on the other hand, managed to classify 
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60% of the companies correctly. These prediction results are below the proportional 
chance probability and can be attributable to mere chance. 
The classification results obtained from the two models presented above suggest that it 
is not possible to predict or classifY possible target companies beforehand with 
significant results by employing Artificial Neural Networks or Logistic Regression. 
However it should be stressed that the results are limited to the corporate governance 
variables that are employed in this study. 
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Chapter 6- Combined Models (Financial and Corporate Governance) 
and Results 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the data used in previous chapters will be combined for modelling md 
applied to takeover predictions. The combined models below will include financial 
ratios (financial variables) and corporate governance variables (non-financial) for the 
companies in the sample set. 
In chapter four, takeover prediction is modelled by using financial ratios to discriminate 
between the target and non-target companies. The rationale behind using financial 
ratios as a discriminatory tool was explained in the related chapter. But the basic 
underlying assumption was that if the target companies underperform compared with 
their counterparts, their underlying financial indicators (ratios) could be utilised to form 
group profiles that can be used for discriminatory purposes. 
Also stated in chapter five is that the reason for using corporate governance variables in 
takeover prediction modelling was that there is a causal relationship between corporate 
governance structure and performance. This assumption implied that there is an optimal 
corporate governance structure and deviations from that oould result in poor financial 
performance. Hence, in an environment where managers compete for better utilisation 
of assets then would act upon this and acquire companies that deviate from the optimal 
governance structure. In this respect it is assumed thlt the target companies' internal 
governance structures are organised ineffectively. 
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Argenti ( 1976) argued that financial ratios were simply "symptoms" of business failure, 
and as a result suggested that they were the fundamentals of the business and 
management structures to be considered for the causes of corporate collapse. Therefore, 
it can be postulated that financial ratios as measures of corporate performance were 
simply a reflection upon the corporate governance structure. Therefore, the very reason 
for target companies to be taken over was that they did not establish proper internal 
monitoring mechanisms through their corporate governance structures which lead to the 
external monitoring mechanism (market for corporate control) to come into effect. 
Even though some studies (Shivdasani, 1993; Gammie and Gammie, 1996; Weir, 1997) 
combined these two groups of characteristics of companies to a limited extend for better 
profiling of target company characteristics, so far there is no example of this type of 
extensive combination and analysis in takeover prediction studies. Sihivdasani ( 1993) 
used financial characteristics (Leverage, Market to book ratio, and Growth rate) as 
control variables for the board characteristics. On the other hand, Gammie and Gamme 
(1996) and Weir (1997) only supplemented profit figure to their corporate governance 
characteristics. 
However as the relation between the two set of variables described above, financial 
ratios as measures of corporate performance were simply a reflection upon the corporate 
governance structure. This implies a time Jag and an interaction between corporate 
governance characteristics and financial variables. In this section of the analysis, this 
aspect of feedback from governance change to financial impact or interaction between 
the two sets of variables will be exploited from takeover predictions modelling 
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perspective. It is expected that this interaction as well as the inclusion of more company 
characteristics of these companies will increase the estimation power of the models and 
will lead into better prediction rates. Furthermore, in contrast to the previous chapters, 
stepwise elimination of combined models will be carried out to see important 
determinants or characteristics that separate target companies from non-target ones. 
This analysis will enable us to observe the significant differences between targets and 
non-targets not only in one aspect of their characteristics such as financial ratios but also 
in general. 
As a result in this section, in order to improve the predictive ability of the models, 
financial and non-financial variables of the companies will be combined. Similar type of 
applications or examples of this type of analysis can be found in corporate failure 
literature (Daily and Dalton, 1994). 
6.2 Methodology 
The same methodology that was explained in the previous chapters (chapter 4 and 5) is 
applied in this section. Diagram 6.1 gives a general description of the methodology in 
this section. As can be seen in diagram 6.1, financial variabl:s (ratios) and non-financial 
variables (corporate governance) are combined to see whether the predictive abilities of 
the models could be improved by taking advantage of the Jag effect and interaction 
between two sets of variables. 
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Diagram 6.1. Schematic description of the steps involved in the combined methodology. 
I VARIABLES I I I 
I FINANOALRATIOS I I NON-FlNANOAL I 
l COMBINED V ARIABl.ES I. 
1 
l l 
r LRl I ANNs I 
However, the modelling is conducted only on time and mixed data (TO and MD). The 
reasoning for this is explained below. In order to identify the data sets used in this 
chapter time data is called total time data (TTD) while mixed data is called total mixed 
data (TMD). Also, a stepwise regression analysis is performed. Among the available 
variable selection methods in SAS, the stepwise elimination was selected. 
There are five variable selection methods that are available in SAS. These methods are 
forward selection, backward elimination, stepwise selection, and score for best subsets 
selection. The stepwise option is similar to the forward selection option except that 
variables already in the model do not necessarily remain. Variables are entered into and 
removed from the model in such a way that each forward selection step can be followed 
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by one or more backward elimination steps. Hence the stepwise selection combines the 
forward and backward selections methods to add variables to the model or remove 
variables from the model as they meet or fail to meet specified significance levels, 
respectively. The stepwise selection process terminates if no further variable can be 
added to the model or if the variable just entered into the model is the only variable 
removed in the subsequent backward elimination (SAS System, 1995). 
Consequently, the stepwise regression based on the stepwise elimination method with 
0.05 statistical significance for inclusion in the model is performed to TMD and TTD. 
These models are called "reduced time data" (RTD) and "reduced mixed data" (RMD). 
The same procedure of network training is followed in this section. The estimation data 
were separated into training and test samples. A number of different trials were carried 
out for hidden layers and nodes for these layers to determine the optimum network 
structure. The sigmoid activation function with a 0.1 learning rate and a 0.8 momentum 
value is used in the training. 
6.3 Multivariate Models and Results. 
The LR models for TMD, RMD, TTD and RTD one year prior to takeover are presented 
in Table 6.1 below. Also, the classification tables of ANNs on the estimation data are 
shown below in Table 6.2 to 6.5. Correlation analysis for these variables is 
supplemented in Appendix C. 
189 
The reason why only these two data samples (TMD and TTD) are considered for the 
combined models is simple. Models constructed by using TD(-2) data samples were not 
statistically significant in both cases of financial and non-financial analysis therefore it 
is not considered in the combined sample. IRD that was used in the financial analysis 
was not used in the non-financial section so it is not possible to apply it in this section. 
The reason for not applying variation data (VD), for example, in this analysis is that it 
could not have been possible to construct this model in the non-financial characteristics 
modelling. Therefore VD and TD(-2) are excluded from the analysis in this chapter. 
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6.3.1 Estimated Models 
Table 6.1. Logistic Regression Models for TMD, RMD, TTD and RTD. 
Variables TMD RMD TTD RTD 
RSHF -0.057 -0.0631 -0.0102 
(6.9801)*** (11.875)*** (1.872) 
TUT -0.0506 -0.0228 -0.029 
(6.0944)** (4.418)** (8.262)*** 
GEAR 0.0097 0.00267 
(3.5739)* (0.468) 
LIQD -2.1281 -2.3957 -2.3399 
(2.126) (5.241)** (7.504)*** 
LOG( SIZE) -0.0168 0.4142 
(0.0005) ( 1.065) 
PROP FIX -0.9912 0.2335 
(0.285) (0.0357) 
PIE -0.0065 -0.00624 
(0.394) (0.8352) 
MBV -0.0513 -0.0255 
(3.0916)* (1.6144) 
GRDUMMY -0.5515 0.1332 
(0.6745) (0.099) 
SepChair -1.4627 -1.5927 -0.7817 -0.8671 
(4.9202)** (8.416)*** (3.872)** (5.974)** 
NEX% -0.1429 -0.0239 
(0.5364) (0.0254) 
NEXOutDir -0.052 -0.0509 
(0.4389) (0.857) 
XoutDir -0.3766 -0.3472 -0.0107 
(3.9197)** (5.136)** (0.017) 
DirShHo -0.0573 -0.0517 0.0139 
(3.7107)* (6.752)*** (0.9687) 
BigShHo -0.00822 0.0245 
(0.244) (4.780)** 
Constant 7.2264 3.1119 0.7845 3.0077 
(3.8151)* (16.9685)*** (0.154) (1 0.967)*** 
N 104 104 156 156 
Model chi-square 41.91*** 25. 73*** 36.66*** 22.965*** 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.4175 0.2851 0.1929 0.1185 
Correct classification % 
Target 82.69% 69.23% 67.95% 64.10% 
Non-Target 82.69% 71.15% 73.08% 69.23% 
Overall 82.69% 70.19% 70.51% 66.67% 
Notes: 
'"significant at the I% level, 2 tail test 
"Significant at the 5% level, 2 tail test 
'significant at the I 0% level, 2 tail test 
2 Figures in the parentheses are Wald statistics. 
3 The likelihood ratio index is defined as (1-log likelihood at convergence/log likelihood at zero). It is 
similar to the R2 statistics of multiple regression and gives an indication of the Logit model's explanatory 
power. 
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All the above models are statistically significant at the l% level. The model likelihood 
ratio index (0.4175) for TMD model is considerable higher compared with the other 
models. In TMD model, RSHF is statistically significant at the I% level while TUT, 
SepChair, and XoutDir are at the 5% level, and GEAR, MBV, and DirShHo are at the 
10% level. The overall classification rate is also very high. Unlike in MD model in 
chapter four, LIQD is statistically not significant. On the other hand, in comparison to 
MD model in chapter five, there is no difference. The significant financial variables 
indicate that target companies had lower returns on their shareholders' funds with lower 
growth and higher gearing. At the same time the corporate governance variables show 
that the roles of chairntan and CEO are not separated and executive directors held less 
outside directorships in other companies while they held less shares in their companies 
compared with non-target companies. 
The stepwise regression procedure on TMD left four variables. While XoutDir is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, RSHF, SepChair, and DirShHo are statistically 
significant at the I% level. All the significant variables have their expected signs. The 
result shows that target companies are characterised as low return companies where 
management skill is graded relatively low in the labour market (XoutDir). It is also 
significant that target companies combine the roles of chairman and CEO, and target 
management interest is not aligned strongly with the shareholders compared to non-
target companies (DirShHo). 
The TTD is statistically significant at the I% level with a likelihood ratio index of 19%. 
The variables, TUT, LIQD, SepChair and BigShHo are statistically significant at the 
five per cent level. The significant variables from the governance variables are SepChair 
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and BigShHo. This again indicates that the target companies combine the roles of CEO 
and chairman and percentage of shareholding among the big shareholder is higher in 
target companies. It is interesting to note that this is exactly the same compared with TD 
models in financial ratio and corporate governance analysis. Even though it is not 
statistically significant the negative coefficient sign of MBV is in line with the expected 
sign indicating that the target company's shares are valued less in comparison with their 
book values, therefore lowering their MBV ratios. The other significant financial 
variables suggest that the target companies are characterised as having low growth and 
liquidity compared with the non-target companies in the sample. 
A simple comparison of this model with TD in financial ratio analysis in chapter four 
shows that the overall classification percentages of the combined model is considerably 
higher as a result of better classification on the non-target companies. Also the 
likelihood ratio of TTD and TMD are higher which indicates that combined models 
provide a higher explanation of a firm's acquisition probability as a result of combined 
(as well as more characteristics included in the analysis) variables. 
On the other hand, the stepwise regression of TTD provided three variables. These, as 
can be seen in Table 6.1, are the same significant variables, accept BigShHo, that were 
given by TTD, even though the statistical significance of 0.15 criterion for inclusion is 
used. The model itself is statistically significant at the one per cent level. TUT and 
LIQD, at the I% level, and SepChair at the 5% level, are statistically significant 
variables provided by the stepwise elimination process. The result of the stepwise 
regression analysis suggests that during the time period outlined in this study thetarget 
companies were characterised by low growth and liquidity, and tended to combine the 
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roles of chairman and chief executive directors on the boards. Nevertheless these 
significant differences can not be used in the identification of target companies prior to 
receiving bids. 
The classification results of ANN for the above combined data samples are presented 
below. 
Table 6 2 ANNs' classification table for TMD.IS-6 nodes in the hidden layers .. 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 47 5 90.38% 
Target 7 45 86.53% 
Overall 88.46% 
An ANN with 15 nodes in the first and 6 nodes in the second layer provided the optimal 
network for the combined data and was used to test the network on the hold-out sample. 
The classification rates on the estimation sample are quite high with over 90% on the 
non-target companies and 86% on the target companies. The overall correct 
classification rate is slightly over 88%. 
Table 6.3. ANNs' classification table for RMD. 64 nodes · m the hidden layers 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 43 9 82.69% 
Target 11 41 78.84% 
Overall 80.76% 
For the RMD, the network with 6 nodes in the first and 4 nodes in the second layer gave 
the optimum network and was tested on the hold-out sa mple. The overall prediction 
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accuracy rates of both networks are higher than LR classification rates on the estimation 
sample. The overall prediction rate has dropped to 80.76% with the RMD model. 
Table 6.4. ANNs' classification table for TTD.15-5 nodes in the hidden layers 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 68 10 87.17% 
Target 17 61 78.20% 
Overall 82.69% 
An ANN with 15 nodes in the first and 5 nodes in the second layer provided the optimal 
network for the combined data and was used to test the network on the hold-out sample. 
The overall classification result for ANNs model is again higher than the one provided 
by logistic regression analysis. 
Table 6.5. ANNs' classification table for RTD. 5-3 nodes in the hidden layers 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 60 18 76.92% 
Target 25 53 67.94% 
Overall 72.43% 
For the RTD, the network with 5 nodes in the first and 3 nodes in the second layer gave 
the optimum network and was tested on the hold-out sample. The overall prediction 
accuracy rates of both networks are higher than LR classification rates on the estimation 
sample. In the RTD the overall prediction rate has dropped from 82.69% in TTD to 
72.43%. The network produced a higher classified rate for non-target companies 
compared with the target ones. 
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6.3.2 Hold-out Test Results 
The prediction results of the above LR and ANNs models are presented below. 
Following the layout of previous chapters, the classification results of the estimated cu~ 
off points as well as the 0.50 cut value will be displayed. Also, in the event that the 
overall classification of the models exceeds the proportional chance probability, the t-
test for significance will be estimated. As it wi ll be realised, when the estimated cu~off 
probability for reduced models is equal to 0.50, the predicted classifications will be 
equal to the ones with the total models' estimations at the 0.50 cu~off point. 
6.3 .2.1 Mixed Data Results 
Table 6.6. LR. Cut-off value of0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 84 61 57.93% 
Target 20 3 1 60.78% 
Overall 58.67% 
Table 6. 7. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TMD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 I 1.92% 18 34.62% 
0.100-0. 199 0.15 2 3.85% 9 17.3 1% 
0.200-0.299 0.25 2 3.85% 5 9.62% 
0.300-0.399 0.35 3 5.77% 8 15.38% 
0.400-0.499 0.45 I 1.92% 3 5.77% 
0 .500-0.599 0.55 5 9.62% 3 5.77% 
0.600-0.699 0.65 5 9.62% 3 5.77% 
0.700-0.799 0.75 4 7.69% 0 0.00% 
0 .800-0.899 0.85 9 17.3 1% 2 3.85% 
0.900-0.999 0.95 20 38.46% I 1.92% 
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Figure 6.1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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The intersection between target and non-target probability occurs at 0.50 cut-off point. 
It can be seen that most of the target companies tent to have an acquisition probability 
greater than 0.5 whi le the non-target sample concentrates below the intersection point. 
From this distribution it can said that they show a very distinct and expected probabi lity 
distribution. 
At this cut-off point LR had an overall classification rate of 58.67% and below the 
proportional change criterion of 61 .5%. This result is quite disappointing as the model 
has a very high explanation of acquisition likelihood. The model had a higher 
classification rate for targets compared with the non-target group even though the 
percentage difference is small. Percentage of targets classified correctly is 33.69% 
(31 /92). This classification rate is not anyvJay different from the ones in chapter four 
and five. 
Table 6.8.ANNs. ( 15-6 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 90 55 62.06% 
Target 19 32 62.74% 
Overall 62.24% 
ANNs prediction on the hold out sample is higher than LR classification as well as 
higher than could be obtained by the proportional change criteria of 61.5%. However 
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the difference is not high enough to make it statistically significant. The /-statistic 
(0.2137) for this classification rate is not statistically significant. The correct 
classification rate of targets is 36.78% (32/87). 
6.3.2.2 Reduced Mixed Data Results 
Table 6.9. LR. Cut-off value of 0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 84 61 57.93% 
Target 20 31 60.78% 
Overall 58.67% 
Table 6. 1 0. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the RMD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00% 11 2 1.1 5% 
0. 100-0.199 0.15 2 3.85% 7 13.46% 
0.200-0.299 0.25 I 1.92% 7 13.46% 
0.300-0.399 0.35 4 7.69% 6 11 .54% 
0.400-0.499 0.45 8 15.38% 9 17.3 1% 
0.500-0.599 0.55 6 11 .54% 5 9.62% 
0.600-0.699 0.65 5 9.62% 4 7.69% 
0.700-0.799 0.75 7 13.46% l 1.92% 
0.800-0.899 0.85 10 19.23% 2 3.85% 
0.900-0.999 0.95 9 17.3 1% 0 0.00% 
Figure 6.2. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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Again the two probability distributions intersect at 0.50 cut-off level. As a result the 
prediction rates are the same as the TMD. 
Table 6.l i.ANNs. (6-4 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 86 59 59.31% 
Target 20 31 60.78% 
Overall 59.69% 
The classification rate of the network is not very different from the LR classification 
rate. It has correctly predicted the same number of targets whi le it narrowly performed 
better on the non-target sample. The correct classification rate of targets is 34.44% and 
not different from LR classification rate. 
6.3.2.1 Time Data Results 
Table 6.4. LR. Cut-off value of 0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 89 30 74.79% 
Target 11 14 56.00% 
Overall 71.53% 
199 
Table 6. 13. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TTD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 5 6.41 % 0 0.00% 
0.100-0.1 99 0. 15 6 7.69% I 1.28% 
0.200-0.299 0.25 12 15.38% 2 2.56% 
0.300-0.399 0.35 9 11.54% 7 8.97% 
0.400-0.499 0.45 18 23.08% 14 17.95% 
0.500-0.599 0.55 14 17.95% 18 23 .08% 
0.600-0.699 0.65 8 10.26% 20 25.64% 
0.700-0.799 0.75 4 5.13% 7 8.97% 
0.800-0.899 0.85 2 2.56% 9 11 .54% 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Figure 6.3. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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As can be seen from the graph the probability distribution ofthe two groups intersects at 
0.43 . The classification of this probabili ty point on the hold-out sample is presented in 
Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14. LR. Cut-offvalue of0.43 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 78 41 65 .55% 
Target 7 18 72.00% 
Overall 66.67% 
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The prediction rate of LR at the 0.43 cut-off point is lower than 0.50 cut value. TI1e 
classification of target companies (72%) is considerably higher than at the cut value of 
0.50 but at the same time it is notably smaller with the non-target ones. Furthermore, the 
percentage of actual target companies correctly classified within the group that is 
predicted as targets by the model is 30.51% (18/59) compared with 3 18% (14/44) ofthe 
0.50 cut value. Even though the prediction rate for ta rget companies is increased, the 
overall percentage classification is small. Furthermore, despite the fact that the overall 
prediction rate of LR at the cut-off point of 0.50 is above the proportional chance 
criterion of71.3 per cent, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.15 .ANNs. (15-5 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 91 28 76.42% 
Target 12 13 52.00% 
Overall 72.22% 
The overall c lassification rate of the network is slightly higher than LR, as well as 
higher than would be expected by chance. The /-statistic for this rate is 0.246 and 
statistica lly not significant. The number of non-targets correctly classified by the 
network is slightly higher than the 0.50 cut value by LR. On the other hand, the network 
performed marginally lower with the target group, even though the di fference is only 
one company. The percentage of actual targets within the predicted target group is 
3 1.7% ( 13/41 ). 
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6.3.2.4 Reduced Time Data Results 
Table 6.1 6. LR. Cut-off value of 0.50 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 89 30 74.79% 
Target 11 14 56.00% 
Overall 71.53% 
Table 6.17. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the RTD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00% 5 6.41 % 
0.100-0.199 0.15 I 1.28% 6 7.69% 
0.200-0.299 0.25 2 2.56% 12 15.38% 
0.300-0.399 0.35 7 8.97% 9 11.54% 
0.400-0.499 0.45 14 17.95% 18 23.08% 
0.500-0.599 0.55 18 23.08% 14 17.95% 
0.600-0.699 0.65 20 25.64% 8 10.26% 
0.700-0.799 0.75 7 8.97% 4 5.13% 
0.800-0.899 0.85 9 11.54% 2 2.56% 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Figure 6.4. Distribution of acquisition probabilities fo r targets and non-targets 
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The probabi lity distribution of the two groups actually intersects at 0.49 and is very 
close to the 0.50 cut value. The classification of tllis probability point on the hold-out 
sample is presented in Table 6. 11 . 
Table 6.18. LR. ut-off value of 0.49 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 89 30 74.79% 
Target 11 14 56.00% 
Overall 71.53% 
The predictive result of the 0.49 cut value is identical to the 0.50 cut-off point. This is 
not surprising since these two values are very close to one another. LR classified 
71.53% of the companies correctly. This is relatively a higher figure compared with the 
TTD (66.67%) above at the 0.43 cut-off point. On the other hand, the number of target 
companies correctly classified is down from 18 to 14 with 56% . Even though the overall 
classification is greater than would be expected from prop01tional chance probability, 
the difference is not big enough to be statistically significant. 
Table 6.19.ANNs. (5-3 nodes) 
Predicted 
Observed Non-target Target % 
Non-target 94 25 78.99% 
Target 13 12 48.00% 
Overall 73.61 % 
Although the network provided a sl ightly h igher classifica tion rate compared with LR, 
the result is higher than the prop01tional chance probability. However the t-statistic fo r 
this rate is 0.629 and not statistical ly significant. The network's classification of non-
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targets is higher. than LR; even though: if slightly underperfonned with .the ,target 
corilpallies, tihe percentage,ofactual1targets within :the rgroup;thafisipreiiieted as.targets 
is ~2043% (I i/3i7,)'co)"nparM with 31 .8!%!(,1'4/44) ,in H~. 
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6.4 Discussions and Summary 
In this chapter, in order to further the prediction abilities of the two techniques, financial 
and corporate governance variables of the companies in the sample are combined. This 
method was only applied to mixed and time data and the underlying reasons for this 
already mentioned above. Also, a stepwise regression analysis with the stepwise 
elimination method was applied and tested on the hold-out sample. The estimated LR 
models are statistically significant at the one per cent level. 
The stepwise regression result of TMD suggests that four variables (RSHF, SepChair, 
XoutDir, and DirShHO) are contributing significantly to the separation of target 
companies from the matched sample of non-targets. It is interesting to note that among 
these four only one (RSHF) is a financial variable while the rest of them came from 
non-financial characteristics. On the financial side the estimation sign of return on 
shareholders' fund indicates that target companies had provided lower returns to their 
shareholders. Furthermore on the governance side target companies combined the 
positions of chairman and CEO that put too much power in the hands of one person, 
their executive directors had lower outside directorships indicating that their managerial 
skills were not so highly rated by the managerial labour market compared with non-
target companies, and their directors held less shareholding in their companies leading 
to misalignment of their interest with the shareholders. 
On the other hand the stepwise regression analysis of TTD produced three significant 
variables (TUT, LIQD, and SepChair) and only one of them (SepChair) is still 
statistically significant compared with RMD. The results of RTD suggest that target 
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companies are characterised as low growth and low liquidity. However the growth-
resource dummy is not significant and does not suggest any growth-resource imbalance. 
But the significance of TUT and UQD indicates that target companies had lower 
growth with liquidity problems. Furthermore the separation of the duties between 
chairman and CEO is still significant and the negative sign demonstrates that target 
companies combined these roles. 
Although the models provided a statistically significant explanation of a finn's 
acquisition probability, the classification results of the models on the hold-out sample 
did not provide significantly higher prediction rates. Neither ANNs nor LR supplied 
significantly higher prediction rates above the proportional chance probability of 71.3% 
on the time data. On the other hand, ANNs had a classification rate above the 
proportional chance probability of 61.5% on the TMD but this was not statistically 
significant either. Once again ANNs failed to outperform LR results. Although the 
network's overall classification rates were higher than LR, the differences were not 
significant. 
As in the previous chapters, the results obtained from the models above show that it is 
not possible to predict target companies prior to receiving bids by using the above 
(financial and non-financial) information. However, the results are limited to the 
variables used and the techniques applied. 
206 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
As summarised earlier, the previous research suggests that takeovers are value 
enhancing and target companies' shareholders benefit from such events as premiums are 
paid above the market value. This has lead to a quest to identify target companies before 
they receive a bid as it creates an opportunity to obtain abnormal returns, if they are 
predicted. Although a substantial amount of research is dedicated to the predictions of 
takeover targets and claims of successful modelling, it has not actually been possible to 
predict takeover targets in advance of the stock market. These studies are already 
identified and quoted in the earlier chapters. 
In the prev1ous takeover prediction research, not only different characteristics of 
companies are included m the modelling process but also different statistical and 
multivariate techniques are employed as modelling tools. Although these techniques 
cover a wide range, the most popular of these are logistic regression, multiple 
discriminant analysis and probit analysis. Recently, application of artificial neural 
networks in other areas of finance has grown exponentially. The main applications of 
them in prediction modelling are in time series and corporate failure predictions. In 
terms of its methodology corporate failure predictions are similar to takeover 
predictions and reported successful application of ANNs in this area prompted the 
employment of this technique in takeover predictions as it has never been applied, at 
least to corporate governance characteristics of target companies. 
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Therefore in this research, ANNs were applied to takeover predictions along with 
Logistic Regression. Two types of company data were used during the analysis. First, 
the two techniques were put to the test by employing financial ratios of the companies 
and second their predictive abilities were evaluated with corporate governance 
variables. In these analyses data relating to one and two years prior to takeovers, as well 
as the percentage change of this data (variation data) from two years to one year were 
extracted for two estimation samples (mixed and time data) and tested on the respective 
hold-out samples. 
In chapter four, the modelling of takeover predictions was conducted by using financial 
ratios as financial variables. The ratios were selected according to the relevant 
hypotheses that were specified in the literature as significant reasons for acquisitions. 
The selection of each ratio within the outlined hypothesis was similar to that used by 
Palepu (1986) with one additional ratio used by Ambrose and Megginson (1992). The 
reason for selecting similar ratios to those used by Palepu (1986) was to use them as a 
yardstick for measurement and comparability since the same financial ratios were used 
by Sen et al., ( 1995). 
In chapter five, the corporate governance variables of the sample companies used to 
discriminate between the target and non-target companies was tested on a hold-out 
sample for prediction purposes. The six variables were selected as measures of what is 
perceived to be an efficient internal monitoring mechanism in the previous literature and 
by the Cadbury Committee. As explained previously, the reasons for using corporate 
governance variables were twofold; first the growing literature on the importance of an 
optimal corporate governance structure on firm perfom1ance (Shivdasani, 1993; Morck 
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et al., 1988), and of the board characteristics of target companies (Gammie and 
Gammie, 1996; Weir 1997). 
Finally, in chapter six, the two sets of variables were combined to test whether this 
would lead to an increase in the predictive abilities of the previous models. Apart from 
using one of the models in the prediction, a stepwise regression analysis was also 
carried out to eliminate insignificant variables from the model. 
Although this research relates, in terms of its methodology and application of similar 
financial variables, to Palepu's (1986) influential study in takeover predictions, it differs 
from it by the application of ANNs. This study also differs from the analysis of Senet 
al., (1995), by its application of non-financial characteristics of the canpanies along 
with the combined (financial and non-financial) data. 
7.2 Empirical Results and General Remarks 
The reported empirical results in chapter four, five and six show that neither ANNs nor 
LR produced statistically significant prediction results in the identification of potential 
targets. Also contrary to the reported success of ANNs in comparison with LR in 
corporate failure prediction studies (Alici, 1996), ANNs did not provide better 
prediction results with either type of data compared to LR. In general, the only 
prediction results that were above the proportional change probabilities were those with 
the financial ratios of mixed data. ANNs and LR achieved 64.28 and 62.76 per cent 
overall classification rates which were above what could be obtained by chance. The /-
statistics for these prediction rates were 0.364 for LR and 0.812 for ANNs. However, 
209 
these statistics are not statistically significant. Also, as mentioned, this type of sample 
was only formulated to act as a benchmark to the time dan modelling. However, even 
though ANNs failed the expectations of a significant target prediction, it is shown that 
they are extremely capable of providing mathematical fit to complex non-linear data. 
Despite the fact that financial ratio modelling supplied a higher explanation of takeover 
probabilities of firms compared with governance data, the prediction results of these 
models were not significantly different. TD( -1) modelling in financial ratio analysis was 
significant at the one per cent level with a likelihood ratio of 0.136 compared with a 
lower model chi-square and likelihood ratio of 0.070 with the TD( -1) modelling in 
governance data. However, the overall prediction rates of both data were not higher than 
the proportional chance criterion and not statistically significant. 
The effort to improve the predictive abilities of the models by combining the two sets of 
data did not provide better prediction results either. Although the estimated model 
(TTD) was statistically significant at the one per cent level with 0.1929 likelihood ratio, 
the overall prediction rates were above the chance probability but not statistically 
significant. In this type of data, on the other hand, ANNs' classification was slightly 
higher compared with LR. Also a stepwise regression analysis was applied to the 
combined time data and found that three variables -TUT, LIQD, and SepChair- outlined 
the significant differences between the target and non-target companies one year prior to 
receiving a takeover bid. The result of the stepwise regression analysis suggests that, 
during the time period outlined in this study, the target companies were characterised by 
low growth and liquidity, and tended to combine the roles of chairman and chief 
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executive directors on the boards. Nevertheless, these significant differences can not be 
used in the identification of target companies prior to receiving bids. 
The predictive results of time data modelling suggest the time impact of takeover 
likelihood characteristics of targets. In short, a model formed with past data would not 
yield significant insight to the following periods to be used in the prediction of target 
companies by employing publicly available inforn1ation. This characteristic of takeovers 
is actually one of the causes of failure in successful prediction of targets. Whether this 
prediction is done by LR or ANNs. As stated, ANNs learns from experience, from the 
data in tllis case, and projects this learning onto the test data. The networks' learning, 
however, is limited to tile experience gained from derivation data and if the same 
pattern is not to be found in the test data it is obvious that the prediction will be 
incorrect. 
The results are consistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
which states that current security prices instantaneously and fully reflect all publicly 
available information about securities markets (Blake 1990). Therefore, by simply using 
publicly available financial information that is already reflected in the share price, it is 
not possible to beat the market. This was also confirmed in recent research by Barnes 
(1998), but it was reported that the anticipatory price changes might indicate that tile 
market may not be efficient in the strong form. 
The high success rates that have been achieved in corporate failure studies stems from 
the fact that acquisitions and corporate failures differ substantially. It is easier to predict 
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eventual failure if the firm has been consistently making losses, not generating enough 
liquid funds, losing its market share to its competitors. 
7.3 Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation of this study is the variables that were used in the modelling process. 
In financial ratio modelling, for example, the variables are selected from the postulated 
hypothesis of takeovers and in order to relate them to Palepu's (1986) study, similar 
ratios are employed in this study. The number of ratios employed can be extended with 
the inclusion of other ratios. As mentioned above, one of the most important 
characteristics of takeovers is that they vary in time so that it should be expected that the 
different ratios, as a result of changing motives for bidders and factors of the market, 
become important at different times. Also, the representative ratio used of each 
hypothesis may not be the best one. A group of ratios under each hypothesis can be 
employed in the modelling process. Bames ( 1998), for example employed 18 ratios 
altogether in his analysis and under the inefficient management hypothesis there were 
seven ratios. There is of course the danger of creating multicollinearity in the estimation 
data which would lead to bias in the estimated model. Second, the variables in this study 
are based on historical cost data and employment of current cost data may improve the 
discrimination ability of the models. Waiter (1994), reported that "employing current 
cost data was useful for identifying future takeover targets and eaming above-average 
stock retums"(p.349). Therefore, the prediction ability of the models might be improved 
with current cost data or with other ratios. 
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For the governance data, the employed variables can be extended for the better 
measurement of companies' internal monitoring process. These could include, for 
example, the share options held by the executive directors or the identification of the 
affiliation of large shareholder and non-executive directors to the executive directors. 
Shivdasani {1993), found that ownership by management with unaffiliated large 
shareholders decreases the probability of takeover, while ownership by unaffiliated 
large shareholders increases this probability. 
There are vanous other factors that come into effect to have an impact on the 
acquisition probability of a company. Takeover defence measures that are employed by 
companies significantly affect their acquisition probability. Sudarsanam (1991) reports 
different takeover defence strategies employed by UK firms. It can be seen in his study 
that pre-bid defensive strategies are solely employed to deter potential bidders. These 
strategies increase the cost of acquisition and reduce the expected benefits of the 
acquisition to bidders, hence reducing the takeover likelihood of companies. Along with 
these strategies, for example, employee share ownership plans (ESOP) can be used as 
an entrenchment tool by the incumbent management even though they cannot be used as 
a poison pill under UK company law (Sudarsanam, 1995, p.200). ESOPs can also have 
an indirect effect on the acquisition probability of the firms. Park and Song (1995) 
found significant improvement in year-end performance of the companies that 
employed ESOPs. 
Also identifYing the nature of the takeover bid as friendly or hostile could improve the 
prediction ability of the models. Takeover characteristics of firms may differ according 
to the nature of the bids (Powell, 1997). It is likely that hostile takeovers are more 
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disciplinary than friendly ones (Shivdasani 1993). However Franks and Mayer (1996) 
reported that hostile bids are not directed to poorly performing firms in the UK. This 
results in different motives of bidders, as a result affecting the characteristics of targets. 
Weir's (1997) analysis of corporate governance data shows some of the differences 
between the hostile and non-hostile characteristics of target companies. The study 
reports that the percentage shareholding of executive directors is statistically significant 
at the 10% level in the hostile group, while this is not significant in the non-hostile 
group. However due to the nature of the acquisition market in the UK, the number of 
hostile takeovers are smaller than in the US market. Sudarsanam (1991), Weir (1997), 
and Powell ( 1997) reported that the proportion of hostile takeovers during the 1980s and 
1990s is around 22 to 24 per cent in the UK. 
Furthermore the construction of the hold-out sample in this study is biased. First, the 
sample does not reflect the population characteristics where the companies are not 
divided into two groups of target and non-target companies. During the forming of the 
sample, special attention has been given to ensure that the non-target companies had not 
received any takeover bids two years before and after the time period analysed and had 
their complete data. This process obviously excluded some companies and reduced the 
number of non-target companies included in the sample and, as a result, led to a 
different data composition than the population. Some companies were not selected as 
non-target companies in the sample because they disappeared from the population for 
reasons other than being taken over. This process of selecting target companies 
enhances the differences between target and non-target firms in the estimation sample 
and would result in better prediction in the test sample than could be expected in the 
population. 
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On a more technical level, in the application of ANNs, the analysis of internal 
connections in the network has not been attempted. This process could lead to the 
identification of important features in the network connections as well as the 
determination of the best-input variables (Vaughn 1996). Such improvements would 
lead to the identification of best ratios. 
Some other impediments of takeover prediction modelling m general can be 
summarised as: 
In theory the matching of the companies in this type of empirical research implies that 
there are two groups of subjects which are, as groups, similar in all the aspects of the 
business that they are operating in but different in certain characteristics that lead to a 
takeover bid. However, the restrictions or impediments attached to the data can quite 
easily prevent any prediction study from forming a clear cut classification or distinction 
of the groups. In most of the prediction studies, as in this study, matching is carried out 
on the basis of very broad industry classification. In any industry a company may 
receive a bid and the underlying reasons for it may not come from a target's financial or 
non-financial characteristics but may simply be as a result of the bidder's characteristics 
or intentions. Powell ( 1997) reported that models of takeovers based on the 
characteristics of targets only might not contain enough information. Tzoannos and 
Samuels (1972) also reported that " ... linear probability function estimated for 
companies bidding for others has a be/fer explanaory power than the one estimated for 
companies taken over" p.15. Sudarsanam (1995) indicate that acquisitions should be 
examined in the context of a company's broader business and corporate strategy. Each 
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acquisition type is a result of these business and corporate strategies and the acquisition 
type dictates the target profile and assessment of target companies. In addition to that, 
for example, in an environment of an Endgame theory, as defined by Martin ( 1997), 
managers start acquiring other companies in order to prevent themselves from being 
acquired. In this sort of environment, it is obvious that they are not pursuing 
shareholders' wealth maximisation but wish to acquire other companies before being 
acquired. Therefore, inability of any model to incorporate aims or intentions of the 
bidding companies is a major limitation of any takeover prediction study. 
Even an attempt to include every possible characteristic of target companies along with 
target and bidding companies to find out reasons why takeover bids make economic 
sense or to discover the synergy, the models may not discriminate between two groups 
of companies because there may not be any financial or economic logic in the event 
and, as a result, any characteristics to differentiate them. Roll (1994) already argued that 
corporate takeovers are one area that is separate from the rational behaviour of 
aggregate market behaviour but characterised by irrational behaviour of individuals as a 
result of hubris and valuation error. Another factor to consder is that de-mergers and 
divestment activities happen after the merger or takeover. One also should not ignore 
the fact that inforrnation efficiency in the financial markets does not necessarily imply 
the same efficiency in the other areas related to the targets such as marketing strategies 
and production technologies (Aggarwal and Navratil, 1991 ). 
Relying on an efficient market and efficient management in such circumstances as 
endgame theory does not make any sense. For example, the market for corporate control 
is considered to be unaffected by the social relations and described as an asocial 
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conceptualisation. However, managerial actions are influenced by the current social 
structures and are not determined entirely by economic interests. Inter-organisational 
structures affect the perception of interest and the manner in which interests are pursued 
(Davis, 1991 ). 
As mentioned before, the reasons for takeovers cover a wide spectrum of motives and 
stem from the bidders' point of view and these are the ones that have been identified in 
the literature as efficient corporate objectives. Managers of the bidding firms look at, let 
us assume, financial ratios in this simplistic case, specific financial ratios that satisfy the 
company objectives. Classifying companies as potential targets makes sense for bidders 
since their strategy for acquisition has been established and finding the suitable target is 
a matter of simple ranking or classification. Asquith et al. ( 1983) drew attention to the 
acquisition programmes. If one also tries to take into account other self-motivated 
objectives by bidding management, the reflection of these objectives in the targets' 
financial ratios that are being used to discriminate will dissipate among all the targets' 
ratios and using these ratios to discriminate will be fruitless. Unlike corporate failure 
predictions, where whatever the reason for going bankrupt there is and will be an 
identifiable pattern in the ratios of the bankrupt firms, there will not be a clearly formed 
pattern in the case of takeover targets (Singh, 1975). 
Mergers are a method of investment and require a proper investment appraisal 
assessment. A bidder is involved in such a process if the expected incremental cash flow 
from the merged firm, after discounting for the cost of capital which incorporates 
consideration of market perceptions of the risk of the merged firm, is positive. To put it 
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simply, if there is an opportunity to achieve a positive net present value (NPV) 
(McLaney, 1997). 
NPV assessment of an investment opportunity involves the future costs and revenues of 
the combined firm where the bidder's valuation of target plays a crucial role. "The value 
of the target from the bidder 's point of view is the sum of the per-bid stand-alone value 
of the target and the incremental value the bidder expects to add to the target's assets·· 
(Sudarsanam, 1995, p.l38). If the bidder's valuation of a target is bigger than the 
market's valuation of the target the bidder makes a bid. In contrast to the market 
valuation of a company, which is the stock market value of a firm's equity capital, the 
bidder's valuation of a target is subjective, which includes any estimated gains through 
synergy and weak management, and cannot be observed (Roll, 1994). Basically, the 
bidder firm makes an assessment and a bid for a target because it estimates that the 
earning power of the target's assets will be enhanced under the new management. Since 
it is not possible to observe the bidder's valuation of the target and see why they 
estimate that their valuation is higher than the market's, it is not easy to predict takeover 
targets by simply looking at targets characteristics without a proper knowledge and 
background of the bidder's intentions. 
The implicit assumption about takeover prediction originates !Tom bankruptcy 
prediction and assumes a distinctive recognisable pattern between targets and non-
targets without considering and including the bidders in the equation. This would only 
be valid if a single reason which could have explained mergers as a means of 
restructuring distressed firms (Ciark and Ofek, 1994). As mentioned above, information 
efficiency is restricted to the financial information and financial information does not 
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incorporate production technologies of the targets. If a target's production technology or 
marketing niche is what a bidder is after it may not pay too much attention to the 
target's ratios and pay some excess price for it, regardless of the hubris that may possess 
the bidding management. 
Another difficulty arises from the fact that takeovers are a dynamic process where the 
impact on takeover likelihood characteristics of targets change over time (Powell, 
1997). This problem is recognised as the time-series problem by Altmanet al., (1981). 
The time series problem occurs in takeover prediction studies because takeovers occur 
too infrequently within a year to generate enough target sampling. This requires pooling 
of different time periods that incorporate structural changes. This then effects not only 
the variables but also the priori probabilities. As a result, the identified characteristics of 
targets sampled over a long period of time will not result in a consistent pattern and 
even those that are possible to detect will diffuse. Choosing a shorter time period to 
eliminate this disadvantage will result in a better recognition of these characteristics, 
this is again assuming that in this short period time, those different objectives of the 
bidders also converge due to, for example, the market induced conditions. However, it 
will be very difficult to use the model for future takeover predictions. Also one should 
not exclude the importance of the legislative environment on mergers and acquisitions 
(Bartley, 1990; Sudasamam 1995). 
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7.4 Further Research 
The approach followed in this study can be extended in vanous ways to further 
research. In the case of ANNs, one should experiment with different activation 
functions. Although the logistic sigmoid function is used in this study, other similar 
functions that were mentioned in chapter 3 could be used. Senet al., (1995) for example 
a applied hyperbolic tangent activation function. It could be argued that the similar 
classification result achieved by ANNs and LR is as a result of employing a logistic 
sigmoid function in this study. After all, the maximum likelihood method (MLM) in LR 
chooses that estimators of the set of unknown parameters, which maximises the 
likelihood of observing the data that has been collected (Kieinbaum 1994). MLM is an 
iterative process. Therefore, employing a standard back propagation algorithm (SBP) 
with a logistic sigmoid function in ANNs is a broadly similar process to LR and bound 
to produce similar results. 
The optimum brain damage (OBD) (Cun et al., 1990) or Skeletonization process (Alici, 
1996) can be used to extract important variables from the network through a continuous 
stepwise elimination. This approach will not only provide an optimum network structure 
but the training time through fewer training examples and an improved speed of 
learning (Cun et al., 1990; Mozer and Smolensky, 1989). These vatiables may however 
not be very different from the ones produced by the stepwise regression process applied 
in this study. Hybrid and complex networks can also be applied (Maren, 1990). 
ANNs are a sub-discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other related Als can be 
applied to takeover prediction studies. Genetic Algorithms can be used to fonnulate the 
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optimum network structure. Neuro-fuzzy nets for example extract the relationship from 
data set. The relationship from a given data is extracted by neural networks and the rules 
are set by fuzzy reasoning. Also the actual model created by the net can be analysed. 
This would enable the researcher to examine the model in detail. This allows for a 
greater understanding of how the model operates. 
Although the models formed in chapters four and five show that the two years prior to 
takeover data did not provide a significant insight into the differences between target 
and non-target companies, the models that were formed with variation data seemed to 
be more robust. Furthermore, the difficulties of making inferences about the dynamics 
of chance from cross-sectional analysis have already been reported by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) in the effect of board composition on firm performance and Hsiao 
( 1986) in economic research. Therefore, panel data analysis could be used. In this way, 
more complicated models can be constructed (Hsiao, 1986). 
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7.5 Summary 
The arguments presented above suggest that the takeovers, especially the reasons for 
companies to acquire specific targets manifest extremely complex behaviour that 
changes over time and cannot be modelled by applying ANNs and LR, at least with the 
variables used in this study, to predict future target companies for the purpose of 
gaining an excess return in the market. 
As quoted by Young, (1999), "in a recent Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 
round table meeting on competitive/competitor intelligence in the UK, some of the 
speakers said that artificial intelligence is just that, artificial. And there is no substitute 
for the human brain. One participant said that looking for anomalies is an art form: 
intuition is something that cannot be recreated by a computer. He also said that neural 
networks use past data (more emphasis should be on current data), and points to the 
disastrous effects that came about in the near-collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management as a prime example of too much reliance on computers"(p65). 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA FOR THE ESTIMATION OF CUT-OFF PROBABll.JTIES- FINANCIAL 
DATA 
A.l Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in the Mixed Data (MD). 
Table A. l.l . Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the MD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 I 1.92 6 11 .54 
0. 100-0.199 0. 15 2 3.85 9 17.3 1 
0.200-0.299 0.25 4 7.69 10 19.23 
0.300-0.399 0.35 2 3.85 11 2 1.1 5 
0.400-0.499 0.45 7 13.46 6 11 .54 
0.500-0.599 0.55 4 7.69 4 7.69 
0.600-0.699 0.65 5 9.62 2 3.85 
0.700-0.799 0.75 4 7.69 2 3.85 
0.800-0.899 0.85 9 17.3 1 2 3.85 
0.900-0.999 0.95 14 26.92 0 0.00 
Figure A.l . l . Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
Estimated Probabbillty Distributions 
30.00% ..-------------------...... 
25.00% 1--------~--~------- - -/----i 
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Probability 
224 
A.2 Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in the Industry Relative 
Data (IRD). 
Table A.2. 1. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the JRD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.100-0. 199 0.15 I 1.28 6 7.69 
0.200-0.299 0.25 2 2.56 11 14. 10 
0.300-0.399 0.35 10 12.82 12 15.38 
0.400-0.499 0.45 19 24.36 24 30.77 
0.500-0.599 0.55 16 20.5 1 14 17.95 
0.600-0.699 0.65 14 17.95 4 5.13 
0.700-0.799 0.75 7 8.97 6 7.69 
0.800-0.899 0.85 6 7.69 I 1.28 
0.900-0.999 0.95 3 3.85 0 0.00 
Figure A.2. 1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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A.3 Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in tbc Variation Data 
(VD). 
Table A.3 .1. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the VD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 4 5.13 
0. 100-0.199 0.15 0 0.00 8 10.26 
0.200-0.299 0.25 5 6.41 7 8.97 
0.300-0.399 0.35 5 6.41 15 19.23 
0.400-0.499 0.45 16 20.51 18 23.08 
0.500-0.599 0.55 20 25.64 14 17.95 
0.600-0.699 0.65 16 20.51 6 7.69 
0.700-0.799 0.75 8 10.26 4 5.13 
0.800-0.899 0.85 3 3.85 2 2.56 
0.900-0.999 0.95 5 6.41 0 0.00 
Figure A.3.1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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A.4 Probability dis tributions of targets and non-targets in the TD (-2). 
Table A.4.1. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TD( -2) 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Val ue No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 2 2.56 
0.100-0.199 0.15 0 0.00 4 5.13 
0.200-0.299 0.25 2 2.56 10 12.82 
0.300-0.399 0.35 4 5.13 13 16.67 
0.400-0.499 0.45 23 29.49 16 20.51 
0.500-0.599 0.55 24 30.77 17 21.79 
0.600-0.699 0 .65 20 25.64 12 15.38 
0.700-0.799 0.75 3 3.85 2 2.56 
0.800-0.899 0.85 2 2.56 2 2.56 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00 2 2.56 
Figure A.4.1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
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APPENDIXB 
DATA FOR THE ESTIMATION OF CUT-OFF PROBABILITIES 
NON-FINANCIAL DATA 
B.l Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in the Time Data (-1). 
Table B.l .l. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TD ( -1 ). 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 I 1.28 
0. 100-0. 199 0. 15 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.200-0.299 0.25 I 1.28 11 14. 10 
0.300-0.399 0.35 13 16.67 23 29.49 
0.400-0.499 0.45 18 23.08 15 19.23 
0.500-0.599 0.55 19 24.36 9 11.54 
0.600-0.699 0.65 12 15.38 11 14. 10 
0.700-0.799 0.75 15 19.23 8 10.26 
0.800-0.899 0.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Figure 8 .1.1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets. 
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B.2 Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in the Mixed Data (MD). 
Table 8 .2. 1. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the MD. 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 4 7.69 
0. 100-0. 199 0. 15 0 0.00 6 11 .54 
0.200-0.299 0.25 2 3.85 3 5.77 
0.300-0.399 0.35 4 7.69 9 17.3 1 
0.400-0.499 0.45 10 19.23 14 26.92 
0.500-0.599 0.55 15 28.85 8 15.38 
0.600-0.699 0.65 8 15.38 2 3.85 
0.700-0.799 0.75 5 9.62 3 5.77 
0.800-0.899 0.85 8 15.38 3 5.77 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Figure 8.2.1 . Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets. 
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B.3 Probability distributions of targets and non-targets in the Time Data (-2). 
Table 8 .3.1. Estimated distribution of targets and non-targets in the TO (-2). 
Target Non-Target 
Range Mid Value No % No % 
0.000-0.099 0.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.100-0. 199 0. 15 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.200-0.299 0.25 0 0.00 I 1.28 
0.300-0.399 0.35 4 5. 13 9 11 .54 
0.400-0.499 0.45 35 44.87 36 46.15 
0.500-0.599 0.55 27 34.62 28 35.90 
0.600-0.699 0 .65 12 15.38 4 5. 13 
0.700-0.799 0.75 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.800-0.899 0 .85 0 0.00 0 0.00 
0.900-0.999 0.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Figure 8.3 . 1. Distribution of acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets. 
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APPENDIXC 
CORRELATION MATRIXES- FINANCIAL DATA 
C.l Correlation Matrix - Mixed Data (MD). 
Obs _TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQD PROP FIX P/E MBV GRDUMMY 
1MEAN 0.~ 15.075 7.1 67.605 4.476 0.99E 0.381 12.557 12.02" 0.327 
' STD 0.50~ 41 .6 18.321 68.473 0.636 0.232 0.184 38.393 10.47 0.471 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
4CORR DV 1 -0.369 -0.32!: 0.19E a -0.21: 0.03~ -0.101 -0.24E -0.041 
5CORR RSHF -0.36S 1 0.36S -0 .06~ 0.31<1 0.056 0.016 0.01~ 0.20 0.011 
6CORR !rUT -0.32~ 0.369 1 0.01~ 0.159 -0.152 0.021 -0.102 -0.01 -0.044 
1CORR GEAR 0.19E -0.062 0.01!: 1 0.191 -0.326 o.o8e -0.195 -0.01 4 -0.052 
~ C_ORR LOG(SIZE) c 0.313 0.15!:: 0.191 1 0.028 0.42!:: 0.152 0.14!: -0.23!' 
9CORR LIQD -0.21 ~ 0.056 -0.152 -0.32€ 0.028 1 -0.081 -0.004 0.024 0.236 
10 CORR PROPFIX 0.03!: 0.016 0.021 0.08!: 0.429 -0.081 1 0.1 -0.0_€ -0.05:'l 
11 CORR PIE -0.101 0.01:< -0.10:< -0.19!: 0.15:< -0.004 0.1 1 0.30 -0.07 
1' CORR MBV -0.24_€ 0.20f -0.01 -0.014 0.145 0.024 -0.08 0.30' 1 0.06 
1 CORR ~RDUMMY -0.041 0.011 -0.044 -0.05 -0.235 0.236 -0.05~ -0.07 ~ 0.06 1 
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C.2 Correlation Matrix- Time Data (-1). 
Correlation Matrix- TD (-1) 
Obs TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQD PROPFIX p E MBV GRDUMMY 
1MEAN 0.5 14.295 5.58!: 67.947 4.418 1.00!: 0.371 9.567 11.29~ 0.314 
2STD 0.502 36.563 22.421 57.37 0.621 0.22S 0.165 33.668 9.991 0.466 
3N 156 156 15E 156 156 15E 15E 156 15€ 156 
4~0RR DV 1 -0.26~ -0.26r 0.159 -0.011 -0.172 0.074 -0.098 -0.148 0.014 
5~0RR RSHF -0.265 1 0 .50~ -0.04::! 0.236 0.121 -0.12" 0.15 0.27 0.04~ 
6CORR !fur -0.267 0 .50~ 1 -0.057 0.038 -0.04S -0.01 s -0.052 0. 10~ -0.139 
rtORR ~EAR 0.159 -0.043 -0.05t 1 0.139 -0.40S 0.111 -0.206 -0.151 -0.115 
~ CORR LOG(SIZE) -0.011 0.236 0.03€ 0.139 1 0.03S 0.22€ 0.149 0.205 -0.093 
9CORR LIQD -0.173 0.121 -0.04S -0.409 0.039 1 -0.18~ 0.11 0.091 0.227 
1C CORR PROPFIX 0.074 -0. 12~ -0.01 s 0.11 1 0.228 -0.18~ 1 0.165 -0.0::! -0.122 
11 CORR PIE -0.098 0.1~ -0.052 -0.206 0.149 0.11 0.16~ 1 0.277 -0.035 
1 ~ CORR MBV -0.148 0.27 0.10..: -0.151 0.20!i 0.09t -0.0 0.277 1 0.052 
13 CORR ~RDUMMY 0.014 0.042 -0.13S -0. 115 -0.09::! 0.22t -0.12~ -0.035 0.05~ 1 
C.3 Correlation Matrix- Industry Relative Data (IRD). 
Correlation Matrix - IRD 
Obs TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQD PROP FIX P/E MBV GRDUMMY 
1MEAN 0 .~ 0.619 0.17S 0.916 2.059 -2.03S 0.85 0.67 0.794 0.276 
.<~ STD 0.50~ 4.543 2.27€ 0.785 0.679 43.314 0.34 1.901 0.683 0.448 
~N 15E 156 15€ 156 156 15E 15E 156 156 156 
4CORR DV 1 -0.28 -0.20" 0.184 0.008 -0.09" 0.06 -0.17 -0.173 -0.014 
5CORR RSHF -0.2e 1 0.40t -0.06t 0.104 0.06 -0.03 0.281 0.343 -0.034 
6CORR TUT -0.20!: 0.407 1 -0.01 ~ 0.13_6 -0.12~ 0.037 0.087 0.24J -0.127 
7CORR GEAR 0.184 -0.067 -0.01!' 1 0.224 -0.08€ 0.15~ -0.08 -0.192 -0.002 
SCORR LOG(SIZE) O.OOE 0.104 0.13€ 0.224 1 -O.OE 0.24 0.02S 0.205 0.007 
9CORR LIQ -0.09!: 0.063 -0.12S -0.08E -0.06 1 0.19S -0.03!: 0.025 0.068 
10 CORR PROP FIX 0.06 -0.033 0 .031 0.15!: 0.24 0.19S 1 0.09S O.OOJ 0.0" 
11 CORR P/E -0.1 I 0.281 0.081 -0.08 0.029 -0.03!: 0.09S 1 0.106 -0.09€ 
1:.1 CORR MBV -0.17 0.343 0.24 -0.19 0.205 0.02: 0.00 0.10€ 1 0.04 
1~ CORR GRDUMMY -0.014 -0.034 -0.121 -0.00 0.007 0.068 0.0 -0.09€ 0.047 1 
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C.4 Correlation Matrix- Time Data (-2). 
Correlati on Matrix- TD(-2) 
Obs TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT 
-
GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQD PROPFIX P/E MBV GRDUMMY 
1MEAN 0.~ 21 .281 8.269 67.114 4.354 0.971 0.42€ 11 .96 12.04~ 0.321 
~STD o.5o~ 27.481 23.464 69.171 0.667 0.186 0.641 18.81E 11.48~ 0.468 
N 15E 156 156 156 156 156 15E 15E 156 156 
4g_ORR DV 1 -0.111 -0.045 0.029 0.076 -0.143 -O.OOE 0.10~ -0.087 -0.055 
~CORR RSHF -0.117 1 0.371 0.138 0.09~ -0.008 -0.18~ -0.09€ 0.227 -0.005 
Ef'ORR ~UT -0.045 0.371 1 0.087 -0.064 -0.191 -0.16 -0.04" 0.125 -0.035 
1CORR [GEAR 0.029 0.138 0.087 1 0.22'i -0.32 0.09~ -0.004 -0.027 0.02 
SCORR IL..OG(SIZE) 0.076 0.09~ -0.064 0.225 1 0.0~ 0.22€ -0.16 0.113 -0.114 
SCORR 1LIOD -0.143 -0.008 -0.191 -0.32 0.02 1 -0.074 0.04 0.036 0.09J 
1C CORR PROP FIX -0.008 -0.18'i -0.167 0.092 0.226 -0.074 1 0.001 -0.086 0.096 
11 CORR P/E 0.109 -0.096 -0.04 -0.004 -0.16~ 0.047 0.001 1 0.151 0.04~ 
1~ CORR MBV -0.087 0.221 0.125 -0.027 0.113 0.03€ -0.086 0.151 1 0.08? 
1 CORR [GRDUMMY -0.055 -O.OO!i -0.03~ 0.02 -0.114 0.09 0.096 0.042 0.082 1 
C.S Correlation Matrix - Variation Data (VD). 
Correlation Matrix - VD 
Obs TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQD PROP FIX P/E MBV GRDUMMY 
1MEAN 0.5 -1 .289 5 .58~ 0.773 0.467 0.071 0.00~ -0.41;< 0.168 -0.006 
~ STD 0.502 10 . 1~;! 22.421 4.301 5.74J 0.541 0.2J 3.716 1.03€ 0.551 
N 156 156 15€ 156 156 15€ 156 156 15€ 15€ 
4CORR DV 1 -0.125 -0.261 0.21 -0.278 -0 .07E 0.126 -0.168 -0.08? 0.058 
5CORR RSHF -0.125 1 0.298 -0.08 0.15::1 -0.02€ -0.022 0.10'i 0.17;< -0.049 
ECORR ~UT -0.267 0.298 1 -0.03 0.364 -0 .09 -0.09~ 0.054 0.11~ -0.207 
1CORR [GEAR 0.21 -0.08 -0.0 1 -0.15 -0.37€ 0.1 11 -0.10§ -0.155 0.01 
SCORR LOG(SIZE) -0.278 0.153 0.364 -0.15 1 0.40 -0.136 0.254 0.15 -0.141 
5CORR LIQD -0.078 -0.026 -0 .09~ -0.376 0.401 1 -0.238 0.115 0.021 0.048 
10 CORR PROPFIX 0.126 -0 .02? -0.09~ 0.111 -0.136 -0.23E 1 0 -0.043 0.05€ 
11 CORR P/E -0.168 0.10" 0.054 -0.106 0.254 0.11~ 0 1 0.411 -0.024 
12 CORR MBV -0.08~ 0. 17~ 0.11 -0.155 0.15 0.021 -0.043 0.411 1 -0. 16~ 
13CORR iGRDUMMY 0.058 -0.04§ -0.201 0.01 -0.14/ 0.04E 0.056 -0.024 -0.16? 1 
233 
CORRELATION MATRIXES- NON-FINANCIAL DATA 
C.6 Correlation Matrix - Mixed Data (MD). 
Correlation Matrix - MD 
Obs TYPE NAME DV SepChair NEXOutDir NEX XOutDir DirShHo BigShHo 
1~EAN 0.5 0.644 4.558 2.827 1 .45~ 12.351 28.979 
2STD 0.502 0.481 5.057 1.903 2.75!: 15.396 20.051 
3N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
4~0RR DV 1 -0.261 -0.048 -0.061 -0.12E -0.133 0.043 
5~0RR SepChair -0.261 1 0.123 0.139 0.13€ -0.035 0.028 
6~0RR NEXOutDir -0.048 0.123 1 0.659 0.1 -0.46:l 0.1 0!i 
7~0RR NEX -0.061 0.139 0.659 1 0.18€ -0.402 0.068 
8CORR XOutDir -0.126 0.138 0.13 0.188 1 -0.19 -0.112 
9CORR DirShHo -0.133 -0.035 -0.463 -0.402 -0.1S 1 -0.277 
10 CORR BigShHo 0.043 0.028 0.105 0.068 -0.11 ~ -0.277 1 
C.7 Correlation Matrix -Time Data (-1)-
Correlation Matrix- TD(-1) 
Obs TYPE NAME DV SepChair NEXOutDir NEX XOutDir DirShHo BigShHo 
1MEAN O.'i 0.601 3.744 2.'i 1.397 13.135 27.047 
:.!STD 0.502 0.491 4.854 1.732 2.333 16.196 19.021 
3N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
4CORR DV 1 -0.236 -0.083 -0.08" 0.034 -0.021 0.157 
!iCORR SepChair -0.236 1 0.205 0.249 0.061 0.01 -0.005 
6CORR NEXOutDir -0. 08"'~ 0.20" 1 0.666 0.117 -0.344 0.005 
rCORR NEX -0.08~ 0.249 0.666 1 0.148 -0.373 -0.03 
8CORR XOutDir 0.034 0.061 0.1 17 0.148 1 -0.1 -0.156 
9CORR DirShHo -0.021 0.01 -0.344 -0 . 37"'~ -0.1 1 -0.232 
10 CORR BigShHo 0.15r -0.005 0.00" -0 .0"'~ -0.1 56 -0.232 1 
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C. 7 Correlation Matrix -Time Data ( -2). 
Correlation Matrix - TD(-2) 
Obs TYPE NAME DV Se pC hair NEXOutoir NEX XOutDir DirShHo BigShHo 
1MEAN o.• 0.628 4.08 2.603 1.538 15.33€ 22.82!: 
~ sro o.so:; 0.48!i 4 .97t 2.on 2.307 17.67S 1s.oo• 
N 15€ 15€ 15E 15€ 156 15€ 15€ 
~ CORR DV 1 -0.1 OE 0 .01~ -0.03 0.002 o.oos 0.05~ 
~ CORR lsepChair -0.1 OE 1 0.114 0.24> 0. 12~ -0.152 0.091 
E ~ORR iNEXOutDir 0.01 0.114 1 0 .72~ 0.10 -0.512 0.02: 
7CORR iN EX -0.03 0.242 0.72~ 1 0.1< -0.521 0.1 
~ ~ORR lxoutDir 0.00 0.122 0.10/ 0.1 1 -0.05€ -0.01€ 
~ ~ORR pirShHo o.oos 
-0.15" -0.51~ -0.521 -0.05€ 1 -0.174 
1C CORR BigShHo 0.05 0.091 0.02!: 0.1 -O.OH -0.174 1 
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CORRELATION MATRIXES- COMBINED (FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL) DATA 
C.8 Correlation Matrix- Total Mixed Data (TMD). 
Correlation Matrix - TMD 
TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG(SIZE) LIQO PROPFJX P/E MBV GROUMMY SepChair NEXOutOir NEX XOutDir OirShHo BigShHo 
MEAN 0.5 15.075 7.12 67.605 4.476 0.996 0.381 12.557 12.023 0.327 0.644 4.558 2.827 1.452 12.351 26.979 
STD 0.502 41 .6 18.327 68.473 0.636 0.232 0.184 36.393 10.477 0.471 0.481 5.057 1.903 2.755 15.396 20.051 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
CORR DV 1 -D.369 -D.325 0.198 0 -D.215 0.035 -D.101 -D.246 -D.041 -D.261 -D.048 -D.061 -D.126 -D.133 0.043 
CORR RSHF -D.369 1 0.369 -D.062 0.313 0.056 0.016 0.012 0.207 0.011 0.045 0.095 0.1 0.012 -D.18 -D.108 
CORR TUT -{) 325 0.369 1 0.015 0.159 -D.152 0.021 -D.102 -D.01 -D.044 0064 0.039 0.046 0.112 -D.037 -D.098 
CORR GEAR 0.198 -D.062 0.015 1 0.191 -D.326 0.085 -D.195 -D.014 -D.052 -D.065 0.054 0.093 0 168 .Q.116 -D.133 
CORR LOG(SIZE) 0 0.313 0.159 0.191 1 0.028 0.429 0.152 0.145 -D.235 0.044 0.421 0.387 0.144 -D.628 -D.004 
CORR LIQD -D.215 0.056 -D.152 -D.326 0.028 1 -D.081 -D.004 0.024 0.236 0.07 0.115 0.046 -D.112 0.081 0.071 
CORR PROPFIX 0.035 0.016 0.021 0.065 0.429 -D.081 1 0.1 -D.08 -D.053 -D.16 0.182 0.177 0.07 -D.238 0.098 
CORR P/E .Q.101 0.012 -D.102 -D.195 0.152 -D.004 0.1 1 0.303 -D.073 0.233 0.038 .Q.03 -D.005 -D.158 0.126 
CORR MBV -D.246 0.207 -D.01 -D.014 0.145 0.024 -D.08 0.303 1 0.06 0.23 0.013 0.079 0.102 -D.088 0.005 
CORR GRDUMMY -D.041 0.011 -D.044 -D.052 -D.235 0.236 -D.053 -D.073 0.06 1 -D.124 -D.179 -D. 151 -D.157 0.266 -D.044 
CORR SepChalr -0.261 0.045 0.064 -D.065 0.044 0.07 -D.16 0.233 0.23 -D.124 1 0.123 0.139 0.138 -D.035 0.028 
CORR NEXOutDir -D.048 0.095 0.039 0.054 0.421 0.115 0.182 0.038 0.013 -D.179 0.123 1 0.659 0.13 -{).463 0.105 
CORR NEX -D.061 0.1 0.046 0.093 0.367 0.046 0.177 -D.03 0.079 -D.151 0.139 0.659 1 0.168 -D.402 0.068 
CORR XOutDir -D.126 0.012 0.112 0.188 0.144 -D.112 0.07 -D.005 0.102 -0.157 0.138 0.13 0.188 1 -D.19 -D.112 
CORR DirShHo -D.133 .Q.18 -D.037 -D.116 -D.628 0.081 -0.238 -D.158 -D.088 0.266 .Q.035 -{).463 -D.402 -D.19 1 -D.277 
CORR BigShHo 0.043 -D.108 -D.098 -D.133 -D.004 0.071 0.098 0.126 0.005 -D.044 0.028 0.105 0.068 -D.112 -D.277 1 
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C.9 Correlation Matrix- Total Time Data {TTD). 
Correlation Matrix - TTD 
TYPE NAME DV RSHF TUT GEAR LOG( SIZE) LIQD PROP FIX P/E MBV GRDUMMY SepChair NEXOutDir NEX XOutDir DlrShHo BlgShHo 
MEAN 0.5 14.295 5.585 67.947 4.418 1.005 0.371 9.567 11 .299 0.314 0.603 3.744 2.5 1.397 13.135 27.047 
STD 0.502 36.563 22.421 57.37 0.621 0 .229 0.165 33.668 9.997 0.466 0.491 4.854 1.732 2.333 16.196 19.021 
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
CORR DV 1 -0.265 -0.267 0.159 -0.011 -0.173 0.074 -0.098 -0.148 0.014 -0.236 -0.083 -0.082 0.034 -0.021 0.157 
CORR RSHF -0.265 1 0.502 -0.043 0 .236 0 .121 -0.125 0.15 0.27 0.042 0.094 0.145 0.146 -0.017 -0.031 -0.098 
CORR TUT -0.267 0.502 1 -0.057 0 .038 -0.049 -0.019 -0.052 0.102 -0.139 0.107 0 .06 0.072 0.035 0 .045 -0.078 
CORR GEAR 0.159 -0.043 -0.057 1 0.139 -0.409 0.111 -0.206 -0.151 -0.115 -0.088 0.1 0.092 0.129 -0.214 -0.004 
CORR LOG(SIZE) -0.011 0.236 0.038 0.139 1 0.039 0.228 0.149 0.205 -0.093 0.042 0.376 0.381 0.155 -0.447 -0.169 
CORR LIQD -0.173 0.121 -0.049 -0.409 0.039 1 -0.185 0.11 0.097 0 .227 0.037 -0.058 -0.106 0.02 0.06 -0.071 
CORR PROP FIX 0 .074 -0.125 -0.019 0.111 0 .228 -0.185 1 0.165 -0.03 -0.122 -0.089 0.197 0.158 -0.001 -0.098 -0.025 
CORR PiE -0.098 0.15 -0.052 -0.206 0 .149 0.11 0.165 1 0.277 -0.035 0.168 0.1 0.118 -0.009 -0.047 -0.01 
CORR MBV -0.148 0.27 0.102 -0.151 0 .205 0.097 -0.03 0.277 1 0.052 0.023 0.008 0.019 0.03 -0.075 -0.032 
CORR GRDUMMY 0 .014 0.042 -0.139 -0.115 -0.093 0.227 -0.122 -0.035 0.052 1 -0.071 -0.139 -0.143 -0.189 0.12 -0.026 
CORR SepChair -0.236 0.094 0.107 -0.088 0 .042 0 .037 -0.089 0.168 0.023 -0.071 1 0 .205 0.249 0.061 0.01 -0.005 
CORR NEXOutDir -0.083 0.145 0.06 0.1 0 .376 -0.058 0.197 0.1 0.008 -0.139 0.205 1 0.666 0.117 -0.344 0.005 
CORR NEX -0.082 0.146 0.072 0.092 0 .381 -0.106 0.158 0.118 0.019 -0.143 0.249 0.666 1 0.148 -0.373 -0.03 
CORR XOutDir 0 .034 -0.017 0.035 0.129 0.155 0.02 -0.001 -0.009 0.03 -0.189 0.061 0 .1 17 0.148 1 -0.1 -0.156 
CORR DirShHo -0.021 -0.031 0.045 -0.21 4 -0.447 0.06 -0.098 -0.047 -0.075 0.12 0 .01 -0.344 -0.373 -0.1 1 -0.232 
CORR BigShHo 0 .157 -0.098 -0.078 -0.004 -0.169 -0.071 -0.025 -0.01 -0.032 -0.026 -0.005 0.005 -0.03 -0.156 -0.232 1 
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APPENDIXD 
LIST OF COMPANIES AND THEIR STATUS 
NAME STATUS SIC CODE YEAR 
(FAME) ACQ. 
BENJAMIN PRIEST Target 3I69 I990 
MOLINS PLC Target 3286 I990 
EPICURE IND PLC Target 3289 I990 
RACAL ELEC PLC Target 3433 I990 
ALUMASC GROUP PLC Target 4270 I990 
STRONG & FISHER PLC Target 4410 1990 
HOBSON PUBLISH. PLC Target 4754 1990 
CRYSTALATE HOLD. PLC Target 4836 1990 
BIRMINGHAM MINT PLC Target 4910 1990 
UNILOCKPLC Target 3284 1990 
DAVIES & METCALFE PLC Target 3289 I990 
AMS INDUSTRIES PLC Target 3454 1990 
STC PLC Target 3441 1990 
AQUASCUTUM GROUP PLC Target 4532 1990 
SKETCHLEY PLC Target 4534 1990 
AARONSON BROSS PLC Target 4620 1990 
EDBRO PLC Target 3283 1991 
HAWKER SIDDELEY PLC Target 3420 1991 
FLEXELLO CASTORS PLC Target 3530 1991 
JOHN J. LEES PLC Target 4214 1991 
TOOTAL GROUP PLC Target 4321 1991 
OAKS SIMPSON PLC Target 4532 1991 
RITZ DESIGN GROUP PLC Target 4533 1991 
TACE PLC Target 3284 1991 
STEETLEY PLC Target 3441 1991 
BARDON GROUP PLC Target 2310 1991 
CARBO PLC Target 2460 1991 
ROCKW ARE GROUP PLC Target 2470 1991 
KINGSGRANGE PLC Target 2581 1991 
THURGAR BARD EX PLC Target 3142 1991 
YALE AND VALOR PLC Target 3165 1991 
DA VY CORPORATION PLC Target 3240 1991 
HERRBURGER BROOKS PLC Target 4920 1991 
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GORING KERR PLC Target 3443 1991 
MANDERS HOLD. PLC Target 2551 1992 
MACARTHY PLC Target 2570 1992 
JAMES WILKES PLC Target 3276 1992 
PENNY & GILES INT'L PLC Target 3442 1992 
THOMAS ROBINSON PLC Target 4160 1992 
MORLAND & CO PLC Target 4283 1992 
STAG FURNITURE GROUP PLC Target 4671 1992 
TAVENERS PLC Target 4214 1992 
USHER-WALKER PLC Target 2552 1992 
CONTINUOUS STATIONARY PLC Target 4723 1992 
CRONITE GROUP PLC Target 3110 1992 
WORCESTER GROUP PLC Target 3165 1992 
BRITISH BUILDING ENG. APP. PLC Target 3289 1992 
AMSTRAD PLC Target 3454 1992 
RANKS HOVIS MCDOUGALL PLC Target 4160 1992 
ARTHUR LEE & SONS PLC Target 2210 1993 
MULTITONE ELEC. PLC Target 3441 1993 
HUNTER SAPHIR PLC Target 4122 1993 
HOUSE OF LEROSE PLC Target 4533 1993 
NU-SWIFT PLC Target 2567 1993 
GOODHEAD GROUP PLC Target 4751 1993 
CLIFFORD FOODS PLC Target 4130 1993 
HARRISON IND PLC Target 3140 1993 
FERRANTIINT'L PLC Target 3204 1993 
EVODE GROUP PLC Target 2562 1993 
WHEW AY PLC Target 3251 1993 
INVERGORDON DISTILLERS PLC Target 3244 1993 
BRITISH SYPHON IND PLC Target 4710 1993 
A TTWOODS PLC Target 2310 1994 
LINREAD PLC Target 3169 1994 
MOL YNX HOLDINGS PLC Target 3222 1994 
SCHOLES GROUP PLC Target 3444 1994 
DALE ELEC INT'L PLC Target 3454 1994 
WESTLAND GROUP PLC Target 3640 1994 
TOWLES PLC Target 4363 1994 
MAGELLAN IND. PLC Target 4532 1994 
LEC REFRIGERATION PLC Target 3284 1994 
KEMBREY PLC Target 3435 1994 
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CONTROL TECHNIQUES PLC Target 3454 1994 
ELSWICK PLC Target 3634 1994 
VIVAT HOLDING PLC Target 4534 1994 
NMC GROUP PLC Target 4710 1994 
J.W. SPEAR & SONS PLC Target 4941 1994 
DAVENPORT V ERN ON PLC Target 4959 1994 
C I GROUP PLC Target 2235 1995 
ALFRED MCALPINE PLC Target 2396 1995 
DOBSON PARK INDUSTRIES PLC Target 2437 1995 
VICTAULIC PLC Target 2515 1995 
KALON GROUP PLC Target 2551 1995 
FISONS PLC Target 2570 1995 
WELCOME PLC Target 2570 1995 
SCANTRONIC HOLDINGS PLC Target 3302 1995 
FAIRLINE BOATS PLC Target 3610 1995 
VSEL PLC Target 3610 1995 
DALEPAK FOODS PLC Target 4122 1995 
ATKINS GROUP Target 4363 1995 
CASKET PLC Target 4557 1995 
FINE DECOR PLC Target 4721 1995 
MAGNOLIA GROUP PLC Target 4728 1995 
HARTONS GROUP PLC Target 2514 1996 
AUTOMATED SECURITY (HOLDINGS) PLC Target 3433 1996 
UNITECH PLC Target 3442 1996 
ERF (HOLDINGS) PLC Target 3510 1996 
NEOTRONICS TCHNOLOGY PLC Target 3710 1996 
EVEREST FOODS PLC Target 4122 1996 
MACALLAN-GLENLIVET PLC Target 4240 1996 
THE TELEGRAPH PLC Target 4751 1996 
FERRY PICKERING GROUP PLC Target 4752 1996 
ASPREY PLC. Target 4910 1996 
600 GROUP PLC Matched 3222 
-
A F BULGIN & CO PLC Matched 3444 
-
A. B. ELEC GROUP PLC Matched 3454 
-
A.G. BARR PLC Matched 4283 
-
ABBEY PANELS INV PLC Matched 4910 
-
ABBEYCREST PLC Matched 4910 
-
ADWEST GROUP PLC Matched 3640 -
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING PLC Matched 3640 -
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AIM GROUP PLC Matched 3640 
-
AIRSPRUNG FURNITURE GROUP PLC Matched 4671 -
ALEXANDER RUSSELL PLC Matched 2310 
-
ALLIED-LYONS PLC Matched 4270 -
AMBER DAY HOLD PLC Matched 4533 -
APV PLC Matched 3205 -
ARMOUR TRUST PLC Matched 3454 -
ASH & LACY PLC Matched 2210 -
ASTEC PLC Matched 3302 
-
ASW HOLDINGS PLC Matched 2210 -
AUSTIN REED GROUP PLC Matched 4532 -
AVON RUBBER PLC Matched 4836 -
BARRY WEHMILLER INT'L PLC Matched 3244 -
BASS PLC Matched 4270 
-
BBA GROUP PLC Matched 3255 
-
BEALES HUNTER PLC Matched 4533 
-
BEMROSE CORPORATION PLC Matched 4754 -
BENSON GROUP PLC Matched 3281 
-
BENSONS CRISPS PLC Matched 3164 -
BLAGDEN INDUSTRIES PLC Matched 3164 -
BLICK PLC Matched 3441 -
BODYCOTE INT'L PLC Matched 3169 -
BOSTROM PLC Matched 3530 -
BPB INDUSTRIES PLC Matched 4710 -
BRAITHWAITE PLC Matched 3284 -
BREEDON PLC Matched 2310 -
BRIDGEND GROUP PLC Matched 3169 -
BRISTOL EVENING POST PLC Matched 4751 -
BRITISH POLYTHENE !ND PLC Matched 4836 
-
BRITISH STEEL PLC Matched 2210 -
BULLOUGH PLC Matched 4672 -
BURNDENE INVESTMENTS PLC Matched 3523 -
BURTONWOOD BREWERY PLC Matched 4270 -
CAD BURY SCHWEPPES PLC Matched 4214 -
CALDERBURN PLC Matched 4671 -
CASTINGS PLC Matched 3111 -
CATHA Y INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS Matched 4671 -
PLC 
CHAMBERLIN AND HILL PLC Matched 3111 -
CONRAD CONTINENTAL PLC Matched 4533 -
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CORNWELL PARKER PLC Matched 4671 
-
COSALTPLC Matched 3523 -
CRADLEY GROUP PLC Matched 4754 -
CRAIG & ROSE PLC Matched 2551 
-
CRA Y ELEC. HOLD PLC Matched 3454 
-
CRESTON LAND & EST PLC Matched 3142 -
CRITCHLEY GROUP PLC Matched 4836 -
DAVID S. SMITH (HOLDINGS) PLC Matched 4640 
-
DE LA RUE PLC Matched 3276 -
DEWHJRST GROUP PLC Matched 4533 
-
DEWHURST PLC Matched 3442 -
DFS FURNITURE COMPANY PLC Matched 4671 
-
DOLPHIN PACKAGING PLC Matched 4836 -
DRS DATA AND RESEARCH SERV PLC Matched 3302 
-
ELBIEF PLC Matched 4650 
-
EMAPPLC Matched 4751 -
EPWIN GROUP PLC Matched 4834 -
EUROCOPY PLC Matched 3441 
-
EXCALIBUR GROUP PLC Matched 4910 
-
FAREPAK PLC Matched 4122 -
FARNELL ELEC. PLC Matched 3454 -
FENNER PLC Matched 3261 
-
FIFE INDMAR PLC Matched 3120 
-
FIRST TECHNOLOGY PLC Matched 3433 
-
FKIPLC Matched 3420 
-
FOLKES GROUP PLC Matched 4671 
-
FORMINSTER PLC Matched 4533 
-
FREDERICK COOPER PLC Matched 3169 
-
G.R. HOLDINGS PLC Matched 4410 
-
GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC Matched 3169 -
GARTON ENG PLC Matched 3120 
-
GEl INT'L PLC Matched 3222 -
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PLC Matched 3444 
-
GOODWIN PLC Matched 2481 -
GREENE KING PLC Matched 4270 -
HADEN MACLELLAN PLC Matched 3230 -
HAMPSON JNDS. PLC Matched 2245 -
HAVELOCK EUROPA PLC Matched 4672 -
HAZLEWOOD FOODS PLS Matched 4122 -
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HEADWAY PLC Matched 4671 
-
HELENE PLC Matched 4532 -
HENL YS GROUP PLC Matched 3510 
-
HEWITT GROUP PLC Matched 2489 -
HICKING PENTECOST PLC Matched 4363 -
HILL & SMITH HOLD PLC Matched 3120 -
HOME COUNTIES NEWSPAPERS HOLD Matched 4751 -
PLC 
HORACE SMALL APPAREL PLC Matched 4532 -
HUNTING PLC Matched 2551 
-
JACQUES VERT PLC Matched 4533 
-
JAMES CROPPER PLC Matched 4710 -
JOHNSTON GROUP PLC Matched 3283 -
JOHNSTON PRESS PLC Matched 4751 
-
KALAMAZOO COMPUTER GROUP PLC Matched 3302 -
LAIRD GROUP PLC Matched 3138 -
LAURA ASH LEY HOLD PLC Matched 4533 
-
LESLIE WISE GROUP PLC Matched 4533 
-
LINCATGRPLC Matched 3165 -
LINX PRINTING TECH PLC Matched 3302 -
L!ONHEART PLC Matched 3161 -
LONDON INT'L GROUP PLC Matched 2570 -
LOUIS NEWMARK PLC Matched 3442 
-
LUCAS IND PLC Matched 3530 
-
MARSHALLS PLC Matched 3283 
-
MS INT'L PLC Matched 3111 -
MTM PLC Matched 2567 -
NEEPSEND PLC Matched 3222 -
NOBO GROUP PLC Matched 3166 -
NORMAN HAY PLC Matched 3138 
-
NORTHERN FOODS PLC Matched 4130 
-
OCEONICS GROUP PLC Matched 3441 -
PATERSON PLC Matched 2570 -
PEX PLC Matched 4363 -
PITTARDS PLC Matched 4410 
-
PLA TIGNUMN PLC Matched 4954 
-
PLYSU PLC Matched 4835 -
POL YPIPE PLC Matched 4834 
-
PRESSAC HOLDINGS PLC Matched 3444 
-
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RADAMEC GROUP PLC Matched 3302 
-
RADIANT METAL FINISHING PLC Matched 3138 -
RADSTONE TECH PLC Matched 3302 
-
RAP GROUP PLC Matched 4812 
-
REAL TIME CONTROL PLC Matched 3302 
-
RECORD HOLDINGS PLC Matched 3161 
-
REL YON GROUP PLC Matched 4671 
-
RICHARDS PLC Matched 4532 
-
RMPLC Matched 3302 -
ROBERT H LOWE PLC Matched 4532 -
RPC GROUP PLC Matched 4836 -
SECURITY SERVICES PLC Matched 3169 -
SHILOH PLC Matched 2570 -
SIDNEY C BANKS PLC Matched 4160 -
SILENTNIGHT HOLDINGS PLC Matched 4671 -
SIMON ENG PLC Matched 4160 -
SMITHS INDUSTRIES PLC Matched 3286 
-
SOMIC PLC Matched 2600 
-
SPRING RAM CORP PLC Matched 2489 -
ST IVES PLC Matched 3276 -
STAVELEY IND PLC Matched 3111 
-
STERLING INDUSTRIES PLC Matched 3222 
-
SYMONDS ENGINEERING PLC Matched 3169 -
T & N PLC Matched 2220 -
T CLARKE PLC Matched 3420 -
TADPOLE TECH PLC Matched 3302 -
TELEMETRIX PLC Matched 3302 
-
THE GREENALLS GROUP PLC Matched 4270 -
THE MA YFLOWER CORP PLC Matched 3510 -
THE SAGE GROUP PLC Matched 3302 -
THOMAS WALKER PLC Matched 3169 -
THORNTONS PLC Matched 4214 -
TOMKINS PLC Matched 3453 
-
TOYE & COMPANY PLC Matched 3740 
-
TRAFFICMASTER PLC Matched 3302 
-
TRANSTEC PLC Matched 3169 
-
TRINITY HOLDINGS PLC Matched 4811 -
TRIPLEX LLOYD PLC Matched 3111 -
TUN STALL GROUP PLC Matched 3433 -
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TURNPYKE GROUP PLC Matched 3137 
-
UNIGATE PLC Matched 4122 -
UNITED BISCUITS HOLD PLC Matched 4122 
-
UNITED INDUSTRIES PLC Matched 3222 -
VICKERS PLC Matched 3276 -
VOLEX GROUP PLC Matched 3442 -
WAGON INDUSTRIAL HOLD PLC Matched 3246 
-
WALKER & STAFF HOLD PLC Matched 3283 
-
WARDLESTOREYSPLC Matched 4812 -
WATMOUGHS PLC-M Matched 4752 
-
WESCOL GROUP PLC Matched 3142 -
WIDNEY PLC Matched 3444 
-
WILLIAM BAIRD PLC Matched 4532 -
WILLIAM RANSOM & SON PLC Matched 2570 -
WOLSELEY PLC Matched 4834 -
WORTHINGTON GROUP PLC Matched 4321 -
YORKSHIRE CHEMICALS PLC Matched 2516 -
YULE CA TTO & CO PLC Matched 2567 -
ALBRIGHTON PLC Matched 2310 -
BRIDGEND Matched 3169 
BROWN (DAVID) GROUP PLC Matched 3222 -
BOWTHORPE PLC Matched 3444 -
M.L. HOLDING PLC Matched 3454 -
AEROSPACE ENG. PLC Matched 3640 
DAVENPORT KNITWEAR PLC Matched 4363 -
GENT (S.R.) PLC Matched 4533 -
BURN FIELD PLC Matched 3284 -
FORWARDTECH.IND. PLC Matched -3435 
VCI PLC Matched -3452 
CREST PACKAGING PLC Matched -4725 
ALEXANDRA WORKWEAR PLC Matched 4534 -
BUNZL PLC Matched -4710 
BLUEBIRD TOYS PLC Matched 4941 -
BERISFORD INT. PLC Matched -4239 
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APPENDIXE 
DESCRIPTION AND THE SOURCE OF THE VARIABLES USED 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Return on Profit before tax I shareholders funds FAME 
Shareholders' Fund 
(RSHF) 
Turnover Trend Turnover (tO)- Turnover (t-1) I Turnover FAME 
(TUT) (t-1) 
Gearing (Gear) (Long term liabilities+ Bank overdrafts) I FAME 
(share capital+ reserves) 
Liquidity (Current Assets- Stocks I Current FAME 
Liabilities) 
Log(Size) Log((Fixed Assets+ Current Assets)- FAME 
Current Liabilities) 
Proportional Fixed Fixed Assets I (Fixed Assets + Current FAME 
Assets (Propfix) Assets) 
Price Earning Ratio Share Price I Earnings FT/FAME 
(P/E) Data stream 
Market to Book Market Value I Book Value FT/FAME 
Value(MBV) Datastrearn 
SepChair Whether the position of chairman and chief P.W.C.R. 
executive are separated A.R. 
NEX: The proportion of outside directors on the P.W.C.R. 
board A.R. 
NEXOutDir The weighted average of outside P.W.C.R. 
directorships held by the non-executive A.R. 
directors 
XOutDir The weighted average of outside P.W.C.R. 
directorships held by the executive directors A.R. 
DirShHo Percentage of the companies' ordinary P.W.C.R. 
shares held by the executive directors A.R. 
BigShHo Outside shareholding of major shareholders P.W.C.R. 
A.R. 
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APPENDIX F 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
Time Data (-1) - Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
FIN. TD_DER I 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered Total 
Value DV Frequency 
1 78 
2 0 78 
Probability modeled is DV='1 •. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-fit Statistics 
Criterion Df Value Value /OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pears on 
146 
146 
186.7436 
156.4718 
1.2791 
1 .0717 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 206.744 
se 221 .312 237.242 
·2 Log L 216.262 186.744 
A-Square 0.1724 Max-rescaled A-Square 
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0.0128 
0.2619 
0.2299 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 29.5184 9 0.0005 
Score 26.1999 9 0.0019 
Wald 20.9463 9 0.0129 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 2.8456 1.6400 3.0107 0.0827 
RSHF -0.00968 0.00764 1.6074 0.2049 
TUT -0.0254 0.0107 5.7052 0.0169 
GEAR 0.00260 0.00364 0.5118 0.4744 
LOG(SIZE) -0.0781 0.3129 0.0623 0.8030 
LIOD -2.2717 0.9749 5.4298 0.0198 
PROPFIX 0.3577 1- 1582 0.0954 0.7574 
P/E -0.00826 0.00634 1 .6984 0.1925 
MBV -0.0188 0.0188 0.9941 0.3187 
GRDUMMY 0.1549 0.3974 0.1520 0.6966 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95"' Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.990 0.976 1.005 
TUT 0.975 0.955 0.995 
GEAR 1.003 0.995 1 .010 
LOG(SIZE) 0.925 0.501 1.708 
LIOD 0.103 0.015 0.697 
PROP FIX 1.430 0.148 13.843 
P/E 0.992 0.980 1.004 
MBV 0.981 0.946 1-018 
GRDUMMY 1.168 0.536 2.544 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
73.9 
25.8 
0.3 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95"' Confidence 
Intercept 2.8456 -0.3080 
RSHF -0.00968 -0.0277 
TUT -0.0254 -0.0479 
GEAR 0.00260 -0.00448 
LOG( SIZE) -0.0781 -0.6960 
LIOD -2.2717 -4.3181 
PROP FIX 0.3577 -1.9323 
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0.482 
0.483 
0.242 
0.741 
Limits 
6.1619 
0.00269 
-0.00620 
0.00991 
0.5395 
-0.4573 
2.6401 
P/E 
MBV 
GRDUMMY 
-0.00826 
-0.0188 
0.1549 
-0.0240 
-0.0567 
-0.6247 
0.00275 
0.0180 
0.9407 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.990 0.973 1.003 
TUT 1.0000 0.975 0.953 0.994 
GEAR 1.0000 1.003 0.996 1 .010 
LOG{SIZE) 1.0000 0.925 0.499 1. 715 
uao 1. 0000 0.103 0.013 0.633 
PROPFIX 1 .0000 1 .430 0.145 14.015 
P/E 1 .0000 0.992 0.976 1.003 
MBV 1.0000 0.981 0.945 1.018 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 1.168 0.535 2.562 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.990 0.976 1.005 
TUT 1 .0000 0.975 0.955 0.995 
GEAR 1.0000 1.003 0.995 1 .010 
LOG{ SIZE) 1.0000 0.925 0.501 1.708 
LIOD 1 .0000 0.103 0.015 0.697 
PROPFIX 1.0000 1.430 0.148 13.843 
PiE 1.0000 0.992 0.980 1.004 
MBV 1.0000 0.981 0.946 1. 018 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 1 . 168 0.536 2.544 
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Time Data (-2) - Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
FJN.TD_DER2 
DV 
2 
156 
binary legit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered Total 
Value DV Frequency 
1 1 78 
2 0 78 
Probability mode led is DV=' 1' . 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness·of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pears on 
146 
146 
200.5604 
155.2478 
1.3737 
1.0633 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Jnte rcept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 220.560 
se 221.312 251.059 
-2 Log L 216.262 200.560 
A-Square 0.0958 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.0019 
0.2847 
0.1277 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
15.7016 
13.7972 
11.9773 
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9 
9 
9 
0.0734 
0.1297 
0.2146 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 2.3468 1 .7482 1 .8020 0.1795 
RSHF -0.0104 0.00781 1. 7647 0.1840 
TUT -0.00752 0.00907 0.6877 0.4070 
GEAR 0.000628 0.00308 0.0415 0.8386 
LOG( SIZE) 0.3800 0.3154 1 .4522 0.2282 
LIDO -3.2117 1 .1903 7.2807 0.0070 
PROPFIX -1.2733 1 .1148 1 .3046 0.2534 
P/E 0.00176 0.00924 0.0361 0.8493 
M8V -0.0122 0.0154 0.6240 0.4296 
GROUMMY -0.1147 0.3722 0.0949 0.7580 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.990 0.975 1.005 
TUT 0.993 0.975 1. 010 
GEAR 1 .001 0.995 1.007 
LOG(SIZE) 1.462 0.788 2.713 
LIQO 0.040 0.004 0.415 
PROPFIX 0.280 0.031 2.488 
P/E 1 .002 0.984 1.020 
MBV 0.988 0.959 1.018 
GROUMMY 0.892 0.430 1.849 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
66.2 
33.4 
0.4 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept 2.3468 -0.9831 
RSHF -0.0104 -0.0269 
TUT -0.00752 -0.0257 
GEAR 0.000628 -0.00562 
LOG(SIZE) 0.3800 -0.2322 
uao -3.2117 -5.7352 
PROPFIX -1.2733 -3.5057 
P/E 0.00176 -0.0172 
M8V -0.0122 -0.0433 
GRDUMMY -0.1147 -0.8472 
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0.327 
0.328 
0.165 
0.664 
Limits 
5.9190 
0.00416 
0.0102 
0.00672 
1.0093 
-1.0347 
0.1940 
0.0205 
0.0177 
0.6183 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95'11 Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.990 0.973 1 .004 
TUT 1.0000 0.993 0.975 1 .010 
GEAR 1.0000 1.001 0.994 1.007 
LOG(SIZE) 1.0000 1.462 0.793 2.744 
LIQD 1. 0000 0.040 0.003 0.355 
PROPFIX 1.0000 0.280 0.030 1.214 
P/E 1.0000 1 .002 0.983 1 .021 
MBV 1.0000 0.988 0.958 1 .018 
GRDUMMY 1 .0000 0.892 0.429 1.856 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95'11 Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.990 0.975 1.005 
TUT 1.0000 0.993 0.975 1. 010 
GEAR 1.0000 1.001 0.995 1.007 
LOG(SIZE) 1.0000 1.462 0.788 2.713 
LIQD 1.0000 0.040 0.004 0.415 
PROPFIX 1.0000 0.280 0.031 2.488 
P/E 1.0000 1.002 0.984 1.020 
MBV 1.0000 0.988 0.959 1.018 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 0.892 0.430 1.849 
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Mixed Data (-1) - Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
FIN.MD_DEA1 
DV 
2 
104 
binary legit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
2 
DV 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
52 
52 
Probability modeled is DV='1', 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness·of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pearson 
94 
94 
101.9992 
96.0421 
1 . 0851 
1.0217 
Number of unique profiles: 104 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 121.999 
se 148.819 148.443 
-2 Log L 144.175 101.999 
A-Square 0.3334 Max·rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.2690 
0.4221 
0.4445 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
IYald 
42.1754 
31.6463 
20.7838 
254 
9 
9 
9 
<.0001 
0.0002 
0.0136 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 3.5630 2.4876 2.0516 0.1520 
RSHF -0.0459 0.0196 5.4740 0.0193 
TUT -0.0518 0.0188 7.6459 0.0057 
GEAR 0.00917 0.00476 3.7066 0.0542 
LOG(SIZE) 0.2250 0.4855 0.2148 0.6430 
LJQD -3.2318 1-3283 5.9192 0.0150 
PROP FIX -0.2918 1 .4548 0.0402 0.8410 
P/E -0.00880 0.00748 1 .3836 0.2395 
MBV -0.0467 0.0257 3.3089 0.0689 
GRDUMMY 0.1751 0.5756 0.0925 0.7610 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.955 0.919 0.993 
TUT 0.949 0.915 0.985 
GEAR 1 .009 1 .000 1.019 
LOG(SIZE) 1 .252 0.484 3.243 
LIOD 0.039 0.003 0.534 
PROP FIX 0.747 0.043 12.929 
P/E 0.991 0.977 1.006 
MBV 0.954 0.908 1.004 
GRDUMMY 1- 191 0.386 3.681 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
83.8 
16.1 
0.1 
2704 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept 3.5630 -1.2121 
RSHF -0.0459 -0.0878 
TUT -0.0518 -0.0920 
GEAR 0.00917 0.000218 
LOG(SIZE) 0.2250 -0.7239 
LIOD -3.2318 -6.1051 
PROP FIX -0.2918 -3.2890 
PiE -0.00880 -0.0289 
MBV -0.0467 -0.1003 
GRDUMMY 0.1751 -0.9625 
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0.678 
0.679 
0.342 
0.839 
Limits 
8.6561 
-0.0112 
-0.0181 
0.0190 
1.2010 
-0.7863 
2.6175 
0.00403 
0.00229 
1 .3162 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.955 0.916 0.989 
TUT 1.0000 0.949 0.912 0.982 
GEAR 1.0000 1.009 1.000 1.019 
LOG( SIZE) 1.0000 1. 252 0.485 3.324 
LIOD 1 .0000 0.039 0.002 0.456 
PROPFIX 1.0000 0.747 0.037 13.701 
P/E 1.0000 0.991 0.972 1.004 
MBV 1 .0000 0.954 0.905 1.002 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 1 .191 0.382 3.729 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.955 0.919 0.993 
TUT 1.0000 0.949 0.915 0.985 
GEAR 1.0000 1.009 1.000 1 .019 
LOG(SIZE) 1.0000 1. 252 0.484 3.243 
LIOD 1.0000 0.039 0.003 0.534 
PROPFIX 1.0000 0.747 0.043 12.929 
P/E 1.0000 0.991 0.977 1.006 
MBV 1 .0000 0.954 0.908 1.004 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 1 .191 0.386 3.681 
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Industry Relative Data - Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
FIN. IRD_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher•s scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
2 
DV 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
78 
78 
Probability modeled is DV;'1'. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV;1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion DF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
130 
130 
194.6245 
152.7021 
1 . 4971 
1 .1746 
Number of unique profiles: 140 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 216.262 214.625 
se 221.312 245.123 
·2 Log L 216.262 194.625 
R-Square 0.1295 Max-rescaled R-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA;O 
0.0002 
0.0847 
0.1727 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
21.6374 
18.3540 
15.0110 
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9 
9 
9 
0.0101 
0.0313 
0.0906 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.0832 0.6843 0.0148 0.9032 
RSHF ·0.1512 0.0991 2.3264 0.1272 
TUT 0.00796 0.0852 0.0087 0.9256 
GEAR 0.4629 0.2429 3.6334 0.0566 
LOG( SIZE) ·0.2159 0.2673 0.6523 0.4193 
UQD ·0.00382 0.00443 0.7436 0.3885 
PROP FIX 0.6050 0.5278 1 .3139 0.2517 
P/E ·0.1037 0.1045 0.9844 0.3211 
MBV ·0.4313 0.2840 2.3070 0.1288 
GADUMMY -0.0626 0.3822 0.0269 0.8698 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.860 0.708 1.044 
TUT 1 .008 0.853 1 .191 
GEAR 1.589 0.987 2.557 
LOG(SIZE) 0.806 0.477 1. 361 
UQD 0.996 0.988 1.005 
PROPFIX 1 .831 0.651 5.152 
P/E 0.902 0.735 1.106 
MBV 0.650 0.372 1.133 
GRDUMMY 0.939 0.444 1.987 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
69.3 
30.3 
0.4 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept 0.0832 -1.2608 
RSHF ·0.1512 ·0.3616 
TUT 0.00796 -0.1704 
GEAR 0.4629 ·0.00528 
LOG( SIZE) ·0.2159 -0.7509 
UQD -0.00382 ·0.0127 
PROPFIX 0.6050 ·0.4212 
P/E ·0.1037 ·0.3299 
MBV ·0.4313 -1.0130 
GRDUMMY -0.0626 ·0.8173 
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0.390 
0.391 
0.196 
0.695 
Limits 
1 . 4361 
0.00617 
0.1767 
0.9539 
0.3045 
0.00475 
1 . 6617 
0.0904 
0.1097 
0.6877 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.860 0.697 1.006 
TUT 1.0000 1.008 0.843 1.193 
GEAR 1. 0000 1.589 0.995 2.596 
LOG(SIZE) 1. 0000 0.806 0.472 1.356 
LIOD 1. 0000 0.996 0.987 1.005 
PROPFIX 1. 0000 1.831 0.656 5.268 
P/E 1. 0000 0.902 0.719 1.095 
MBV 1. 0000 0.650 0.363 1.116 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 0.939 0.442 1.989 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.860 0.708 1.044 
TUT 1.0000 1.008 0.853 1. 191 
GEAR 1.0000 1.589 0.987 2.557 
LOG( SIZE) 1.0000 0.806 0.477 1. 361 
LIOD 1.0000 0.996 0.988 1 .005 
PROPFIX 1.0000 1.831 0.651 5.152 
P/E 1.0000 0.902 0.735 1 .106 
MBV 1.0000 0.650 0.372 1.133 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 0.939 0.444 1 .987 
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Variation Data-Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
FIN. VD_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered Total 
Value DV Frequency 
78 
2 0 78 
Probability modeled is DV='1'. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
146 
146 
188.7886 
151.1913 
1 .2931 
1.0356 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 208.789 
se 221.312 239.287 
·2 Log l 216.262 188.789 
A-Square 0.1615 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.0098 
0.3672 
0.2153 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
27.4734 
17 0 8357 
17.0134 
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9 
9 
9 
0.0012 
0.0371 
0.0485 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.2361 0.1937 1.4864 0.2228 
RSHF -0.0746 0.0639 1.3662 0.2425 
TUT -0.0250 0.0102 5.9929 0.0144 
GEAR 0.0181 0.0576 0.0987 0.7534 
LOG(SIZE) . 9. 5456 4.5760 4.3514 0.0370 
LIOD -0.7555 0.9321 0.6570 0.4176 
PROPFIX 0.8329 0.8882 0.8793 0.3484 
P/E 0.0327 0.0556 0.3466 0.5561 
M8V -0.2599 0.1912 1. 8478 0.1740 
GRDUMMY -0.1203 0.3302 0.1328 0.7156 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.928 0.819 1.052 
TUT 0.975 0.956 0.995 
GEAR 1 .018 0.910 1.140 
LOG(SIZE) <0.001 <0. 001 0.562 
LIQD 0.470 0.076 2.920 
PROPFIX 2.300 0.403 13.114 
P/E 1.033 0.927 1 .152 
M8V 0.771 0.530 1 .122 
GRDUMMY 0.887 0.464 1.694 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
72.7 
26.9 
0.4 
6084 
Somerst 0 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
0.457 
0.459 
0.230 
0.729 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept 0.2361 -0.1393 0.6228 
RSHF -0.0746 -0.2426 -0.00149 
TUT -0.0250 -0.0463 -0.00617 
GEAR 0.0181 -0.0742 0.1583 
LOG(SIZE) -9.5456 -19.9679 -1.6749 
LIOD -0.7555 -2.6513 1.0587 
PROP FIX 0.8329 -0.8496 2.6849 
P/E 0.0327 -0.0652 0.1832 
M8V -0.2599 -0.6892 0.0900 
GRDUMMY -0.1203 -0.7744 0.5299 
261 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1 .0000 0.928 0.785 0.999 
TUT 1 .0000 0.975 0.955 0.994 
GEAR 1.0000 1 .018 0.929 1.172 
LOG(SIZE) 1.0000 <0.001 <0.001 0.187 
LIQD 1.0000 0.470 0.071 2.883 
PROPFIX 1.0000 2.300 0.428 14.657 
P/E 1.0000 1.033 0.937 1. 201 
MBV 1.0000 0.771 0.502 1.094 
GRDUMMY 1. 0000 0.887 0.461 1.699 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.928 0.819 1.052 
TUT 1.0000 0.975 0.956 0.995 
GEAR 1.0000 1 .018 0.910 1.140 
LOG(SIZE) 1.0000 <0.001 <0.001 0.562 
LIQD 1 .0000 0.470 0.076 2.920 
PROP FIX 1 .0000 2.300 0.403 13.114 
P/E 1.0000 1 .033 0.927 1 .152 
MBV 1.0000 0.771 0.530 1.122 
GRDUMMY 1 .0000 0.887 0.464 1.694 
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Time Data (-1) - Non-Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
NONFIN.TD_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
2 
DV 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
78 
78 
Probability modeled is DV='1 •. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·B) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pears on 
149 
149 
201.1166 
154.7632 
1 .3498 
1 .0387 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 215.117 
se 221.312 236.466 
-2 Log L 216.262 201.117 
A-Square 0.0925 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr 
Likelihood Ratio 15.1453 6 
Score 14.5297 6 
Wald 13.4446 6 
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0.0029 
0.3564 
0.1234 
> ChiSq 
0.0192 
0.0242 
0.0365 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.1725 0.5313 0.1054 0.7454 
SepChair -0.9473 0.3580 7.0002 0.0082 
NEXOutDir -0.0595 0.0496 1-4378 0.2305 
NEX 0.0438 0.1316 0- 1109 0.7391 
XOutDir -0.00242 0.0750 0-0010 0.9743 
DirShHo 0.00107 0.0119 0.0080 0.9289 
BigShHo 0.0185 0.00983 3.5432 0.0598 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
SepChair 0.388 0.192 0.782 
NEXOutDir 0.942 0.855 1 .038 
NEX 1-045 0.807 1 .352 
XOutDir 0.998 0.861 1.155 
DirShHo 1 .001 0.978 1 .025 
BigShHo 1 .019 0.999 1.038 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
67.5 
32.3 
0.2 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept 0.1725 -0.8728 
SepChair -0.9473 -1.6624 
NEXOutDir -0.0595 -0.1623 
NEX 0.0438 -0.2150 
XOutDir -0.00242 -0.1544 
DirShHo 0.00107 -0.0226 
BigShHo 0.0185 -0.00044 
0.352 
0.353 
0.177 
0.676 
Limits 
1.2240 
-0.2542 
0.0334 
0.3051 
0.1447 
0.0246 
0.0383 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
SepChair 1 .0000 0.388 0.190 0.776 
NEXOutDir 1.0000 0.942 0.850 1.034 
NEX 1.0000 1.045 0.807 1.357 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.998 0.857 1. 156 
DirShHo 1 .0000 1 .001 0.978 1.025 
BigShHo 1.0000 1.019 1 .000 1.039 
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Wald .Co~f.idence •Interval' for· 'Adjusted Odds; ·RaHos' 
Effect !~-ni-t ~E~Yl'~~t.~ '95% Conhdi!nce ~~11!!t1;s 
. - . -". -- ·-
SepChair ,1:!oooo 6.3BB 0.:192 'o'.71!J! 
NEXOutDir :h!OOOO 0.:942, 0,,855: 1.038 
NEX ,1::0000 ,11:045• 0.807• ·1.352 
XOutDir :1.'0000 0 :il96 0 -11~1 1.155, 
Dir'ShHo 1•:0000 1\i001 0.978 1.025 
BigShHo woooo ,1i.019i 0;999: 1 .038 
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Time Data (-2) - Non-Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
NONFIN.TO_DER2 
DV 
2 
156 
binary legit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered Total 
Value DV Frequency 
1 78 
2 0 78 
Probability mode led is DV=' 1' . 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·B) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion DF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
146 
146 
212.9018 
155.7907 
1. 4582 
1.0671 
Nu•ber of unique profiles: 153 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 226.902 
se 221.312 248.251 
-2 Log L 216.262 212.902 
A-Square 0.0213 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.0003 
0.2744 
0.0284 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
3.3601 
3.3287 
3.2673 
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6 
6 
6 
0.7625 
0.7666 
0.7746 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.00641 0.4655 0.0002 0.9890 
SepChair -0.4644 0.3534 1. 7268 0.1888 
NEXOutDir -0.0311 0.0477 0.4260 0.5139 
NEX -0.0707 0.1118 0.4001 0.5270 
XOutDir -0.0192 0.0715 0.0723 0.7881 
DirShHo 0.00549 0.0103 0.2842 0.5939 
BigShHo 0.00761 0.00961 0.6276 0.4282 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
SepChair 0.628 0.314 1.256 
NEXOutDir 0.969 0.883 1.064 
NEX 1.073 0.862 1.336 
XOutDir 0.981 0.853 1.128 
DirShHo 1.006 0.985 1.026 
BigShHo 1.008 0.989 1.027 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
56.1 
42.9 
1.0 
6084 
Somers' 0 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept 0.00641 -0.9164 
SepChair -0.4644 -1.1647 
NEXOutDir -0.0311 -0.1296 
NEX 0.0707 -0.1479 
XOutDir -0.0192 -0.1649 
DirShHo 0.00549 -0.0146 
BigShHo 0.00761 -0.0112 
0.131 
0.133 
0.066 
0.566 
Limits 
0.9220 
0.2253 
0.0605 
0.3043 
0.1215 
0.0261 
0.0267 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
SepChair 1.0000 0.628 0.312 1 .253 
NEXOutOir 1.0000 0.969 0.878 1.062 
NEX 1. 0000 1.073 0.863 1.356 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.981 0.848 1 .129 
DirShHo 1.0000 1.006 0.985 1 .026 
BigShHo 1. 0000 1.008 0.989 1 .027 
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.- -~-~---
,, 
Wald •Conf:idence. !nter\(al ,for. ,'Ad) ustedl cidds_IAatios. 
E#eci: Unit !Estimate: 95% Conf.idimce Limits 
'sepCtiair 1!.0000: '0.628' :o·. 31'4 ,1:.'256 
NEXOut!Jir 1!.()\>00' 0.969 0'.883 :f.'064 
NEX 1!.0000· 1 .073i 0.862 {,'336' 
XOutDir' 1•.0000• 0.981 ,0·.853 f-128' 
DirShHO· 1:,0000· 1.-.006: 0.985 :1:JQ26' 
BigStiHo 1.0000i ·1.008! 0·.989 ;11:027 
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~xed Data - Non-Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
NONFIN.MD_DER1 
DV 
2 
104 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
2 
DV 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
52 
52 
Probability mode led is DV=' 1'. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
97 
97 
124.4245 
103.9876 
1 .2827 
1.0720 
Number of unique profiles: 104 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 138.425 
se 148.819 156.935 
·2 Log L 144.175 124.425 
R·Square 0.1730 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.0317 
0.2954 
0.2306 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
19.7501 
16.0626 
12.5269 
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6 
6 
6 
0.0031 
0.0133 
0.0512 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 2.3875 0.8323 8.2282 0.0041 
SepChair -1.2198 0.4750 6.5956 0.0102 
NEXOutDir -0.0427 0.0582 0.5366 0.4639 
NEX -0.0825 0.1490 0.3067 0. 5797 
XOutDir -0.2912 0.1457 3.9982 0.0455 
OirShHo -0.0462 0.0192 5.7839 0.0162 
BigShHo -0.00898 0.0119 0.5678 0.4511 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95'11 Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
SepChair 0.295 0- 116 0.749 
NEXOutDir 0.958 0.855 1 .074 
NEX 0.921 0.688 1.233 
XOutDir 0.747 0.562 0.994 
DirShHo 0.955 0.920 0.991 
BigShHo 0.991 0.968 1 .014 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
75.5 
24.3 
0.1 
2704 
Somers· D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95'11 Confidence 
Intercept 2.3875 0.8515 
SepChair -1 .2198 -2.1939 
NEXOutDir -0.0427 -0.1590 
NEX -0.0825 -0.3827 
XOutDir -0.2912 -0.6158 
DirShHo -0.0462 -0.0861 
BigShHo -0.00898 -0.0328 
0.512 
0.513 
0.258 
0.756 
Limits 
4.1442 
-0.3166 
0.0715 
0.2085 
-0.0484 
-0.0102 
0.0143 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95'11 Confidence Limits 
SepChair 1.0000 0.295 0. 111 0.729 
NEXOutDir 1.0000 0.958 0.853 1.074 
NEX 1 .0000 0.921 0.682 1. 232 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.747 0.540 0.953 
DirShHo 1.0000 0.955 0.918 0.990 
BigShHo 1.0000 0.991 0.968 1.014 
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Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
SepChair 1 .0000 0.295 0.116 0.749 
NEXOutDir 1. 0000 0.958 0.855 1.074 
NEX 1. 0000 0.921 0.688 1.233 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.747 0.562 0.994 
DirShHo 1.0000 0.955 0.920 0.991 
BigShHo 1 .0000 0.991 0.968 1. 014 
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Variation Data - Non-Financial 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
NONFIN.VD_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered Total 
Value DV Frequency 
1 1 78 
2 0 78 
Probability modeled is DV='1'. 
Model Convergence Status 
Complete separation of data points detected. 
WARNING: The maximum likelihood estimate does not exist. 
WARNING: The LOGISTIC procedure continues in spite of the above warning. Results shown 
are based on the last maximum likelihood iteration. Validity of the model fit is 
questionable. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness·of·Fit Statistics 
Criterion 
Deviance 
Pear son 
DF 
144 
144 
Value 
0.0314 
0.0157 
Value/OF 
0.0002 
0.0001 
Number of unique profiles: 152 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 16.031 
se 221.312 40.430 
·2 Log L 216.262 0.031 
R·Square 0.7499 Max·rescaled R·Square 
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Pr > ChiSq 
1 .0000 
1 .0000 
0.9999 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
Analysis 
Chi-Square 
216.2305 
156.0000 
1.3310 
of Maximum Likelihood 
Standard 
OF 
7 
7 
7 
Pr > ChiSq 
<.0001 
<.0001 
0.9876 
Estimates 
Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -9.2027 11.3569 0.6566 0.4178 
DV 18.4055 16.3605 1. 2656 0.2606 
SepChair -398E-18 15.5605 0.0000 1.0000 
NEXOutDir 9.66E-17 2.5922 0.0000 1.0000 
NEX -187E-18 5.2979 0.0000 1.0000 
XOutOir 3.23E-16 3.5613 0.0000 1.0000 
DirShHo 2.84E-17 0.7374 0.0000 1.0000 
BigShHo -106E-18 0.4942 0.0000 1 .0000 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
DV >999.999 <0.001 >999.999 
SepChair 1.000 <0.001 >999.999 
NEXOutDir 1.000 0.006 160.868 
NEX 1.000 <0.001 >999.999 
XOutDir 1.000 <0.001 >999.999 
DirShHo 1 .000 0.236 4.243 
BigShHo 1.000 0.380 2.634 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence 
Intercept -9.2027 
DV 18.4055 8.7085 
SepChair -398E-18 
NEXOutDir 9.66E-17 
NEX -187E-18 
XOutDir 3.23E-16 
DirShHo 2.84E-17 
BigShHo ·106E-18 
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1 .000 
1 .000 
0.503 
1.000 
Limits 
-3.6690 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
DV 1 .0000 >999.999 >999.999 
SepChair 1 .0000 1 .000 
NEXOutDir 1 .0000 1 .000 
NEX 1 .0000 1.000 
XOutDir 1 .0000 1.000 
DirShHo 1.0000 1.000 
BigShHo 1.0000 1.000 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
DV 1.0000 >999.999 <0.001 >999.999 
SepChair 1.0000 1.000 <0.001 >999.999 
NEXOutDir 1.0000 1.000 0.006 160.868 
NEX 1.0000 1.000 <0. 001 >999.999 
XOutDir 1.0000 1.000 <0. 001 >999.999 
DirShHo 1.0000 1.000 0.236 4.243 
BigShHo 1.0000 1.000 0.380 2.634 
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Total Time Data (-1) - Combined 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
IAodel Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
COMB.TID_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
1 
2 
DV 
1 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
78 
78 
Probability modeled is DV='1'. 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness·Of·Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
140 
140 
174.5368 
156.9870 
1 .2467 
1. 1213 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 206.537 
se 221.312 255.334 
-2 Log L 216.262 174.537 
A-Square 0.2347 Max-rescaled R·Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.0253 
0. 1548 
0.3129 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
41.7252 
36.6608 
28.7073 
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15 
15 
15 
0.0002 
0.0014 
0.0175 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.7845 1.9955 0.1545 0.6942 
RSHF -0.0102 0.00747 1 .8723 0.1712 
TUT -0.0228 0.0109 4.4182 0.0356 
GEAR 0.00267 0.00390 0.4688 0.4935 
LOG( SIZE) 0.4142 0.4012 1 .0658 0.3019 
LIOD -2.3957 1 .0464 5.2418 0.0221 
PROP FIX 0.2335 1 .2360 0.0357 0.8502 
P/E -0.00624 0.00683 0.8352 0.3608 
MBV -0.0255 0.0201 1 -6144 0.2039 
GRDUMMY 0.1332 0.4233 0.0991 0.7530 
SepChair -0-7817 0.3973 3.8722 0.0491 
NEXOutDir -0.0509 0.0550 0.8570 0.3546 
NEX -0.0239 0.1501 0.0254 0.8733 
XOutDir -0.0107 0.0821 0.0170 0.8964 
DirShHo 0.0139 0-0142 0.9687 0.3250 
BigShHo 0.0245 0.0112 4.7801 0.0288 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.990 0.975 1.004 
TUT 0.977 0.957 0.998 
GEAR 1.003 0.995 1.010 
LOG(SIZE) 1.513 0.689 3.322 
LIOD 0.091 0.012 0.708 
PROP FIX 1.263 0- 112 14.240 
P/E 0.994 0.981 1.007 
MBV 0.975 0.937 1.014 
GRDUMMY 1. 143 0.498 2.619 
SepChair 0.458 0.210 0.997 
NEXOutOir 0.950 0.853 1.059 
NEX 0.976 0.728 1.310 
XOutDir 0.989 0.842 1.162 
DirShHo 1 .014 0.986 1.043 
BigShHo 1.025 1.003 1.048 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
78.5 
21.4 
0.2 
6084 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
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0.571 
0.572 
0.287 
0.786 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept 0.7845 -3.1497 4.7333 
RSHF -0.0102 -0.0279 0.00214 
TUT -0.0228 -0.0458 -0.00321 
GEAR 0.00267 -0.00490 0.0105 
LOG( SIZE) 0.4142 -0.3591 1 . 2261 
LIDO -2.3957 -4.5973 -0.4523 
PROP FIX 0.2335 -2.2220 2.6588 
P/E -0.00624 -0.0226 0.00563 
M8V -0.0255 -0.0661 0.0135 
GRDUMMY 0.1332 -0.6968 0.9720 
SepChair -0.7817 -1.5742 -0.00972 
NEXOutOir -0.0509 -0.1657 0.0517 
NEX -0.0239 -0.3221 0.2718 
XOutDir -0.0107 -0.1775 0.1499 
DirShHo 0.0139 -0.0137 0.0423 
BigShHo 0.0245 0.00303 0.0472 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1 .0000 0.990 0.972 1.002 
TUT 1.0000 0.977 0.955 0.997 
GEAR 1.0000 1.003 0.995 1. 011 
LOG( SIZE) 1 .0000 1 .513 0.698 3.408 
LIDO 1 .0000 0.091 0.010 0.636 
PROPFIX 1 .0000 1.263 0.108 14.278 
P/E 1 .0000 0.994 0.978 1.006 
MBV 1.0000 0.975 0.936 1 .014 
GRDUMMY 1.0000 1 .143 0.498 2.643 
SepChair 1.0000 0.458 0.207 0.990 
NEXOutDir 1. 0000 0.950 0.847 1 .053 
NEX 1 .0000 0.976 0.725 1. 312 
XOutDir 1. 0000 0.989 0.837 1. 162 
DirShHo 1.0000 1.014 0.986 1. 043 
BigShHo 1.0000 1.025 1.003 1.048 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1 .0000 0.990 0.975 1 .004 
TUT 1.0000 0.977 0.957 0.998 
GEAR 1 .0000 1.003 0.995 1 .010 
LOG( SIZE) 1.0000 1. 513 0.689 3.322 
LIOD 1 .0000 0.091 0.012 0.708 
PROPFIX 1 .0000 1.263 0. 112 14.240 
P/E 1 .0000 0.994 0.981 1.007 
MBV 1 .0000 0.975 0.937 1 .014 
GRDUMMY 1 .0000 1.143 0.498 2.619 
SepChair 1 .0000 0.458 0.210 0.997 
NEXOutDir 1.0000 0.950 0.853 1 .059 
NEX 1 .0000 0.976 0.728 1. 310 
XOutOir 1.0000 0.989 0.842 1. 162 
DirShHo 1 .0000 1 .014 0.986 1. 043 
BigShHo 1.0000 1.025 1.003 1 .048 
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Tota~ Reduced Time Data (-1) - Combined 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Oata Set 
Response Variable 
COMB.TD_DER1 
DV 
2 
156 
Numbar of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
binary legit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value DV 
Total 
Frequency 
2 
1 
0 
Probability modeled is DV='1'. 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Model Convergence Status 
78 
78 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
36.6608 15 0.0014 
Step 1. Effect RSHF entered: 
Model Convergance Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 208.259 
se 221 .312 214.358 
-2 Log L 216.262 204.259 
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A-Square 0.0741 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.0987 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi·Square Df Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 12.0032 0.0005 
Score 9.2871 0.0023 
Wald 8.1753 0.0042 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square Df Pr > ChiSq 
27.3407 14 0.0174 
Step 2. Effect SepChair entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 202.771 
se 221 .312 211 .921 
-2 Log L 216.262 196.771 
A-Square 0.1174 Max ·re scaled A-Square 0.1566 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi·Square Df Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
19.4905 
17.0070 
14.4637 
2 
2 
2 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi·Square Df Pr > ChiSq 
20.8155 13 0.0767 
Step 3. Effect LIOD entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
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< .0001 
0.0002 
0.0007 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AJC 218.262 199.445 
se 221.312 211.645 
-2 Log L 216.262 191 .445 
A-Square 0.1471 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.1961 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
24.8167 
21.7969 
17.9005 
3 
3 
3 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
15.9264 12 0.1946 
Step 4. Effect TUT entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
<. 0001 
<. 0001 
0.0005 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 196.241 
se 221 .312 211.490 
-2 Log L 216.262 186.241 
A-Square 0. 1751 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.2334 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi- Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
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30.0212 
26.5690 
4 
4 
<.0001 
<.0001 
Wald 21.4464 4 0.0003 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
11.5999 11 0.3945 
Step 5. Effect RSHF is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 198.615 
se 221.312 210.814 
-2 Log L 216.262 190.615 
A-Square 0.1516 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.2021 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
25.6473 
22.9654 
19.0562 
3 
3 
3 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
15.7446 12 0.2032 
Step 6. Effect P/E entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
<.0001 
<.0001 
0.0003 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Criterion 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Only 
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Intercept 
and 
Covariates 
AIC 
se 
-2 Log L 
A-Square 0.1724 
218.262 
221.312 
216.262 
196.752 
212.001 
186.752 
Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.2296 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
29.5103 
26.1470 
21.2224 
4 
4 
4 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
11.7359 11 0.3838 
Step 7. Effect P/E is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
< .0001 
<.0001 
0.0003 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 218.262 198.615 
se 221.312 210.814 
-2 Log L 216.262 190.615 
A-Square 0.1516 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.2021 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
25.6473 
22.9654 
19.0562 
3 
3 
3 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square Of Pr > ChiSq 
15.7446 12 0.2032 
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< .0001 
< .0001 
0.0003 
NOTE: Model building terminates because the last effect entered is removed by the Wald 
statistic criterion. 
Step Entered 
RSHF 
2 SepChair 
3 LIDO 
4 TUT 
5 
6 PIE 
Effect 
Removed 
RSHF 
PIE 
OF 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 
NUIIber 
In 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
Score 
Chi-Square 
9.2871 
7.4478 
5.1967 
4.7581 
4.2936 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
2.9473 
2.7787 
Pr > Ch1Sq 
0.0023 
0.0064 
0.0226 
0.0292 
0.0860 
0.0383 
0.0955 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion DF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pear son 
Parameter 
Intercept 
TUT 
LJOD 
SepChair 
152 
152 
190.6146 
155.9088 
1.2540 
1.0257 
Number of unique profiles: 156 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square 
3.0077 0.9082 10.9677 
-0.0290 0.0101 8.2629 
·2.3399 0.8542 7.5044 
·0.8671 0.3548 5.9749 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
TUT 0.971 0.952 0.991 
LJQD 0.096 0.018 0.514 
SepChair 0.420 0.210 0.842 
Pr 
0.0184 
0.3973 
> ChiSq 
0.0009 
0.0040 
0.0062 
0.0145 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
72.2 
27.5 
0.2 
6084 
SomerS 1 0 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
0.447 
0.448 
0.225 
0.724 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept 3.0077 1 .3140 4.8989 
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TUT -0.0290 -0.0501 -0.0106 
LIOD 
SepChair 
-2.3399 -4.1149 -0.7412 
-0.8671 -1.5738 -0.1787 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect 
TUT 
uoo 
SepChair 
Unit 
1.0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
Estimate 
0.971 
0.096 
0.420 
95% Confidence Limits 
0.951 
0.016 
0.207 
0.989 
0.477 
0.836 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect 
TUT 
LIOD 
SepChair 
Unit 
1 .0000 
1.0000 
1.0000 
284 
Estimate 
0.971 
0.096 
0.420 
95% Confidence Limits 
0.952 
0.018 
0.210 
0. 991 
0.514 
0.842 
Total Mixed Data - Combined 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
Number of Response· Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
COMB.TMD DER1 
DV 
2 
104 
binary logit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value 
2 
DV 
0 
Total 
Frequency 
52 
52 
Probability modeled is DV='1', 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion OF Value Value/OF Pr > ChiSq 
Deviance 
Pearson 
88 
BB 
83.9706 
89.1140 
0.9542 
1.0127 
Number of unique profiles: 104 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 115.971 
se 146.819 158.281 
-2 Log L 144.175 83.971 
A-Square 0.4395 Max-rescaled A-Square 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
0.6018 
0.4468 
0.5860 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
60.2040 
41.9178 
24.6341 
285 
15 
15 
15 
<.0001 
0.0002 
0.0551 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 7.2264 3.6997 3.8151 0.0508 
RSHF -0.0570 0.0216 6.9801 0.0082 
TUT -0.0506 0.0205 6.0944 0.0136 
GEAR 0.00970 0.00513 3.5739 0.0587 
LOG( SIZE) -0.0168 0.7246 0.0005 0.9815 
LIOD -2.1281 1 .4595 2.1260 0.1448 
PROPFIX -0.9912 1 .8567 0.2850 0.5934 
P/E -0.00650 0.0104 0.3940 0.5302 
MBV -0.0513 0.0292 3.0916 0.0787 
GRDUMMY -0.5515 0.6715 0.6745 0.4115 
SepChair -1.4627 0.6594 4.9202 0.0265 
NEXOutDir -0.0520 0.0785 0.4389 0.5077 
NEX -0.1429 0.1952 0.5364 0.4639 
XOutDir ·0.3766 0.1902 3.9197 0.0477 
DirShHo -0.0573 0.0297 3.7107 0.0541 
BigShHo -0.00822 0.0166 0.2440 0.6213 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.945 0.905 0.985 
TUT 0.951 0.913 0.990 
GEAR 1. 010 1.000 1.020 
LOG( SIZE) 0.983 0.238 4.069 
LIOD 0.119 0.007 2.080 
PROPFIX 0.371 0.010 14. 123 
P/E 0.994 0.974 1.014 
MBV 0.950 0.897 1.006 
GRDUMMY 0.576 0.155 2.148 
SepChair 0.232 0.064 0.843 
NEXOutDir 0.949 0.814 1 .107 
NEX 0.867 0.591 1. 271 
XOutDir 0.686 0.473 0.996 
DirShHo 0.944 0.891 1 .001 
BigShHo 0.992 0.960 1 .025 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
89.4 
10.4 
0.1 
2704 
Somers· D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
0.790 
0. 791 
0.399 
0.895 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept 
RSHF 
7.2264 
-0.0570 
0.1532 
-0.1034 
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14.9280 
-0.0191 
TUT -0.0506 -0.0948 ·0.0137 
GEAR 0.00970 0.000506 0.0209 
LOG(SIZE} ·0.0168 ·1 .4608 1.4333 
LIOD -2.1281 ·5.1852 0.6450 
PROPFIX ·0.9912 -4.5845 2.9922 
P/E -0.00650 ·0.0337 0.00970 
MBV ·0.0513 ·0.1116 0.00517 
GRDUMMY ·0.5515 ·1.9111 0.7586 
SepChair -1.4627 ·2.8608 ·0.2280 
NEXOutDir ·0.0520 ·0.2103 0.1019 
NEX -0.1429 ·0.5453 0.2311 
XOutDir ·0.3766 ·0.8234 ·0.0831 
DirShHo ·0.0573 -0.1207 -0.00238 
BigShHo -0.00822 -0.0420 0.0241 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1. 0000 0.945 0.902 0.981 
TUT 1. 0000 0.951 0.910 0.986 
GEAR 1. 0000 1 .010 1.001 1 .021 
LOG(SIZE} 1. 0000 0.983 0.232 4.193 
LIOD 1. 0000 0.119 0.006 1 .906 
PROP FIX 1. 0000 0.371 0.010 19.929 
P/E 1. 0000 0.994 0.967 1 .010 
MBV 1. 0000 0.950 0.894 1 .005 
GRDUMMY 1. 0000 0.576 0.148 2.135 
SepChair 1 .0000 0.232 0.057 0.796 
NEXOutDir 1. 0000 0.949 0.810 1 .107 
NEX 1. 0000 0.867 0.580 1 .260 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.686 0.439 0.920 
DirShHo 1 .0000 0.944 0.886 0.998 
BigShHo 1. 0000 0.992 0.959 1.024 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1 .0000 0.945 0.905 0.985 
TUT 1.0000 0.951 0.913 0.990 
GEAR 1 .0000 1.010 1.000 1 .020 
LOG(SIZE} 1 .0000 0.983 0.238 4.069 
LIOD 1.0000 0.119 0.007 2.080 
PROPFIX 1 .0000 0.371 0.010 14. 123 
P/E 1.0000 0.994 0.974 1.014 
MBV 1.0000 0.950 0.897 1.006 
GRDUMMY 1 .0000 0.576 0.155 2.148 
SepChair 1.0000 0.232 0.064 0.843 
NEXOutDir 1. 0000 0.949 0.814 1.107 
NEX 1.0000 0.867 0.591 1. 271 
XOutDir 1.0000 0.686 0.473 0.996 
DirShHo 1.0000 0.944 0.891 1.001 
BigShHo 1.0000 0.992 0.960 1.025 
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Total Reduced Mixed Data - Combined 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Model Information 
Data Set 
Response Variable 
COMB.TMD_DER1 
DV 
2 
104 
Number of Response Levels 
Number of Observations 
Model 
Optimization Technique 
binary legit 
Fisher's scoring 
Response Profile 
Ordered 
Value DV 
Total 
Frequency 
2 0 
Probability modeled is DV~'1'. 
Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Model Convergence Status 
52 
52 
Convergence criterion (GCONV~1E·8) satisfied. 
Residual Chi·Square Test 
Chi· Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
41.9178 15 0.0002 
Step 1. Effect TUT entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV~1E·8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 136.671 
se 148.819 141.960 
·2 Log L 144.175 132.671 
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A-Square 0.1047 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.1396 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi·Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 11.5034 0.0007 
Score 10.4277 0.0012 
Wald 9.1007 0.0026 
Residual Chi·Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
35.0941 14 0.0014 
Step 2. Effect SepChair entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-6) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 131 .633 
se 146.619 139.766 
·2 Log L 144.175 125.833 
A-Square 0.1617 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.2156 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
18.3415 
16.4246 
14.0622 
2 
2 
2 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
29.9110 13 0.0049 
Step 3. Effect ASHF entered: 
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0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0009 
Model Convergence Status 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 120.584 
se 148.819 131.162 
-2 Log L 144.175 112.584 
A-Square 0.2620 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.3493 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi- Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
31 .5903 
23.2278 
17.3092 
3 
3 
3 
Residual Ghi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
23.7781 12 0.0218 
Step 4. Effect DirShHo entered: 
Model Convergence Status 
< .0001 
< .0001 
0.0006 
Convergence criterion (GGONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 115.674 
se 148.819 128.896 
-2 Log L 144.175 105.674 
A-Square 0.3094 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.4125 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 38.5006 4 <.0001 
290 
Score 
Wald 
Step 5. Effect XOutOir entered: 
27.4531 
20.3197 
4 
4 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi·Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
18.7541 11 0.0657 
Model Convergence Status 
<.0001 
0.0004 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·8) satisfied. 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 110.971 
se 148.819 126.838 
·2 Log L 144.175 98.971 
A-Square 0.3525 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.4700 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi· Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
45.2033 
29.7906 
20.5713 
5 
5 
5 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square OF Pr > ChiSq 
13.2040 10 0.2125 
Step 6. Effect TUT is removed: 
Model Convergence Status 
<.0001 
<.0001 
0.0010 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E·B) satisfied. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates 
AIC 146.175 113.061 
se 148.819 126.283 
·2 Log L 144.175 103.061 
A-Square 0.3265 Max-rescaled A-Square 0.4354 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=O 
Test Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 
Score 
Wald 
41.1140 
25.7309 
19.3324 
4 
4 
4 
Residual Chi-Square Test 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq 
16.4282 11 0. 1260 
< .0001 
<.0001 
0.0007 
NOTE: No (additional) effects met the 0.05 significance level for entry into the model. 
Step Entered 
1 TUT 
2 SepChair 
3 RSHF 
4 OirShHo 
5 XOutDir 
6 
Summary of Stepwise Selection 
Effect Number Score Wald 
Reaoved Of In Chi-Square Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
1 10.4277 0.0012 
2 6.7314 0.0095 
3 7.8811 0.0050 
4 6.3768 0.0116 
5 5.4095 0.0200 
TUT 4 3.6505 0.0561 
Deviance and Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
Criterion 
Deviance 
Pearson 
OF 
99 
99 
Value 
103.0607 
91.7697 
Value/OF 
1 . 0410 
0.9270 
Number of unique profiles: 104 
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Pr > ChiSq 
0.3700 
0.6841 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Standard Wald 
Parameter OF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 3.1119 0.7555 16.9685 <.0001 
RSHF -0.0631 0.0183 1 L 8752 0.0006 
SepChair -1.5927 0.5490 8.4166 0.0037 
XOutDir -0.3472 0.1532 5- 1361 0.0234 
DirShHo -0.0517 0.0199 6.7529 0.0094 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Point 95% Wald 
Effect Estimate Confidence Limits 
RSHF 0.939 0.906 0.973 
SepChair 0.203 0.069 0.596 
XOutDir 0.707 0.523 0.954 
DirShHo 0.950 0.913 0.987 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Percent Concordant 
Percent Discordant 
Percent Tied 
Pairs 
82.5 
17.4 
0.1 
2704 
Somers' D 
Gamma 
Tau-a 
c 
Profile Likelihood Confidence 
Interval for Parameters 
0.651 
0.652 
0.329 
0.826 
Parameter Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
Intercept 
RSHF 
SepChair 
XOutDir 
DirShHo 
3. 1119 
-0.0631 
-1.5927 
-0,3472 
-0.0517 
1.7702 
-0.1028 
-2.7414 
-0.6827 
-0.0941 
4.7631 
-0.0306 
-0.5656 
-0.0827 
-0.0153 
Profile Likelihood Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1.0000 0.939 0.902 0.970 
SepChair 1.0000 0.203 0.064 0.568 
XOutDir 1 .0000 0.707 0.505 0.921 
DirShHo 1. 0000 0.950 0.910 0.985 
Wald Confidence Interval for Adjusted Odds Ratios 
Effect Unit Estimate 95% Confidence Limits 
RSHF 1 .0000 0.939 0.906 0.973 
SepChair 1. 0000 0.203 0.069 0.596 
XOutDir 1 .0000 0.707 0.523 0.954 
DirShHo 1 .0000 0.950 0.913 0.987 
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APPENDIXG 
THE SOFfWARES USED IN THE STUDY 
The simulator used for the implementing the Artificial Neural Network modelling was 
NEUframe Professional, version 3.0- 1997 Neural Computer Sciences (NCS). 
The Logistic Regression analyses were performed by using SAS, release 8.2- 1999. 
SAS Institute Inc. 
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